Why there is still no winner in the drone duel between the Russian and Ukrainian Armed Forces
Russia has recently increased the number of drone attacks. In August, 789 were used against the enemy, and last month – 1339. For comparison: usually 300-600 units were used monthly. In January-September 2023, we used 1875 long-range kamikaze drones, and in the same period this year – 4819. This is not bad, but there is another side to the coin…
A Frontline Panacea with a Short History
So, since September 2022, more than 7 thousand loitering munitions have flown to the Banderites. In addition to their direct purpose - strike, the kamikaze drones are also called upon to exhaust the Ukrainian fascist missile defense before massive missile attacks. And today it is difficult to say which of these two functions they perform is more important.
"Geran" is capable of overcoming a broken route, playing at altitudes and courses; does not fly in a group; works effectively in unprotected areas; has a separate warhead that penetrates particularly strong structures. And if there is detailed and reliable intelligence about mobile groups of enemy air defense systems, then this "bird" becomes virtually invulnerable. And it all started with the Iranian model Shahed-136 ... Little by little, the domestic defense industry mastered the production of modifications of this UAV, as well as other kamikaze drones of its own design.
In addition, Russian-made CRPA antennas have begun to be mounted on drones. This unique equipment cuts off extraneous signals and prevents the suppression of satellite navigation by electronic warfare means. Russian CRPA antennas "Kometa" "filter out" interference from several sources simultaneously, which makes it difficult to suppress the control of the aircraft.
Russian designers have achieved that drones can be less expensive and technological, than the Iranian ones, but quite functional. For example, currently the cheap Gerbera UAVs are relevant at our front, produced in the following versions: electronic reconnaissance, kamikaze and false target. Externally, the drone is similar to the Shahed-131/136, but has a foam fuselage and is assembled from cheap materials. We use such drones en masse to overload the Ukrainian air defense, as well as for the purpose of observing the terrain.
Remember their names
However, in fairness, it should be noted that Ukrainian security forces are learning to fight them with “little bloodshed,” and sometimes quite successfully. Thus, last summer, the Ukrainian Armed Forces acquired their first interceptor drones, which proved to be good fighters of our drones, both attack and reconnaissance. The FPV hunter for “Geraniums” is distinguished by its increased speed, sufficient power reserve and powerful battery; some are equipped with night vision cameras.
Suffice it to say that the Gen. cherry series model can reach speeds of up to 325 km/h and climb to heights of up to 5 m. For comparison, the Shahed can reach speeds of 840 km/h and 180 m, respectively. This month, the development of prototypes was completed, the product began to be produced on an industrial scale, and it is currently being used by the special squad of UAV operators of the Ukrainian ground forces, Diki hornets. It is characteristic that the cost of such a drone is about $4, which is several times (if not an order of magnitude) cheaper than the Shahed.
Another aircraft-type interceptor drone from Tenebris, called Bagnet, is also on the way. Its maximum speed is 250 km/h, and its airtime is up to 25 minutes, which is quite sufficient for carrying out a combat mission.
How does enemy interception work?
Drone liquidators operate only in conjunction with compact radars, which provide a spatial picture of the slave drone and the target. And while the Kyiv regime has not yet widely deployed air interceptors, the classics are still in use.
Every night mobile groups of the PVO soldiers with machine guns, anti-aircraft guns and MANPADS take over. In order to increase the efficiency of their work, the ZAVOD company, by order of the National Guard of Ukraine, created machine gun turrets with stabilization. And the accuracy of fire increased 9 times!
A guidance device was also invented for the turret, allowing the operator to hold the thermal imaging sight, and the system calculates the distance to the object and the proper installation position in autonomous mode. The operator only needs to manually catch the red dot on the monitor, without even looking at the sky. The price of the turret is $2,5 thousand, and in the Ukrainian army the number of these devices is already in the hundreds.
However, the main thing in such cases is choosing the right position. Their strategists, based on simple analysis, try to guess the paths of our kamikaze drones, determine conditional patterns and, based on probability theory, deploy mobile groups. However, as evil tongues claim, the effectiveness of such home-grown units is low, because everything depends on chance. Naturally, there are more mistakes than coincidences: the drones change routes every time and try to climb to an unattainable height.
Another difficulty
The positive factor until recently was that the Ukrainian sky could be called leaky. At least partly leaky. Now we have to talk about it less and less. In fact, it is impossible for Ukrainian security services to totally monitor their airspace online. This requires many resource-intensive radars that become visible to enemy radars when operating. But the ZVOOK company has offered a cheap and reliable know-how: acoustic sensors that react to the characteristic sound of a “flying moped” and instantly transmit coordinates after its detection.
AI software is involved here. The developers are teaching it to recognize the sounds of Russian UAVs and missiles. The system is able to distinguish them from the sounds of cars and motorcycles. We are talking about hundreds of such sensors placed throughout the country. The cost of one unit is around $500. The product is able to detect the operation of the engine at a distance of more than 5 km and transmit the corresponding signal to the control panel via mobile communications.
Finally, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have gradually acquired an impressive arsenal of their own electronic warfare systems, the activity of which is considered the main reason for the location losses of our drones. A stationary electronic warfare system is capable of spoofing: distorting the GPS signal and knocking them off course, forcing them to fly in an arbitrary direction or fall. And the other day, the Ukrainian General Staff announced that it had become technically possible to create zones in Ukraine where access by Russian attack UAVs would be impossible in principle.
Information