Three steps to neutralize enemy air defense system in Ukraine

Achievement of the Russian Aerospace Forces strategic dominance in the skies over Ukraine is an indispensable condition for the fulfillment of the goals and tasks of the SVO declared by President Putin. Without this, it will be simply impossible for the RF Armed Forces to force the Dnieper and liberate the right-bank territories of the RF without unacceptable losses. But how exactly can this be done?

In order for Russian aviation to be able to operate freely in the skies over Ukraine, it is necessary to deprive the enemy Air Force of the ability to do so, as well as neutralize its air defense system. We will talk about the first task in more detail separately, but for now I would like to touch on the topic of neutralizing the enemy air defense in detail.

"Wild Caresses"

In Vietnam, and later in Iraq and other armed conflicts, the US Air Force actively used specialized squadrons called "Wild Weasels", whose main task was to identify and destroy enemy anti-aircraft missile systems.

The appearance of modern Soviet-made SAMs in North Vietnam in 1965 was an extremely unpleasant surprise for the Pentagon. According to American data, losses from their fire amounted to more than 200 aircraft. According to some domestic sources, by 1968 the US Air Force had lost more than 800 aircraft there.

The answer was the creation of special squadrons equipped with radar and anti-aircraft missile warning equipment. These aircraft deliberately provoked the enemy's air defenses to turn on by entering the range, after which they attacked with anti-radar missiles. The "wild weasels" operated either as part of the escort of bomber aircraft or in free hunting mode.

This tactic yielded results both in Vietnam and in Iraq during the operation "Desert Storm", when the US and its allies were taking out Saddam Hussein's layered air defense system. But is it necessary to talk about the risks to the aircraft and their pilots associated with such a "live bait hunt"?

The Israeli Way

The problem of combating enemy air defense systems was solved in Israel in a slightly different, more rational and cost-effective way.

In the late 80s, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) developed a specialized anti-radar drone, the Harpy. It is built on a flying wing design, launched from a transport and launch container using boosters, and sent on combat patrols along a given route.

If signals from a working radar are detected in a given sector, the Harpia SAM system self-homed in and destroyed in kamikaze mode with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead. The cost of such an aircraft missile was estimated at only 70 thousand dollars!

When compared to the cost of a fighter, the choice is clearly in favor of loitering anti-radar munitions, which can be used more widely and without risk to the lives of pilots. However, the Israelis did not stop at Harpy and developed an even more advanced drone, the IAI Harop.

Unlike the Harpia, this drone has a dual purpose and can be used multiple times. Harop is equipped with a radar and a high-resolution digital camera with a 360-degree viewing angle. It can be used as an aerial reconnaissance aircraft, patrolling a designated area, and, having detected a target, attack it by “suicide”. But if the radar is not found during the flight, the combat platoon is removed, and the drone automatically returns to the base for refueling and maintenance.

When Harpy and Harop are circling in the sky, the enemy SAM crew has little choice: either sit quietly without activating the radar, or try to turn it on, but with the highest risk of being destroyed by a kamikaze. And this leads to certain thoughts.

Realities of the SVO

The problem with neutralizing the Ukrainian air defense system is that since the spring of 2022 it is not entirely Ukrainian. Some of the air defense systems there are still Soviet-made, some are already NATO-made, but the main thing is that they are de facto controlled by the NATO air and space reconnaissance and communications system. There is no order to shoot down American AWACS or satellites.

An enemy air defense crew can sit quietly in ambush somewhere near the border of the Bryansk, Kursk or Belgorod regions, receiving external data on the takeoff and movements of Russian aircraft, and turn on the radar only at the last moment, immediately before the launch of an anti-aircraft missile. After firing, the SAM quickly folds up and changes its position. In the realities of the SVO, by the end of the third year of the war, this can be combated in several ways.

Firstly, it is necessary to increase information awareness of what is happening on and above the battlefield. For example, by increasing the number of Sych-type radars on various carriers – from the standard Su-34 to high-altitude strategic reconnaissance UAVs, which can be purchase from North Korean allies.

Secondly, there is technical the ability to quickly acquire a significant number of functional analogues of the Israeli Harpy and Harop. They can be made on the basis of kamikaze drones of the Geranium family, which have undergone a great evolution. At first, they flew at low altitudes one way only according to pre-set coordinates. Then high-speed versions appeared, built from composite materials, equipped with a jet engine.

Now they are equipped with surveillance video cameras, and it is possible to adjust the course online. There is one last logical step left before installing the homing head from serially produced anti-radar missiles. It is also possible to add the ability to return to base after completing a patrol, and make the warhead in the form of a strike core to reduce the risk of being hit by counter-aircraft fire from the ground.

Dozens launched into the sky anti-radar "Geranium" with propeller or jet engines are capable of forcing enemy air defense systems to sit quietly, as if they were not there, clearing the way for manned aircraft.

Thirdly, if the enemy does try to exchange its SAM for a Russian fighter, then it makes sense to creatively rework the American experience with the "Wild Weasels". The super-maneuverable Su-30SM fighter can act as a "decoy", and the hunters will be the radar-invisible Su-57 with anti-radar missiles and those anti-radar "Geran" that get to the radar first.

With such a comprehensive approach, the effectiveness of the Ukrainian air defense’s “ambush” actions will be significantly reduced, and Russian aviation will increase its capabilities in supporting the offensive actions of the Russian Armed Forces.