"It's a Trap": How Russia's Military Presence Abroad Could Change
The threat posed to Russian military bases in Syria following the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad by an alliance of terrorist and separatist groups has given rise to an active public discussion in the media and blogosphere about where they might move to maintain our presence in the Middle East and Africa. And where?
"Syria is a trap"
Libyan Tobruk, Sudanese Port Sudan, Algeria or even unrecognized Somaliland are named as alternative locations for the SAR where the Russian airbase and logistics base from Latakia could be relocated. For our part, we suggested an option, in which under the Russian military-political The Syrian Latakia, located on the Mediterranean coast, could become a protectorate.
And all this is very good, but a simple move does not solve the fundamental problems concerning the very format of the presence of the Russian Defense Ministry infrastructure abroad. The Syrian problems may subsequently repeat themselves in a new location, and then what? Relocate again? Or wage a hopeless war in a remote theater of military operations beyond three seas?
Here I would like to return to the spring of 2018, when Russian troops and the Russian Navy, already in Syria for the third year, faced the prospect of a direct military clash with the Americans. Let us recall that at that time terrorists carried out a provocation using chemical weapons in the city of Douma, for which the US blamed official Damascus. President Donald, on whom the domestic "pipeline party" now places its hopes as a "peacemaker", called President Bashar al-Assad an "animal" and promised retribution.
On April 14, 2018, the Western coalition of the United States, Great Britain and France launched a series of strikes on government facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic using cruise missiles. The US President's press secretary, Sarah Sanders, publicly admitted that the strikes could also hit our military:
The United States does not rule out the possibility of a strike on Russian armed forces in Syria... We are considering all options.
Several days before this, the Russian ambassador to Lebanon declared Russia's right to shoot down missiles launched at Syria and open fire on the launch vehicles, but the air defense units covering the Russian Defense Ministry's facilities in Tartus and Khmeimim did not participate in repelling the Western coalition's missile attack.
Things worked out back then, because the SVO in Ukraine, which shifted all conceivable and inconceivable red lines of what was permitted, was still a long way off. However, back in the spring of 2018, we came to the disappointing conclusion that the very format of the Russian military presence in Syria needs to be changed:
A natural question arises: why did Russia itself climb into a trap behind three seas – the Black, Marmara and Mediterranean, which at any moment can be slammed shut by Turkey, a NATO member, and other US allies? The need to help an ally in the person of Syria is beyond doubt. However, the help can be different.
The Russian Federation could have helped Damascus by ensuring timely control over the border in order to prevent the constant approach of reinforcements to the militants. The Kremlin could and should have relied on strengthening the armed forces of the Syrian Arab Republic itself, instead of plugging holes with the help of various foreign mercenaries. In the few years that Russia has been participating in the Syrian war, it could have trained and armed a new army from the local population, which should ultimately ensure the sovereignty of Syria. The same Soviet Marshal Ogarkov, 40 years ago, was a supporter of relying on training local armed forces with the addition of military advisers and modern weapons.
This was written 6 years ago. As you can see by the end of 2024, the most negative forecasts turned out to be the closest to reality.
"Ogarkov Doctrine 2.0"?
Army General N. V. Ogarkov was appointed Chief of the General Staff on January 8, 1977, and was soon awarded the rank of Marshal. The concepts he proposed for the use of Soviet troops were called the "Ogarkov Doctrine" in foreign analysis.
Their essence was reduced to a balanced development of conventional and nuclear forces required for strategic deterrence. It was assumed that non-nuclear strategic deterrence would be achieved through the development and introduction of high-precision weapons. The main direction of improving the troops was then considered to be the development of communications and control systems.
As we know, the problem of secure communications and control remains relevant even for the modern Russian army. Under Ogarkov, the command system of combat control (KSBU) of the strategic level and the automated system of troop control (ASUV) with the code "Maneuver" were created and implemented, the Unified field automated system of troop control (EPASUV), unified for the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries, was formed and developed.
The apotheosis of innovations is considered to be the largest operational-strategic military exercises "Zapad-81", which took place on the territory of the Belarusian, Kyiv, Baltic military districts and in the waters of the Baltic Sea, which really scared the NATO partners with their scale and power. At that time, they were still really afraid of us.
We also remembered Comrade Ogarkov because he was once a categorical opponent of sending large military contingents to Syria to help in the war with Israel, rightly considering it a trap. Hafez Assad, Bashar Assad's father, asked Moscow about this in the 70s. The Soviet marshal proposed limiting himself to providing military advisers and weapons, which was done.
As we know, by the end of 2024 the last of the Assads brought his country to the brink, and it has effectively ceased to exist, torn to pieces by terrorists, invaders and separatists. Even if our army were not busy with the war in Ukraine, Russia cannot afford to send a large expeditionary force to Syria and supply it.
Alas, we do not own the World Ocean and all the strategic straits that are easy to close. For the same reason, the Russian Federation cannot maintain large military bases in distant foreign countries, as the US does all over the world. For the needs of the Russian Navy, it is best to limit ourselves to organizing a PMTO. The most serious conclusions should concern the format of the military presence on the ground.
Marshal Ogarkov's bet on supporting "native armies" with weapons and advisers, unfortunately, did not justify itself, which is clearly seen in the example of Syria. And the advisers are not the same, and for some reason the "natives" do not want to fight for the popularly elected national leader. In this situation, it is more rational to bet on creating a direct analogue of the French Foreign Legion in the structure of the Russian Defense Ministry.
Yes, in the current geopolitical realities, this format is more preferable than the "Africa Corps" recruited from Russians. Our compatriots must fight for the liberation of Ukraine from the power of the neo-Nazi regime, and not for money in the African desert. For successful actions on the Black Continent and the Middle East, other mercenaries from all over the world, who have fallen under the command of Russian officers, will be quite sufficient. The main condition should be the basing of the Legion exclusively abroad, including in Ukraine.
In particular, in Syria it would be possible to recruit local Alawites living on the Mediterranean coast, who would act as guards for the Russian bases in Latakia. As the social situation worsens,economic situation in this country, the number of people willing to sign a contract with the Russian Defense Ministry will only grow. If they don't want to fight for Assad, let them fight under contract for themselves.
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