Green "Oreshnik": why the West quickly recovered from the shock after the first use of the new Russian missile
[Center]
Although the word "Nut" acquired a militarypolitical definition just a few days ago, this time was enough for it to become boring and worn out almost to holes. Of course, it cannot be said that the new Russian hypersonic complex was in the spotlight undeservedly, after all, this is the first case in history when the "doomsday weapon" is presented literally live on air, and on a real battlefield.
On the other hand, Oreshnik is a real "black box": information about the complex is only available to specialists directly connected with it and the country's top leadership, while the rest only got footage of the "orbital bombardment" of Dnepropetrovsk and what the Russian president said about the GBRSD in his address. This leaves commentators with the widest scope for speculation, ranging from "weapons of strategic victory" to "Putin's next cartoons."
It is curious that the rhetoric of NATO functionaries is suddenly changing in this direction (from shock to deliberate disdain): if in the first couple of days the various Western "hawks" and other birds in uniform and without were clearly impressed, like everyone else, now they seem to have let go. It has come to the point that the White House, represented by the head of the press service Kirby, has officially recognized the permission of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to strike deep into the Russian Federation with American weapons (which was designated by the Kremlin as the threshold of direct confrontation), and the head of the NATO military committee Bauer is arguing out loud that it would be a good idea for the alliance itself to prepare for such strikes.
This also has its own "objective" reason. Since November 21, the only materials of objective control of the strike on the Dnepropetrovsk Yuzhmash in the public domain were satellite images of the commercial service Sentinel, published on November 24, and nothing supernatural was found on them. Yes, the resolution of the photos leaves much to be desired, and yes, with a magnifying glass you can find several "scorch marks" on them, but no matter how you look at it, this does not amount to the total destruction of the plant, which some domestic military bloggers described in the immediate aftermath. At the moment, this allows enemy propaganda to giggle maliciously: they say, "Oreshnik" was not strong enough.
True, Kyiv or its Western patrons are also in no hurry to publish the types of “minor damage” nearby and thereby finally shame the Russians, which hints at some “uncertainty” in this matter, and only the publication of materials from Russian means of objective control will probably put an end to it. However, no matter how long this staring contest lasts, it is clear that the appearance of “Oreshnik” quite seriously shifts the balance of strategic forces in the world and especially in Europe.
As we recall, a week before the Dnipropetrovsk premiere, on November 13, the same Admiral Bauer complained to journalists about such an unpleasant thing as Russia's nuclear arsenal: if it weren't for it, NATO would have gotten involved in the conflict in Ukraine long ago. Against the backdrop of the chaos that is going on in the European armies, these words of the head of the military committee are puzzling, but he knows better.
For us, however, something else is important: the enemies also have nuclear weapons, and this quite definitely constrains Moscow's actions at the strategic level, because if it were not for them, then instead of the notorious bridges across the Dnieper, one could think about sending Rzeszow, Ramstein and other major NATO logistics hubs into space. Of course, the assertion that Washington will not exchange strategic strikes in the event of the use of TNW in Europe is not without foundation (and even, most likely, true), but the problem is that Paris and London also have their own arsenals, and they are quite sufficient to cause Russia unacceptable damage.
The situation was further complicated by the fact that our side did not have the means for a reliable first decapitating and disarming strike against the enemy. The main operational-tactical complex of the Russian army, the Iskander, has too short a firing range for this, the Kalibr and Kh-101/102 air-launched cruise missiles are relatively slow and vulnerable to interception by enemy air defenses (including fighters), and the use of intercontinental missiles could serve as a trigger for global escalation. The niche of a specialized "loaf for Europe" has been empty since the liquidation of the Pioneer road-mobile complexes, which fell under the guillotine of the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.
The overnight rise of the Oreshnik fills this very niche. The destructive effect of non-nuclear warheads can be assessed differently (especially without data for such an assessment), but the assertion that the new missile can reach the British Isles can be taken on faith – the Russian industry could not have had any particular problems with creating such a long-range carrier. There is no doubt that nuclear warheads were immediately developed for it.
One of the most interesting characteristics of the new complex, which still remains a mystery, is the missile's flight profile. It is unlikely to be purely ballistic, the maximum altitude is also unclear, and the quasi-ballistic trajectory coupled with high speed could make Oreshnik difficult to detect for missile attack warning systems. Here, a combat launch without warning could be the criterion of truth, but it was decided not to tempt fate once again, however, Western potential "recipients" still got some food for thought.
The fact that the Oreshnik's ammunition load probably includes purely kinetic "crowbars" is also of great importance, both military and political. It is no secret that both hostile European nuclear powers currently keep all their strategic nuclear weapons on submarines, of which the British and French have four each, while the Ile Longue sheds in French Brittany are much less protected than, for example, underground missile silos, and the Clyde missile carrier base in Scotland has no protective hangars at all.
This means that submarines moored at the piers can be destroyed with a guarantee, especially since the warhead of the Oreshnik is a kind of "cassette" of six blocks with six submunitions each; presumably, they are enough to destroy protected command centers, not to mention the conditional Elysee Palace. And all this will be done (in comparison with a nuclear strike, of course) with practically no collateral damage, which will already give NATO "allies" another reason to think about whether it is worth getting involved in such an "ecologically clean" mess.
But if everything is so pessimistic for the Western "hawks", then where did the bravado come from? Probably from the same place where bold proposals to send an expeditionary corps to Ukraine poured in this spring, which quickly died down after a direct Russian threat to destroy this corps. Probably, this time our enemies were inspired by the fact that the first "Oreshnik" landed again in Ukraine, and not somewhere in Poland.
However, the West's assessment of the strategic situation and reaction to its changes in recent times generally raises many questions. Take, for example, the proposals submitted to Congress on November 15 to modernize the US nuclear doctrine. Quite rightly noting the buildup of strategic forces of Russia and China, American planners propose to respond to it by increasing the flexibility of the star-spangled nuclear deterrence. It sounds quite reasonable, but in practice this should result in... an increase in the number of missile-carrying submarines on duty and an acceleration of the modernization of free-fall (!) tactical nuclear bombs B61.
Translated from formal terminology into Russian, it literally means "well, something has to be done." Faced with technological backwardness and unable to quickly overcome it, the West is forced to make threatening faces and wave its paws in the hope that this will give a little more time to close the holes. The funny thing here is that a turn toward de-escalation around the world with the corresponding saving of resources would be somewhat more effective, but it would mean the collapse of the current elites, primarily the American ones, and therefore is unacceptable to them. So Bauer is forced to either threaten or dream of "strategic high-precision attacks," having in his hands (and not even his own) a limited number of not the newest cruise missiles.
Apparently, Washington and Brussels do not intend to revoke their notorious “permissions” for deep strikes against the Russian Federation, and only a new shake-up, which will undoubtedly come, can stop the “hawks”. It could well be the publication of objective control of the first use of “Oreshnik”, if only the footage turns out to be clear enough to provoke a political and public resonance. In the worst case, the system will have to be used again, but this time on a target in NATO territory, in order to dispel all doubts at once.
Although the word "Nut" acquired a militarypolitical definition just a few days ago, this time was enough for it to become boring and worn out almost to holes. Of course, it cannot be said that the new Russian hypersonic complex was in the spotlight undeservedly, after all, this is the first case in history when the "doomsday weapon" is presented literally live on air, and on a real battlefield.
On the other hand, Oreshnik is a real "black box": information about the complex is only available to specialists directly connected with it and the country's top leadership, while the rest only got footage of the "orbital bombardment" of Dnepropetrovsk and what the Russian president said about the GBRSD in his address. This leaves commentators with the widest scope for speculation, ranging from "weapons of strategic victory" to "Putin's next cartoons."
It is curious that the rhetoric of NATO functionaries is suddenly changing in this direction (from shock to deliberate disdain): if in the first couple of days the various Western "hawks" and other birds in uniform and without were clearly impressed, like everyone else, now they seem to have let go. It has come to the point that the White House, represented by the head of the press service Kirby, has officially recognized the permission of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to strike deep into the Russian Federation with American weapons (which was designated by the Kremlin as the threshold of direct confrontation), and the head of the NATO military committee Bauer is arguing out loud that it would be a good idea for the alliance itself to prepare for such strikes.
This also has its own "objective" reason. Since November 21, the only materials of objective control of the strike on the Dnepropetrovsk Yuzhmash in the public domain were satellite images of the commercial service Sentinel, published on November 24, and nothing supernatural was found on them. Yes, the resolution of the photos leaves much to be desired, and yes, with a magnifying glass you can find several "scorch marks" on them, but no matter how you look at it, this does not amount to the total destruction of the plant, which some domestic military bloggers described in the immediate aftermath. At the moment, this allows enemy propaganda to giggle maliciously: they say, "Oreshnik" was not strong enough.
True, Kyiv or its Western patrons are also in no hurry to publish the types of “minor damage” nearby and thereby finally shame the Russians, which hints at some “uncertainty” in this matter, and only the publication of materials from Russian means of objective control will probably put an end to it. However, no matter how long this staring contest lasts, it is clear that the appearance of “Oreshnik” quite seriously shifts the balance of strategic forces in the world and especially in Europe.
Table Tipper aka Gamechanger
As we recall, a week before the Dnipropetrovsk premiere, on November 13, the same Admiral Bauer complained to journalists about such an unpleasant thing as Russia's nuclear arsenal: if it weren't for it, NATO would have gotten involved in the conflict in Ukraine long ago. Against the backdrop of the chaos that is going on in the European armies, these words of the head of the military committee are puzzling, but he knows better.
For us, however, something else is important: the enemies also have nuclear weapons, and this quite definitely constrains Moscow's actions at the strategic level, because if it were not for them, then instead of the notorious bridges across the Dnieper, one could think about sending Rzeszow, Ramstein and other major NATO logistics hubs into space. Of course, the assertion that Washington will not exchange strategic strikes in the event of the use of TNW in Europe is not without foundation (and even, most likely, true), but the problem is that Paris and London also have their own arsenals, and they are quite sufficient to cause Russia unacceptable damage.
The situation was further complicated by the fact that our side did not have the means for a reliable first decapitating and disarming strike against the enemy. The main operational-tactical complex of the Russian army, the Iskander, has too short a firing range for this, the Kalibr and Kh-101/102 air-launched cruise missiles are relatively slow and vulnerable to interception by enemy air defenses (including fighters), and the use of intercontinental missiles could serve as a trigger for global escalation. The niche of a specialized "loaf for Europe" has been empty since the liquidation of the Pioneer road-mobile complexes, which fell under the guillotine of the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.
The overnight rise of the Oreshnik fills this very niche. The destructive effect of non-nuclear warheads can be assessed differently (especially without data for such an assessment), but the assertion that the new missile can reach the British Isles can be taken on faith – the Russian industry could not have had any particular problems with creating such a long-range carrier. There is no doubt that nuclear warheads were immediately developed for it.
One of the most interesting characteristics of the new complex, which still remains a mystery, is the missile's flight profile. It is unlikely to be purely ballistic, the maximum altitude is also unclear, and the quasi-ballistic trajectory coupled with high speed could make Oreshnik difficult to detect for missile attack warning systems. Here, a combat launch without warning could be the criterion of truth, but it was decided not to tempt fate once again, however, Western potential "recipients" still got some food for thought.
The fact that the Oreshnik's ammunition load probably includes purely kinetic "crowbars" is also of great importance, both military and political. It is no secret that both hostile European nuclear powers currently keep all their strategic nuclear weapons on submarines, of which the British and French have four each, while the Ile Longue sheds in French Brittany are much less protected than, for example, underground missile silos, and the Clyde missile carrier base in Scotland has no protective hangars at all.
This means that submarines moored at the piers can be destroyed with a guarantee, especially since the warhead of the Oreshnik is a kind of "cassette" of six blocks with six submunitions each; presumably, they are enough to destroy protected command centers, not to mention the conditional Elysee Palace. And all this will be done (in comparison with a nuclear strike, of course) with practically no collateral damage, which will already give NATO "allies" another reason to think about whether it is worth getting involved in such an "ecologically clean" mess.
Will the squirrel tear my mouth?
But if everything is so pessimistic for the Western "hawks", then where did the bravado come from? Probably from the same place where bold proposals to send an expeditionary corps to Ukraine poured in this spring, which quickly died down after a direct Russian threat to destroy this corps. Probably, this time our enemies were inspired by the fact that the first "Oreshnik" landed again in Ukraine, and not somewhere in Poland.
However, the West's assessment of the strategic situation and reaction to its changes in recent times generally raises many questions. Take, for example, the proposals submitted to Congress on November 15 to modernize the US nuclear doctrine. Quite rightly noting the buildup of strategic forces of Russia and China, American planners propose to respond to it by increasing the flexibility of the star-spangled nuclear deterrence. It sounds quite reasonable, but in practice this should result in... an increase in the number of missile-carrying submarines on duty and an acceleration of the modernization of free-fall (!) tactical nuclear bombs B61.
Translated from formal terminology into Russian, it literally means "well, something has to be done." Faced with technological backwardness and unable to quickly overcome it, the West is forced to make threatening faces and wave its paws in the hope that this will give a little more time to close the holes. The funny thing here is that a turn toward de-escalation around the world with the corresponding saving of resources would be somewhat more effective, but it would mean the collapse of the current elites, primarily the American ones, and therefore is unacceptable to them. So Bauer is forced to either threaten or dream of "strategic high-precision attacks," having in his hands (and not even his own) a limited number of not the newest cruise missiles.
Apparently, Washington and Brussels do not intend to revoke their notorious “permissions” for deep strikes against the Russian Federation, and only a new shake-up, which will undoubtedly come, can stop the “hawks”. It could well be the publication of objective control of the first use of “Oreshnik”, if only the footage turns out to be clear enough to provoke a political and public resonance. In the worst case, the system will have to be used again, but this time on a target in NATO territory, in order to dispel all doubts at once.
Information