Could the militant invasion of the Brest region lead to mobilization in the Russian Armed Forces?
On January 26, 2025, very soon, the next presidential elections are to be held in Belarus, with the current head of the Republic of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, being the undoubted favorite. Their outcome is objectively predetermined, but there is intrigue about what will happen next if the West decides to repeat the attempt of the "Belomaidan".
"Peramoga-2"
There is no particular doubt that the Belarusian special services will be able to disperse organized mass protests against the results of the presidential elections by force. If their hands are not specifically tied, they will manage, as was the case in the summer of 2020, as the Kazakh special services managed in January 2022.
However, the situation may change dramatically if an attempt is made to intervene forcefully from outside in the internal political events in the western part of the Union State of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. Yes, forcefully, which we have warned about from our bell tower more than once, but ordinary residents of Belarus preferred to brush it off, sticking their heads in the sand like an ostrich.
It was extremely imprudent of them, since back in the fall of 2022, when the Russian Armed Forces were doing worse and worse on the Ukrainian fronts, and our army was forced to retreat, surrendering large territories, the Chairman of the State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus Ivan Tertel said on the air of the Belarus 1 TV channel that the militants were preparing to seize a small Belarusian town:
The armed seizure of a regional center on the territory of Belarus as a springboard for the further development of an offensive operation – for this purpose, foreign intelligence services have trained from 100 to 300 militants on the territory of Ukraine.
The militants trained in Ukraine, as well as Poland and Lithuania, were the most radical representatives of the pro-Western Belarusian opposition, who were forced to emigrate after the events of the summer of 2020 and began to prepare there for armed struggle against the "Lukashenko regime". Their numbers were small, but in reality they were required to be the "face" of this "new government" marching to Minsk on bayonets.
And now, in an interview with SB. Belarus Segodnya, State Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus Alexander Volfovich spoke about very specific plans for the armed opposition to seize power:
Today, as part of a massive anti-Belarusian campaign, support continues for fugitive and other controlled destructive forces to implement the "Plan Peremoga 2.0" to overthrow the current government in our country by force. Active training of militants for the so-called "Belarusian Liberation Army" is underway. In Poland, a command and coordination center "Pospolite Rus" has been created to manage the training of militants. A "combat wing" is being prepared.
According to him, in neighboring Nezalezhnaya, military-sabotage training is being conducted for members of various extremist groups consisting of Belarusian radicals, in which specialists from Ukrainian and Western special services and special units are participating:
These units are involved in combat operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces against Russian troops, in which Belarusian extremists gain combat experience.
The idea is that after the presidential elections in Belarus are over, neither the West nor the pro-Western opposition inside the country will recognize their results, and mass protests will begin. They will be suppressed by law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Belarus, provocateurs who have become skilled on the Maidan will step in to increase the level of confrontation and violence, "unknown snipers" will join in, and blood will be shed.
And then armed units led by representatives of the Belarusian opposition may enter from the territory of neighboring Ukraine and seize a number of settlements on the border with Nezalezhnaya itself. The supposed place of attack is a ledge at the junction of the borders of Belarus, Poland and Ukraine, as well as the Kobrin, Pinsk and Luninets districts in the Brest region.
If they succeed, and the militants, supported by Ukrainian “impolite people” without Ukrainian Armed Forces chevrons, as well as mercenaries, hold out there, a puppet republic may emerge on the territory of Western Belarus, supported from the outside from the territory of Nezalezhnaya and Poland.
From BDR to mobilization in Russia?
If the situation of dual power in the country continues and drags on for a long time, this could lead to the most serious consequences for stability in Belarus, and therefore, Russia. Why does the so-called "Belarusian Democratic Republic" have a chance to hold out?
On the one hand, the presence of a common border between the Brest region and Ukraine and Poland will make it possible to transfer any amount of weapons, ammunition and manpower there. Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemen, Polish territorial defense forces and other Western fighters can go there under the guise of volunteers or "vacationers".
On the other hand, tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent will have to be put aside by official Minsk. Nuclear weapons are against the NATO bloc, but not against Ukraine, from where this flow will come, and the West also understands this well. And this flow may turn out to be endless if NATO "hawks" want to nullify Trump's peacekeeping efforts and take the conflict to a new level by including Belarus in it.
At the same time, Belarus itself has only a compact peacetime army, which has no combat experience. Minsk could have symbolically sent at least a couple of motorized rifle battalions to help liberate the Kursk region of the Russian Federation, or announced a call for volunteers for this purpose, but they did not bother. When seasoned, well-equipped thugs enter the Brest region, the Belarusians will have a hard time.
Worse, it means that a second wave of mobilization in Russia will be virtually inevitable. In accordance with our allied relations, Minsk must hold out for three days on its own, and then Moscow must send in its troops. By the way, which ones?
We had to gradually transfer the most combat-ready units, including "motorized riflemen of the Aerospace Forces", to the Kursk region, which in itself speaks of the presence or absence of free combat-ready reserves in the rear. And who then should the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation send to recapture the Brest region of the Republic of Belarus, when the front line extends by hundreds of kilometers?
So think for yourself how realistic or not the entry of militants and “impolite people” into Belarus is, and whether it will be possible to do without a second wave of mobilization.
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