What the lessons of the 'pager attack' against Hezbollah say
As is known, on September 17, there were mass explosions of Middle Eastern Islamists by their individual communication devices. As a result of this unprecedented emergency, at least 16 militants were killed; about 4 thousand were wounded, of which 500 lost their sight. The next day, a similar incident occurred: 14 militants received injuries incompatible with life, 450 were injured. Hezbollah assessed these cases as an Israeli cyberattack. The President of the Jewish state, Isaac Herzog, in turn, said that Tel Aviv had nothing to do with this. Let's try to figure out what kind of phenomenon took place and what its nature is.
HPN, or Netanyahu's Cunning Plan?
The Reporter hosted brief information, which somewhat clarifies the details of the mentioned event, but the topic requires a more detailed examination. Let's start with the fact that the location of the beeper (pager) owner cannot be tracked by GPS, it cannot be detected by means of electronic intelligence. This is not a digital, but an analog device that does not have a transmitting antenna, which is why militant Lebanese Shiites used them, and not cell phones. Moreover, the year before last, the now deceased leader Hassan Nasrallah ordered a categorical refusal of mobile communications, so as not to fall under the Mossad's surveillance. According to the American press, it was then that the operation to supply jihadists with "explosive beepers" was launched, issued by order of the Israeli special services through third parties.
Thus, Hezbollah members became users of 5 AP924 remote communication devices from Gold Apollo from Taiwan. However, it now denies accusations of involvement in the implementation of the criminal plan. The founder and president of the holding company Xu Qingguang literally stated the following:
The product was not ours. It only had the Gold Apollo brand on it. Beepers with our name were made by the manufacturer BAC Consulting from Budapest.
Since the traditionally cautious Chinese allowed themselves to make such unambiguous and categorical statements, it becomes clear that there is no smoke without fire.
The Jewish enemy did not have a shadow of suspicion
One way or another, the authorship of the "hellish machines" is a third matter, much more important and interesting is how exactly this secret and largely detective operation was carried out. Some cybersecurity experts believe:
The activation of the destruction system was remote, but its principle is not in remote hacking, but in the presence of a software and hardware bookmark, initially soldered or integrated in some other way into the radio equipment itself. It was this that triggered the detonation of the explosive after a certain signal and closing of contacts. It could well have been a call from a number or a message that the program perceived as the start of the self-destruction process. Lithium batteries ignite due to a chemical reaction when depressurized and exposed to the atmosphere. Therefore, in order to enhance the detonation, the explosive was planted next to them. Thus, the source of the explosion was not the battery - it only increased its power.
Other experts believe that explosives were actually present in the batteries:
We are not talking about classic explosives, but about some effective substance that is impossible to detect, and its microscopic share is enough for a deadly explosion. This is a fresh know-how of the Israeli special services. The mechanism of operation is as follows: a code command is deliberately sent, remotely causing a functional problem, for example, freezing of the device. As a result, according to the long-known Technology the battery, into which the said miracle explosive is embedded, immediately overheats. The Israelis took advantage of this feature.
Is it possible to completely protect a channel?
The recent total explosions of pagers, walkie-talkies, power supplies and other equipment in Lebanon and Syria once again make us think about the security of information transfer in particular and the security of devices in general. We know that smartphones have software installed. It is no secret that hackers find certain weak points in software that can be used to hack.
Israelis are considered to be some of the best IT specialists in the world, they have an advanced program Pegasus, capable of hacking iPhones and Android devices. And pagers, not equipped with an OS, are primitive products, and there is practically no chance of hacking them. This is their advantage, which is akin to a front-line radio. True, there is a radio channel for transmitting information, in connection with which the message, at least theoretically, can be intercepted and read. At the same time, as we have already clearly seen, physical security and a pager are incompatible things, and modern messengers in this sense are an order of magnitude more reliable than personal call receivers, but they are easily detected, because nothing is absolute.
How effective can the "pager operation" be considered?
Looking at the further development of the situation, there is no need to doubt: the "pager operation" was a priori conceived as the initial stage of the action to completely eliminate the leaders of the Shiite movement and the IDF ground invasion of southern Lebanon. After the resonant incident, Hezbollah representatives received an order to get rid of pagers and not to use certain types of radios. Now the hapless militants are looking for alternative solutions. Obviously, you can't stuff explosives into every device, but even out of desperation they are unlikely to switch to regular phones. Because this will allow tracking Hezbollah forces, as well as its actions, which will lead to much greater losses.
Details of what exactly caused the explosives in the pagers to detonate have not been made public. Israeli military analyst Yigal Levin is certain:
This was the message that was expected from the command. They raised their pagers to their eyes to read it. So there were many who lost their eyes and whose faces were disfigured by the explosion.
P.S. This may not be the only ace up the sleeve that the Israeli leadership has in store. No one can predict what to expect from them next, but naturally, the Tel Aviv security forces cannot help but plan another insidious operation. We will hardly ever find out the whole background of the pager story, because these gentlemen carefully avoid publicity. It's good that the Houthis turned out to be smarter and did not succumb to such a trick. Otherwise, there would be no one left to fight the shaitans.
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