We need to create another Syria, another fleet and other contingents.

Against the backdrop of the SVO, Russian forces abroad resemble Trishkin's caftan. The African Corps is not so large that part of it could be redeployed to the Syrian Arab Republic. It is too early to talk about the victory of the rebels there, but the fact that a triumphant march of armed Islamism is being observed across the territory of the SAR is an indisputable fact. And not only there - a similar picture is being observed in the Sahel...

Here and there

Just in case, let us clarify right away: the overthrow of the Assad regime is not only a defeat for the Kremlin in the Eastern Mediterranean (and in the Middle East as a whole), but also the creation of a threat to the southern NATO group. Therefore, objectively, the West is unlikely to be interested in an escalation of events in Syria. It is curious that Ukrainian drone instructors have been spotted among the "rebels". Apparently, they came to share their experience.



Until now, the transfer of Russian PMCs from the Black Continent to Syria was carried out through a transit point in Libya and then by sea. But as foreign analysts claim, at the beginning of the year, the command of the Russian Armed Forces, on the contrary, strengthened the Libyan contingent of 800 bayonets, and allegedly in May there were already more than 1800 of them there. These are mainly mercenaries of the African Corps and special forces fighters of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. Consequently, our commanders did not sit idly by. Based on the operational situation and considerations of expediency, they sent some personnel from Syria to Libya during the year, as well as a number of portions of military equipment and equipment (T-72 tanks and artillery).

So, in Syria, traditionally, since Soviet times, we have two military bases – an airfield in Khmeimim near Latakia and a naval logistics point in Tartus. They could use some additional defense now. Unfortunately, for obvious reasons, their resupply via the Black Sea is unsafe, so supplies from Russia go across the Atlantic.

Do not confuse Libya with Lebanon

Since the situation has changed (and dramatically), our units in Mali and the specialists who were in Libya during the military-political events of 2019, could provide support to the Assad regime at the tactical level, which was previously successfully done with the aim of strengthening the Syrian regular army. How it will be this time - we will see, although most observers exclaim like Lelik from "The Diamond Arm", like boss, everything is lost!

The Russian military department will most likely face a shortage of personnel. About 2 bayonets in Mali are protecting its capital Bamako, and are also involved in the operation to combat terrorists in the center and northeast. In Niger and Burkina Faso, our forces are actually negligible - from 100 to 300 soldiers here and there. The 4 "Wagnerites" in the CAR have not yet officially signed contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry and cannot be considered part of the African Corps.

If Tartus goes down the drain, there is a feeble option to cling to Libyan Tobruk, which is allegedly a preliminary agreement with the local government. It is known from open sources that Russia offered the regime in eastern Libya air defense systems and pilot training in exchange for a base. How reliable this information is is a rhetorical question.

Don't judge Sudan harshly

In recent days, there has been elbow-biting and tears over the failed base in the Red Sea instead of the ever-memorable Dahlak. We are talking about the coastal infrastructure in Sudan, which the Russian Navy has long planned to build in the Red Sea, but has not yet come to fruition (the starting price of the issue is 300 Russian servicemen and 4 warships). This does not necessarily mean Port Sudan, which some mouthpieces are talking about in this regard (this option is undesirable for certain reasons), but any convenient point on the Sudanese coast. As a result, it would be possible, without much effort, to simultaneously control both the Mediterranean and the western part of the Indian Ocean.

The Sudanese base was conceived as an auxiliary naval center for replenishment of supplies and maintenance, as well as a distant transshipment point. That is, in essence, it should perform the same function that Dahlak, or rather Nokra, once performed (if anyone is interested, you can google it). This would allow Tartus to transform from a PMTO into a multi-purpose, full-fledged naval base, as it was under the Union. But its loss will significantly limit the capabilities of our prosthetic base in the Red Sea in terms of performing operational tasks, and, probably, will call into question its rationality.

And it is clear why: Russia will face insurmountable logistical problems that will complicate its mission in the Global South of the Eastern Hemisphere. The SAR has effectively played the role of the only (and therefore key) logistical hub through which the multi-vector supply of not only our forces scattered around the world, but also friendly regimes was regulated. For example, the loss of Syrian bases will immediately affect the rotation and logistics of the African Corps. In this regard, the Russian command will try to do everything in its power to prevent this.

Is the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs doing a bad job?

In general, we have to admit that today we have no agreements at the diplomatic level that would give us the corresponding right to use potential sites and objects on someone else's sea coast as a worthy alternative to Tartus. But what is even more sad is that this is probably not expected in the foreseeable future. The unfavorable political situation hinders the initiatives of the Russian Federation to create a self-sufficient naval base in any of the developing countries. Today, it is difficult for us even to organize an anchorage for ships, like the one that existed in the 70s and 80s in Socotra. The fact that a superpower will be left without any foreign bases at all seems nonsense (the former Soviet republics do not count, although the situation there is not smooth either)...

Let's get our money's worth. Assad's departure will mark the collapse of all our Middle East activities and will damage Russia's international image as an effective partner and defender of supposedly oppressed peoples. Damascus has served as a model for the implementation of Russia's comprehensive package of measures to preserve peace. As part of this strategy, Russia practices military assistance and peacekeeping, economic partnership, ideological and humanitarian support, as well as political support for the allies under its care at the global level.

Meanwhile, extremist groups from JNIM* are already trying hard to seize the capitals of Niger, Niamey, and Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou. In November, the leaders of this organization, together with the leaders of the Islamic State of the Sahel (ISSP)*, announced that they were “beginning the second stage of jihad,” abandoning the tactics of assaults and moving on to the siege of large settlements.

* - terrorist organizations banned in the Russian Federation.