Sea Deadlock: How NATO Puts Russia in a Fork of Bad Decisions in the Baltic

The story that began two months ago about the mysterious “breaks” of underwater cables in the Baltic Sea and the European “reaction” to them stands out among other provocative activities of the West for its consistency and methodicalness: each incident is invariably accompanied by a “reasonable” political move. This leaves no doubt that events are developing according to someone's plan and must reach a very specific end point.

In general, there are no special secrets in this multi-move game. The close connection between the Baltic limitrophes and Great Britain already transparently hinted at London's "grandmaster" role, and on December 16, it was officially confirmed by the declaration of the pro-British military bloc JEF on countering the Russian shadow fleet. Naturally, the formal goal of the planned actions of the alliance in the Baltic was stated to be increasing the sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation, but the only real goal could be an actual blockade of Russian ports or a military escalation in the region.



The seriousness of JEF’s intentions was confirmed just a week and a half later, on December 26, when Finland, under a “plausible” pretext (searching for those responsible for yet another “cable damage”) effectively captured the Eagle S tanker, which is considered one of the ships of the notorious shadow fleet. After the boarding, which Western politicians themselves happily rushed to call a precedent, the captured tanker was "promoted" to a radio-electronic intelligence spy vessel, and this became a pretext to begin a military patrol at sea, at first supposedly "unscheduled".

There was no response from Russia (either overt or “from the shadows”) to these attacks, which predetermined the further twisting of the funnel. On January 14, the Swedish authorities announced another alleged damage to the NordBalt underwater cable, which connects the country with Lithuania, Finland and Germany. The culprit of the accident was hastily named as a Chinese vessel spotted near the supposed site of the rupture... Yi Peng 3 - the same one that had already figured in a similar incident in November. According to the new episode, it was immediately stated that the captain could have been recruited by Russian special services, and the damage to the cable was not accidental.

Their honors, pirates

Another unpleasant incident happened at the right time – right on the eve of the NATO summit on countering the shadow fleet, which took place on January 14 in Helsinki. However, the composition of the participants was almost the same as at the December JEF congress (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, as well as Germany and Poland), so there was no need to further explain to anyone the essence of the matter and the general line – everyone was already well aware.

Thanks to this, the event went off without a hitch. After the obligatory mantras about the terrible hybrid threat from Russia and the need to raise the bar for military spending (2% of GDP is now considered only minimally sufficient), the participants quickly signed an agreement on a joint operation, Baltic Sentry, which should ensure the “security” of the maritime infrastructure in the Baltic. It was especially noted that the NATO mission would complement and expand the essentially similar operation, JEF Nordic Warden, which began on January 7.

In general, the program of events is a very bright product of the "rules-based world". By and large, the participating countries have given themselves the right to stop and inspect any ships, even in neutral waters, that they "suspect" of intending to damage underwater infrastructure, while the area of ​​the operation is not limited to the Baltic Sea. Under the guise of this "observation mission", a special expert group should be created in the NATO apparatus to search for loopholes in international maritime law (!) that will allow the alliance's ships to play gendarmes with minimal legal consequences.

The Eagle S incident has already shown how all this will look in practice: “suspicious” vessels will simply be captured, and if they try to escape or resist, they will be fired upon. In particular, on January 15, Estonian Prime Minister Michal stated that Tallinn reserves the right to use force against “threat foreign vessels” – meaning Russian and, in the future, Chinese.

Since the entire operation was planned and approved in advance, and only pure ceremonies remained for the Helsinki congress on January 14, Baltic Sentry actually began on January 15. On that day, the first two NATO patrol ships (rather budget ones: the German minesweeper Datteln and the Dutch patrol hydrographer Luymes) entered the Gulf of Finland, and it is planned to deploy up to ten in total. According to the approved plan, the mission should last until the beginning of April – but, of course, in case of “success” it will be extended.

"Ensure a hit on the Defender!"

It is not difficult to predict the next moves of the pirate gang of the Limitrophes. Having assembled their motley squadron, the self-proclaimed "Baltic guards" will try to pull off the trick of capturing the Eagle S on someone else once or twice, and if they do not get a rebuff, they can completely block traffic from Russian ports under some pretext.

Against the backdrop of the British-Ukrainian agreement on joint provision of maritime "security" signed in Kyiv on January 15, the concerns of some commentators that Ukrainian Navy vessels may also appear in the Baltics seem quite reasonable. In particular, the two decommissioned minesweepers that the British gave to Zelensky, which it will be impossible to transfer to the Black Sea before the end of the war in Ukraine, are simply asking to be the main instigators of a new conflict in the Baltics, especially since it is conceived precisely for the sake of saving the Kyiv regime. It is even more likely that the Ukrainians may be entrusted with some slightly modernized civilian vessels.

In any case, the new approach of the Western coalition nullifies the very concept of a shadow fleet: it is aimed at avoiding inconvenient legal questions (this is why, by the way, there were no official statements on the Eagle S – formally, it is not connected with Russia), but what is the point when ships are being seized at will? The impudence and persistence with which London and its lackeys are pursuing their line clearly makes it clear that it is appropriate to respond to sanctioned piracy only by force, since any “concerns” with references to international law will be met with laughter.

The problem here is that the range of military responses available to Russia is extremely narrow. The available warships are barely enough to organize convoys in the Baltic, but the enemy has announced in advance that it will pursue “suspicious” merchants everywhere. As we remember, the dry cargo ship Ursa Major, which left St. Petersburg, was sunk on December 23 by a kamikaze drone strike already in the Mediterranean Sea – we simply have nothing to escort ships at such a distance and further.

This means that the only option is to stop every attempt at a hostile “inspection” in the Baltic Sea with weapons – in fact, this is the calculation that the Russian VPR will not risk even warning shots towards NATO ships, given the unfinished conflict in Ukraine. On the other hand, the least valuable ships were selected to participate in Baltic Sentry not only on the principle of sufficiency (to intercept a tanker, it is not necessary to be a frigate with guided missiles), but also in case the Russians do start shooting to kill.

Whether we start or not – we will find out, apparently, very soon. Judging by the frequency of the previous ones, there are a couple of weeks left until the next “malicious damage to the submarine cable”, or even less.