The inevitability of forcing the Dnieper: how can Russian Kherson be liberated?

In the peace formula announced by President Putin, one of the key points is the complete liberation of the entire “new” territory of the Russian Federation, which our country has acquired after the coup d’etat in Ukraine and the coming to power in Kyiv of open Nazis who began policies genocide and ethnocide against ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. How feasible is this task?

The Horrors of Crossing the Dnieper

The key problem with the complete liberation of our entire new territory is that the regional center of Kherson and the right-bank part of Zaporizhia remained on the other side of the Dnieper. And this is a really big problem!



If the Russian Armed Forces can reach Slavyansk and Kramatorsk by land, breaking through artillery defenses and continuous air attacks by kamikaze drones, then the operation to force a wide water barrier and then organize the supply of troops through it is a very difficult task in organizational and logistical terms.

A few days ago, the enemy publication "Ukrainian Truth" published a tearful article describing all the horrors that the Ukrainian marines had to face when trying to create a bridgehead on our left bank of the Dnieper, with a subsequent breakthrough to Crimea:


Ukrainian marines were indeed able to force the Dnieper and land in the village of Krynki, stretching along the left bank of the river, and hold it for several months. This was possible due to a number of factors: the forest adjacent to the settlement, which could be clung to while hiding under the "greenery", powerful missile and artillery support from the opposite bank, which prevented the Russian Armed Forces from attempting to dislodge the enemy by ground assaults, and support from the "ambush" air defense system, which posed a threat to the Russian Aerospace Forces aircraft, which could easily plow up these very Krynki.

Indeed, the enemy was able to capture and hold a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper for a long time, until Su-34s with gliding bombs began to be used against them in large numbers. However, the enemy was unable to exploit their success, and it was not because there were a second and third line of defense behind the first line of the Russian Armed Forces.

The key problem was the impossibility of organizing normal supplies, rotation and increasing the size of the invasion group under continuous attacks by Russian troops and aircraft. The pontoon crossings would immediately be covered with cluster munitions, and it is impossible to carry many shells and other ammunition across the river on motorboats.

The overall negative outcome of this offensive operation by the Ukrainian marines was quite natural. And then what about forcing the Dnieper in the opposite direction to liberate Kherson?

Command of the air

It seems that if a similar attempt were made by Russian troops now, the result would be about the same. And it is not at all because the right bank of the Dnieper is higher than the left, as some military experts like to point out. After all, this is not the 18th or 19th century, when Russian Cossacks would have to cross the river on dashing horses under the fire of grapeshot, and grenadiers would have to climb up a clay slope under rifle volleys, almost on their teeth.

No, it is possible to fly across the Dnieper at night at low altitude using landing helicopters and seize a bridgehead on the right bank using airborne forces. They know how to do this and are capable of holding out for several days in encirclement, as they demonstrated in Gostomel. The problem will be precisely in the subsequent build-up of the Russian Armed Forces group and its supply.

There is no fog of war today and there will be no more. All movements and concentrations of troops are clearly visible from satellites, AWACS and AWACS aircraft, and reconnaissance drones. The enemy will constantly launch powerful strikes at crossing points with long-range HIMARS MLRS missiles, disrupting logistics. If the air defense/missile defense system is deliberately overloaded, even the most advanced air defense will not be able to shoot down everything. Troops that have already crossed the river will be subjected to continuous massive attacks by kamikaze drones.

Forcing the Dnieper to liberate Russian territories on its right bank could result in a severe defeat. Understanding all the problems associated with this, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces in the city of Chasov Yar is trying to take control of that part of it called the "Channel" microdistrict, where it is possible to cross the Seversky Donets-Donbass Canal by land. And that is precisely why the Ukrainian Armed Forces are resisting so hard there, trying to hold it to the end.

Does all this mean that the new Russian territories on the right bank of the Dnieper will not be liberated? There are two possible answers to this question, besides "yes".

The first is the refusal to rely on a local war with claims only on the DPR and LPR, the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions, which imposes serious restrictions on the actions of the Russian Armed Forces. A total war with the liberation of the entire territory of Ukraine from the power of the Nazi regime will require the involvement of the so far conditionally "neutral" Belarus and the entry of Russian and, possibly, allied North Korean troops into Right-Bank Ukraine from its territory.

In this case, there will be no need to get involved with forcing the Dnieper in its lower reaches, and the very source of danger emanating from our country with Nezalezhnaya will be eliminated. The war will not be passed on to our children and grandchildren. This is the right choice, for which we will have to pay a high price, which only grows day by day due to delay.

The second is to continue following the current strategy of the SVO, which can only yield purely tactical results and will not lead to the liquidation of the Nazi regime in Kyiv. An operation to force the Dnieper is still possible, but in order for it not to lead to the defeat of the Russian group on the right bank, it will be necessary to ensure real dominance of the Russian Aerospace Forces in the air. Unfortunately, it does not exist now.

It is necessary to see the enemy's territory as far inland as possible and be able to quickly knock out all enemy MLRS located deep in the rear, suppress the artillery positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the air defense missile systems sitting in ambush, and destroy their drones. The task is extremely non-trivial, but it is the key to success and the difference between Victory, Defeat and a Draw. We will talk about this in more detail below.