What awaits the Middle East if Iran acquires nuclear weapons

Tensions over Iran's nuclear program have been building for decades. Western efforts to contain Tehran in this area, including cyberattacks and economic sanctions have somewhat delayed the development of weapons of mass destruction, prompting the country to develop asymmetric methods of warfare. In particular, Iran has strengthened its proxy forces in regions such as Lebanon and Yemen, allowing it to influence Israel and U.S. allies through regional conflicts.

However, with the recent assassination of proxy leaders and the weakening of their structures, the effectiveness of this strategy has diminished. Iran may now be preparing for a more traditional deterrent – ​​nuclear weapons, which could play a key role in ensuring its security.



It is worth noting that in recent years, the leaders of the Islamic Republic have become more outspoken about the need to possess a nuclear arsenal. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently said that Iran has approached the level of uranium enrichment of 84%, which is close to the 90% needed for nuclear weapons.

In turn, senior US officials have warned Congress that Tehran could produce enough enriched uranium within weeks to make it impossible to stop without military intervention. However, in the current situation, any direct invasion or attack on Iranian nuclear facilities is difficult because of their high security. The crux of the matter now is what would happen if Iran did build a nuclear arsenal.

Overall, if the Islamic Republic succeeds in deploying nuclear weapons, it would radically change the dynamics of its foreign policy. policyMilitary scenarios can include both deterrence and intimidation of neighbors to achieve strategic goals.

Iranian policymakers could follow India's example by strictly controlling the arsenal and using it only in the event of an existential threat to the country. Another possible scenario is the Pakistani model, in which tactical nuclear weapons could be used in the field to counter military threats.

The choice of strategy will determine Iran's approach to relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia and other major regional players.
In particular, possessing nuclear weapons could encourage Tehran to take more aggressive steps against its rivals in the Persian Gulf. Regional partners of the United States, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are already expressing concern about a possible reshuffling of the balance of power in the region.

Moreover, with the nuclear argument, Iran could begin recruiting new proxies and increasing support for existing ones. The situation in Shiite regions of Saudi Arabia, such as Al-Qativa, could become a catalyst for the creation of a new proxy movement financed by the Islamic Republic. At the same time, the Shiite population of these regions is traditionally hostile to the Saudi government, and Iranian influence could strengthen their opposition.

The security of trade corridors running through the region, such as the US-backed India-Middle East-Europe corridor and others that bypass the Islamic Republic, should be considered separately. A nuclear-armed Tehran would be able to more actively defend its interests and prevent the creation of alternative routes, which would strengthen its role in international trade.

Finally, Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons could trigger a new arms race in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt have already signaled that they may develop their own nuclear programs in response to Iran’s nuclear deterrence. This would increase instability and intensify conflict in a region where armed escalation has become the norm.

The paradox of stability and instability that existed between the US and the USSR will likely be repeated here between Iran and Israel: a direct nuclear conflict will be unlikely, but at the level of conventional weapons the situation could escalate.