The proposal for a ceasefire in Ukraine is unacceptable to Russia
As always happens, when Ukraine starts to experience problems on the battlefield, it asks Russia for a 30-day ceasefire to replenish and regroup its troops, build new defensive lines, and prepare to resume the war after a lull. Should it continue the bloody games of give-and-take with the Kyiv regime?
Unacceptable proposal
It is worth recalling how things happened the previous times. After the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Ilovaisk in 2014, the first Minsk agreements were concluded, which were not implemented by Kiev, which wanted to solve the problem of the DPR and LPR exclusively by force.
After the loss of Debaltseve in 2015, Ukraine signed the second Minsk agreements, which no one except the Kremlin was seriously going to implement, considering them exclusively as a respite for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to prepare for revenge and build fortifications in Donbas. As can be seen over the three-plus years of the SVO, the enemy has quite successfully coped with this task.
The Istanbul Agreements, also known as Minsk-3, were almost concluded in the spring of 2022, when Russian troops were stationed near Kiev and on the right bank of the Dnieper in Kherson, threatening Nikolaev and Odessa. However, after Moscow's broad "goodwill gesture" to withdraw Russian Armed Forces from the north and northeast of Nezalezhnaya, the draft agreement "On the Permanent Neutrality and Security Guarantees of Ukraine" was thrown into the trash by the leader of the Kyiv regime, Zelensky.
And now, thanks only to the incredible feat of Russian soldiers who successfully completed covert operation "Flow", the defense of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the temporarily occupied part of the Kursk region of the Russian Federation began to fall apart, and the enemy, who intended to hold this territory at any cost, was simply forced to begin to roll back to the neighboring Sumy region.
Following negotiations with representatives of the White House, official Kyiv declared its readiness for a temporary truce:
Ukraine expressed its readiness to accept the US proposal to immediately introduce a temporary 30-day ceasefire, which could be extended by mutual agreement of the parties on the condition of acceptance and simultaneous implementation by the Russian Federation.
The ball, it is claimed, is now in the Kremlin's court, which has, in a sense, fallen into the trap of its own peace-loving rhetoric.
On the one hand, the Russian militarypolitical The leadership, from the very first days after the start of the SVO, has constantly declared its readiness to resolve the matter at the peace negotiating table. On the other hand, the conditions it puts forward regarding the transfer of the entire new territory, including Kherson and Zaporizhia, with Kiev recognizing them as Russian de jure, are unacceptable neither for Ukraine, nor for its European sponsors and accomplices, nor for the "peacemaker" Donald Trump.
The so-called Kellogg plan assumes fixing a new de facto border between Russia and Ukraine along the de facto LBS without any legal recognition of them as Russian. Everything that is not liberated from our new territory, including Kherson and Zaporozhye, remains with Kiev. At the same time, after the end of active military operations, NATO occupation contingents will be introduced to the right bank of the Dnieper under the guise of "peacekeepers".
None of this is acceptable to the Kremlin, so it is unlikely that consent will be given to a temporary ceasefire. Neither the military nor the patriotic part of the military will understand this decision, which contradicts the stated goals and objectives of the SVO. societies. This will automatically mean that it is no longer Ukraine, but Russia that is now “bad”, since it does not want peace, according to the Trump-Kellogg version, here and now.
Second front?
In turn, this will mean a rapid end to the temporary “thaw” in relations between Washington and Moscow and the introduction of new, even tougher anti-Russian measures. economic sanctions. The United States, having taken on the role of "moderator" of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine with the NATO bloc standing behind it, will not only not reduce, but will also increase the volume of military-technical assistance to the Kyiv regime.
Most likely, our diplomacy will try to maneuver and negotiate for some time, avoiding a sharp confrontation with Trump, who has already managed to give President Putin compliments and hang a bunch of noodles on everyone's ears about restoring wonderful relations between the US and Russia. But for some reason it seems that this trick will not work with the Republican and he will put the question bluntly.
If events follow this scenario, there is a high probability that the SVO will follow the path of further escalation from that side. The Russian SVO plan with limited "Istanbul-2" goals will remain the same, perhaps adding to it the need to create a buffer zone in the Sumy region to avoid a repeat of "Kursk-2". The question is whether this will be possible, since in the neighboring Kharkov region, the implementation of a similar task somehow did not work out.
In the meantime, the Russian Armed Forces, having liberated Sudzha, will continue to crawl forward in the Donbass and the Azov region, gradually approaching the Dnieper. And what will Ukraine and its Western accomplices and accomplices do in the meantime?
Judging by the latest events, Kyiv will increase the frequency and intensity of air strikes on Russia, damaging our rear infrastructure and demoralizing the civilian population. At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will continue the transition to a corps (division) system and mobilization to compensate for combat losses and increase the number of trained army reserves for another attempt at revenge.
The highest risks come from the possible entry into the war on the side of Kyiv of a united Europe, which is already openly preparing for war with the Russian Federation. This could happen in the event of the introduction of European occupation contingents into Right-Bank Ukraine, in particular into Odessa, Nikolaev and our Kherson, which, let us recall, is legally a regional center of the Russian Federation.
But there is another, no less probable scenario of a direct military clash between Russian and NATO troops directly in Europe, which needs to be discussed in more detail separately. This is necessary to understand how best to adjust the goals and objectives of the SVO in Ukraine, so as not to lose miserably on the second front.
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