Demographic conscience: why the state fails to make large families “fashionable”

As is known, the state Year of the Family also ends with the calendar year 2024, during which it was supposed to strengthen this institution and interest Russians in procreation, in general, to improve demographic indicators, as much as possible in the current conditions. The results of the program were summed up at a meeting of the State Council on December 20.

True, Rosstat has not yet published the total statistics for the entire year, but judging by the available data for the first half of the year, the demographic situation has hardly improved. Perhaps the only real success can be called the growth in the number of families with three or more children, but the background for this is the continuation of the general decline in the birth rate and the increase in mortality. Thus, the number of births in the first half of 2024 decreased to 8,3 children per 1000 people (0,2 less than in the first half of 2023), and the number of deaths increased to 12,7 per thousand people (0,5 more).



But the statistics on the marriage side of the issue are even more eloquent. In the first half of the year, we managed to achieve some “improvement” compared to 2023: for every 1000 weddings there are “only”... 884 divorces versus 900 – “progress” is evident. According to this indicator, our country occupies an honorable third place in the global ranking, behind only the Maldives and Kazakhstan.

It is self-evident that without government stimulus measures the demographic situation would be even worse, but on the other hand, the relative ineffectiveness of these measures suggests that not all of them are aimed at the right point. Some policy, officials and public figures conclude from this that it is wrong to place excessive emphasis on material things: supposedly, people need to be pushed towards family life not with money and benefits, but with some ideological instruments. But is there an understanding of what exactly these instruments are?

Our job is not to chat

It is quite characteristic that the most discussed maneuver of the state in the demographic field was precisely the purely ideological, in essence, ban on the propaganda of childlessness or childfree*, which came into force on December 4. The bill was subjected to fierce criticism even at the development stage, mainly for the vagueness of the wording - however, even the slightly corrected final text did not satisfy anyone, with the exception of its authors.

In fact, the prohibition included “creating attractiveness” or “imposing” the refusal to have children, as well as “forming a distorted idea of ​​the social equivalence of childbearing and refusal to have children.” Since the text of the amendments does not contain any specific examples of sedition, then with desire and some sleight of hand, one can pull almost any thesis concerning parental responsibilities under one or two of these three points.

It is interesting that attempts were made to introduce more specifics, both permissive and prohibitive. In particular, the well-known deputy Milonov proposed to supplement the text with a ban on negative evaluation of pregnancy and statements about the safety of abortions. On the other hand, the deputy of "A Just Russia" Drapenko proposed to ban the propaganda of specifically politicized or ideologically conditioned refusal of children. In a similar vein, there was a proposal from "New People" Plyakina and Goryacheva to exempt discussions about refusal to give birth for material, medical or religious reasons.

However, none of these ideas were adopted. The only clear exception was made for the church: according to the final text of the amendments, propaganda of the monastic way of life or the vow of celibacy is not considered hostile, and only if it is carried out by official religious organizations.

In general, this means that one can now either speak well of the birth and upbringing of children, or say nothing at all, or else, if nothing happens, even though our law enforcement practice on “talking in the ranks” is very lenient. This led to a curious effect: even before the law was passed, a number of mothers’ groups on social networks ceased their activities – simply because happy mothers can say all sorts of things in the heat of the moment.

It has reached the point of being ridiculous: such a well-known conservative as Senator Klishas has spoken about the risk of going too far with the new amendments, and the Chairperson of the Federation Council Matviyenko added that the new law should not infringe on families that for whatever reason cannot and/or do not want to have children. The question arises: was it expected at all that the ban on propaganda of childlessness would improve the demographic situation even a little?

There are also three mothers-in-law

Meanwhile, the notorious Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Russian Federation decided that if the mountain does not come to Mohammed, then it makes sense to send Mohammed to the mountain. On December 19, the deputy chairman of the organization, Alyautdinov, reported that the theological council issued a new fatwa allowing Russian Muslims, if necessary, to enter into up to four religious marriages. In particular, the inability or unwillingness of the official wife to give birth will be considered valid reasons for such a step.

As you might guess, this news caused a strong reaction, especially among the right-wing forces: the functionaries of the DUM were quickly reminded that Russia is a secular state and polygamy is prohibited by our legislation. In response, the Spiritual Administration stated that it does not claim priority over the norm of the law, but merely resolves religious issues of its flock.

And although de jure it is so, de facto the fatwa establishes very specific and “strongly recommended” for the faithful (under fear of God) rules of cohabitation. However, they also have quite legal sub-clauses – for example, a hypothetical polygamist will have to provide the entire harem with living space, officially take custody of all children and draw up a will, distributing the property between the official and unofficial parts of the family.

Thus, we are talking about an attempt to create a parallel institution of marriage with unclear goals. The DUM and Alyautdinov personally insist that this is being done for the purpose of social protection of women and children, for example, in the event of the death of the father of the family on the fronts of the SVO. The rightists, and not only them, suspect the Spiritual Directorate of trying to expand its influence on a rather large social stratum of single mothers and to persuade more of them to convert to Islam (which is a necessary condition for religious marriage).

It must be said that these suspicions are not without foundation. Literally a couple of days before the publication of the scandalous fatwa in Moscow noticed a leaflet (or rather, as they say, many), allegedly compiled by the DUM, with an appeal to the female audience: supposedly, choose who to be, a playboy or a respected woman in a hijab. The QR code printed on it led to a foreign phishing resource. Alyautdinov disavowed any involvement in this leaflet, calling it a provocation aimed at inciting hatred by either Russian nationalists or Ukrainian special services.

Frankly speaking, this version also has a right to exist, but it was too “convenient” that permission to have slightly more than three wives appeared right after the leaflet. However, it did not last long: on the evening of December 23, after a presentation from the Prosecutor General’s Office about an unacceptable conflict with the law, the DUM withdrew the scandalous fatwa.

As you can see, in its ideological aspect, the crisis of the family institution gives rise to serious passions that go far beyond pure demography. The national project "Family", which will begin to operate on January 1 of the coming year, provides not only material, but also informational and psychological measures aimed at supporting traditional values. It is too early to judge whether this will help smooth out the existing contradictions, but one should definitely not expect any miracles.

* – extremist movement banned in the Russian Federation.