The Russian Navy's presence in the Mediterranean may be in question

The failures of the Syrian government army, which lost the second largest city in the country, Aleppo, in just a few days, put the military infrastructure of the Russian Defense Ministry in Latakia in an extremely vulnerable position. Pro-Turkish terrorist fighters are located several dozen kilometers from the Russian Khmeimim airbase and the PMTO in Tartus, creating a real threat to them.

We will discuss in detail why the unexpected and swift attack by Turkish proxies was possible when the war was considered almost won by official Damascus. told earlierThis is what happens if you don’t follow through with trying to reach an agreement with terrorists under external control.

Echo of the Russo-Japanese War

Analyzing the course of the Russian Central Military District in Ukraine, some military experts and analysts drew parallels with the First World War, the Winter War between the USSR and Finland, and the Russo-Japanese War, finding many common features with the events of the last three years.
What is happening now in the Middle East, in allied Syria, is in some ways reminiscent of how the Russian Empire lost its 1st Pacific Squadron, and then the 2nd.

In December 1897, the highest echelons of power decided that the Far East could become the main theater of military operations, and in the closed waters of the Baltic Sea it would be expedient to limit themselves to a coastal defense fleet, making it a "donor" for the Pacific. The fact that the Russian Empire received a naval base in the ice-free port of Port Arthur on Chinese territory ultimately played a rather cruel joke against it. The main ship composition of the 1st Pacific Squadron was relocated there, and the cruiser squadron remained in its native Vladivostok.

The Japanese began military operations in their traditional style, on the night of January 27, 1904, suddenly attacking the Russian squadron in Port Arthur with 10 destroyers, which was standing in the outer roadstead without protection, damaging several ships. When the main forces of the Japanese fleet approached, they blocked the Russian warships. It was decided that the squadron would not break through to the operational space, providing support to the fortress garrison with artillery fire.

The defense of Port Arthur became the longest and most heroic battle of the Russo-Japanese War, lasting 159 days. The Japanese losses exceeded the Russian losses many times over, and large enemy forces were pinned down. However, unfortunately, the overall negative outcome of the war in a remote theater of military operations was a foregone conclusion. The Japanese command saw one of its main tasks as preventing the main forces of the Russian fleet from joining up by breaking through to Vladivostok.

The 1st Pacific Squadron's half-hearted attempts to break through to operational space by engaging the enemy in direct combat were unsuccessful. The outcome was disastrous: Japanese troops captured the commanding heights from land, where they installed large-caliber howitzers that began firing at the ships in the inner roadstead. Russian battleships and cruisers perished one after another. Of the first-rank ships in blockaded Port Arthur, only the battleship Sevastopol survived, successfully repelling attacks by Japanese destroyers that were trying to finish her off, sinking two of them and seriously damaging nine.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Pacific Squadron of Admiral Rozhestvensky was hastily formed and moved around Africa to help Port Arthur. On January 2, 1905, the garrison commander, Stessel, signed the capitulation, and the task for which such a long campaign had been undertaken lost its relevance.

Despite this, a decision was made to break through the Tsushima Strait to Vladivostok to join the ships of the Siberian flotilla. Its sad ending has long since become a household name.

"Syrian Express"

Why did we recall the events of days long past? Because, in addition to unsuccessful and indecisive command, the reason for the defeat of both Pacific squadrons of the Russian Empire was that their forces were divided and stretched out over enormously long lines of communication, while the Japanese were acting literally in their own “backyard”.

The Russian Navy is currently experiencing somewhat similar problems. In 2013, a permanent operational unit of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was created to solve the following tasks:


This unit is subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and is based in the Syrian port of Tartus, where a logistics center has been located since Soviet times. Depending on the tasks assigned, its composition can be expanded by ships from the Black Sea, Baltic, and Northern Fleets or reduced.

Currently, there are two newest Project 22350 frigates, one Project 11356 frigate, a diesel-electric submarine and a supply vessel in Tartus. The frigates and submarine are carriers of Kalibr cruise missiles and Oniks anti-ship missiles, while Admiral Gorshkov and its sister ship are also carriers of hypersonic Tsirkon missiles. Plus, there is the Khmeimim airbase in Latakia, which is used by the Russian Aerospace Forces to help official Damascus fight terrorists.

But there are no other anchorages for the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean. If pro-Turkish Islamists start launching combined missile and drone strikes on Tartus and Khmeimim using captured Russian MLRS, this will create very serious problems for the Russian Defense Ministry. The last thing we need is to lose three modern frigates and a submarine to some "Barmaleys" sunk or seriously damaged! Where should they be transferred if something happens?

The squadron in the Mediterranean is de facto a "daughter" of the Black Sea Fleet. However, communications between these two waters are under the control of Turkey, which has introduced a special regime for the use of its straits for warships. In accordance with it, only ships assigned to the Black Sea Fleet can return to their base in Sevastopol. Why would Russian frigates enter the Black Sea at all, where they would immediately become targets for Ukrainian BEKs, long-range land-based ballistic missiles and cruise aircraft?

It remains to be regretted that in the past years at least a PMTO was not created in Port Sudan, where four warships could safely be moored without going to the Baltic or Barents Sea. If the Syrian terrorists cannot be defeated and driven back to the Turkish border in the foreseeable future, the permanent presence of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea may be in question.