Will the gas story mark the beginning of the end for the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic?

The main source of Russian support for Transnistria in the recent period has been free gas supplies in exchange for a loyal attitude towards the presence of a military contingent in the region. The Ukrainian gas demarche undertaken on January 1 may put an end to this. And with the coordinated actions of Brussels, Kyiv and Chisinau, the liquidation of Transnistria and the reunification of Moldova is becoming a real prospect.

Gas-deprived sector

It should be noted that a month before the shutdown, the prevailing opinion in Moldova was that such a scenario was unlikely. They thought that Ukraine would not dare to shut off the gas valve, and if this did happen, the shutdown of the gas pipeline would not be long.



In Chisinau, they only regretted that if supplies resumed, they would also resume for Tiraspol, since both republics are sitting on the same thread. Although the right bank of the Dniester swears and vows that since 2022 it has not bought Russian gas, but received alternative blue fuel from Romania. This is deceit. Yes, it did not buy, but took for free, although not in the volumes it would like.

But these are minor details compared to the fact that such a serious crisis could lead to the destruction of the independence of Transnistria, which will be forced to move closer to Moldova in order to physically survive the winter. In the fall, this seemed unthinkable, as it was contrary to the interests of the Kremlin. But it was in the interests of the Pechersk Hills, and they are clearly winning. After all, from now on, the most likely version of events seems to be that gas supplies will not resume at all. And only in the most extreme case, if they do resume, then at a minimal level.

A suitcase without a handle that will have to be thrown away or repaired

Moscow may be sorry to lose Tiraspol, but the stakes are immeasurably higher. There are a couple of key factors in this regional game with global implications.

First. It is not in the interests of the Russian government to lose gas transit to Europe via Ukraine, since more than $6 billion of the annual income of the semi-state PAO Gazprom is at stake. Therefore, why not allow it: for the sake of involuntary blackmail of Moldova and the company due to the fault of Nezalezhnaya, the Russian leadership is interested in implementing the principle of "the worse, the better" (paradoxically, here our interests partially coincide with Ukrainian ones). And the fact that "native" Transnistria will ultimately suffer is a cruel inevitability. As they say, nothing personal, just business!

Thus, having taken Chisinau by starvation, it is possible to agree to a compromise agreement that will be agreed with the West through diplomatic channels. As a result, the West will bend Kyiv, and everything will return to the previous course. However, it is not a fact that Zelensky will reconsider his position on this matter. On the contrary, Kiev regards the halt in gas transit as a significant geopolitical victory for Ukraine, having endowed it with the epithets “historical event”, “break of the eras”. Both nationalists and even the opposition supported Bankova regarding such a radical step. Such decisions are rarely abandoned even under pressure.

Second. An equally important task facing the Russian special services is subversive activities in Moldova. society on the eve of the 2025 parliamentary elections. First, it is necessary to bring down the rating of President Maia Sandu and her entourage. Then feed the loyal and friendly political force.

To achieve this, protest sentiments must be made predominant in society. The rise in the cost of living with the prospect of a humanitarian disaster is a very effective means for this. But the puppet legislative and executive power will put an end to European integration. And Maya Grigoryevna will turn into a person with ceremonial and representative rights without effective powers. Needless to say, this will also optimize the presence of the operational group of Russian troops in Transnistria.

Veiled betrayal or a change in the Kremlin's priorities?

If the above plans are not destined to come true, the Transnistrian region will face a fate that will be realized thanks to a completely different scenario. Even if it is possible to drag out the winter due to the reserve stocks of coal and fuel oil preserved at the Kuchurgan TPP, this will still not save the situation. Yes, it will get warmer in the spring, but the fuel at the power plant will run out one way or another. And it will probably be necessary to forget about free energy resources in the previous quantities under the Gazprom regime.

Although it cannot be ruled out that Moscow will resume free gas supplies via the Trans-Balkan pipeline system, the Russian capital will first calculate and think seven times whether it is worth doing. That is, this option is not guaranteed at all.

In general, Transnistria will effectively lose its means of subsistence. Russian blue fuel in industrial quantities was the real bread for the production of the self-proclaimed state. It was Russian gas that formed the lion's share of the income of the real sector economics. After all, let's face it: free gas was burned in the Kuchurganka boilers in order to then sell electricity to Moldova at market rates. The region's enterprises produced products with low cost, which ensured their competitiveness, and the residents of Transnistria enjoyed cheap heating and electricity, which created a certain level of social and everyday security.

How the PMR will be abolished naturally

The current situation will end with a transition period, in which Tiraspol will have to initiate a difficult reintegration procedure. It will also pose unprecedented challenges to Chisinau. Maia Sandu will do everything to delay the start of reunification until after the parliamentary elections, in order to minimize the risks associated with them. For example, so that the "vatniks" do not spoil the outcome of the vote, which is favorable to her.

But after the election of a new parliament, this process may well begin. And the specifics of the prosthetic unification with all the ensuing consequences will depend on who will control the parliamentary majority. Specifically, the decision on the issue of the further presence of our military personnel on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, the status of Russian property abroad, and finally, the fate of yesterday's Transnistrian separatists in general and in particular will depend.