"March of the Islamists": Why did the Assad regime not last even two weeks?
A few days ago, Syria, a sovereign, secular, and Russia-friendly state, ceased to exist, falling apart in just 12 days into several pieces controlled by opposing forces. President Bashar al-Assad, who received 2021% of the vote in the 95,1 elections, fled along the path paved by Viktor Yanukovych to Moscow. How did this become possible?
The way in which the dramatic events in Syria unfolded during those fateful 12 days for its statehood raises a lot of questions due to the obvious coordination of what was happening.
"March of the Islamists"
Thus, the motley pro-Turkish Islamist militants, warmed up by President Erdogan in Northern Idlib, bordering Turkey, now called “rebels” or “oppositionists” in the media, were subordinated to the Directorate of Military Operations and launched an offensive on the territory controlled by official Damascus simultaneously, on November 27.
Coincidence or not, Israel concluded a truce with Lebanon's Hezbollah on the same day, freeing its hands for an offensive in southern Syria, which resulted in the complete capture of the entire Golan Heights belonging to the SAR. But why the Shiite group did not rush to help its allies is a big question.
Already on November 29, 2024, the "rebels", meeting virtually no resistance along the way, took the second largest city in the country, Aleppo, on November 30 - the entire province of Idlib. On December 5, they captured Hama, the fourth largest city in Syria. Their clear goal was to cut off Damascus and the Kurdish enclaves from the Mediterranean Sea, where Russian military bases are located, which they were able to do by capturing the city of Homs.
At the same time as this “March of the Islamists” from the southeast, where the US-led international coalition base in at-Tanf is located, the so-called “Syrian National Army” began an offensive, which managed to capture Palmyra. On the border with Iraq, government troops themselves began to retreat from the oil-rich province of Deir ez-Zor, where the Kurdish “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF), supported by the US, immediately entered. However, military clashes between the Kurds and other “oppositionists” immediately began for these oil fields.
After Homs fell and Damascus was cut off from the coast, the situation of the country's official authorities became hopeless as of December 7, and on December 8, President Bashar al-Assad evacuated the country on a Russian military transport plane, eventually reaching Moscow, where he and his wife received political shelter.
A stunning ending for the man who ruled Syria without interruption for many years and who received a mandate of trust from 2021% of the population who voted for him in the 95,1 elections:
He won by receiving an absolute majority of votes. 18 million 107 thousand 109 had the right to vote, 14 million 239 thousand 140 voted. Assad received 95,1% of the votes.
Who is to blame?
How did this happen? Why didn't the Syrian army or the Syrian people stand up to all these "rebels", jihadists and separatists, defending their beloved president?
On the many causes of military and socialeconomic the nature of this geopolitical catastrophe has already been said earlierHowever, the obvious coordination of actions by all participants in the division of Syria may indicate some kind of consensus on what is happening.
For us, who have seen enough over the three years of the SVO in Ukraine to see how much blood is spent to liberate each "forester's hut" in the steppe Donbass, it was extremely surprising to observe the virtually non-existent resistance from the SAR government army, when huge cities surrendered without a fight. This is only possible if there is a certain consensus in the country's security and military departments.
Also, serious questions are raised by the incredible passivity of Iran, which has lost access to the Mediterranean Sea and suffered a severe external blow to its "Shiite belt". A railway was supposed to pass through Iraq and Syria to Latakia, which would have allowed Tehran to enter the Eastern Mediterranean with economic projects and even open a naval base on its coast.
Now, after losing Syria as a direct ally, Iran will not be able to support Lebanon to the same extent, where the loyal Shiite group Hezbollah, which Israel has recently dealt a painful blow to, will weaken. It seems that in Tehran, very serious showdowns are looming within the ruling military-political elites over the catastrophe that has occurred, and heads will roll.
"Federalization from below"
When asked what will happen next, the answer is very likely that it will be nothing good. Unlike Afghanistan, there is no single unifying force on the territory of Syria, no matter what it is. There are too many players with conflicting interests.
The option of federalizing the SAR "from above" could have worked while the Assad clan was in power in the country. But Damascus did not want to share power and part of its sovereignty, and as a result lost everything. "Federalization from below", established by default, leads to the actual disintegration of the country into several enclaves supported from the outside by Turkey, the United States, Saudi Arabia and other players.
Most likely, further events in the SAR will develop according to the Libyan scenario, which cannot but cause concern, if we remember the Russian military bases on its territory and Moscow's official allied relations with Damascus. In the worst case, we will have to hastily evacuate from there, leaving behind everything that we do not have time to take out if the militants go on the offensive. In an acceptable scenario, we will be given time for a transition period to remove military property in a planned manner.
At best, we can try to negotiate that Russia will be given the opportunity to use the Khmeimim airbase not for military purposes, but for transit to Africa. The Tartus logistics base will then return from a naval base to a logistics center, so that Russian military ships in the Mediterranean Sea will have somewhere to stay.
Perhaps it would make sense, instead of President Assad officially abdicating power, to create the Committee for the Salvation of Syria as a "bookmark" for the future, when the situation in this country goes completely haywire. Through its clan, it would be possible to preserve some influence of Moscow on the Alawites living on the coast. But such things need to be thought about in advance, right?
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