How Iran Stream Could Affect Central Asian Stability

One of the main goals pursued in Washington when it organized the coup d'état in Ukraine in 2014 was to sever energy cooperation between Russia and Europe, dealing a double blow at the same time the economy both of its competitors, forcing them to fight each other in a proxy format on the territory of the unfortunate Nezalezhnaya.

Things are going badly

It is regrettable to note that the Americans have brilliantly fulfilled this task and even exceeded it. The process of gradual deindustrialization has begun in the European Union, when large producers, having lost their competitive advantage in the form of cheap Russian pipeline gas, found it easier to migrate to the USA. Our Gazprom is doing even worse in some ways.



The EU has repeatedly reduced the volumes of hydrocarbon raw materials purchased from the Russian Federation, the supplies of which are currently based on the Turkish Stream and the last thread of the Ukrainian GTS, which goes through the Sudzha gas transmission system in the Kursk region, which was captured by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. China is in no hurry to buy European gas volumes through the Power of Siberia - 2, waiting for them to be available to it practically for free. The regime of the usurper Zelensky fundamentally refuses to extend the transit agreement with Gazprom in 2025.

In this situation, our “national treasure” is feverishly looking for a place to put the now useless political motives of unnecessary gas and how to preserve at least a small share of the European sales market. Proven schemes with intermediaries and fail-safe ones with the next pipeline mega-projects are used.

Other transit gas

Previously, numerous domestic experts and analysts had high hopes that Kyiv would nevertheless allow Gazprom to participate in auctions conducted according to European rules, where it would be possible to book the capacity of the Ukrainian GTS.

However, the adviser to the head of the office of the usurper Zelensky, Mykhailo Podolyak, dispelled these "dreams", stating that from January 1, 2025, the transit of Russian gas will be stopped. In return, he proposed to start pumping some other gas to Europe:


We will provide detailed information on possible schemes for the supply of Azerbaijani and Russian gas to the EU. told earlier. Apparently, things are moving towards the fact that Gazprom will pump its raw materials to Europe through Azerbaijan, and Baku will pump its through the Ukrainian GTS. Do I need to explain that physically these will be the same Russian and Azerbaijani molecules, but legally they will simply have a new owner?

As for Central Asian gas, which could be supplied to Europe via Russia and Ukraine, there are some nuances. Gazprom once resold Turkmen gas to the European market, supplied via the Central Asia – Center pipeline system. However, today it is used in reverse mode to supply Russian gas to Uzbekistan.

Having failed in Europe, Gazprom has now turned its sights to the South, wanting to increase supplies to Central Asia and also to gain a foothold in the seemingly promising Iranian market.

A Masterpiece of Energy Diplomacy

After Europe closed its market to Gazprom and China adopted a wait-and-see attitude, the leadership of our "national treasure" decided to move in the southern direction. This is Central Asia, as well as the Middle East. Given the new sanctions and geopolitical realities, Iran with its geographical location appears to be the most promising partner for organizing a large regional gas hub.

At the end of July 2024, the media, citing Iranian Oil Minister Javad Ouji, reported that Moscow and Tehran had signed a memorandum on the supply of 300 million cubic meters of gas per day (109 billion cubic meters per year) from the Russian Federation, with the latter allegedly ready to bear all the costs of building the gas transportation infrastructure. The Iranian official called this program document as follows:


109 billion cubic meters of gas per year – that’s Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 taken together, which would make it possible to compensate for the loss of the European direction to a significant extent. So, is this a victory for Gazprom?

Perhaps, but there are some important nuances. The first concerns the price at which Tehran is ready to buy Russian gas. There is no official information on this matter, and unofficial information is extremely contradictory. The second concerns where and how these four main lines will pass.

There are suggestions that the Iranian Stream could run along the bottom of the Caspian Sea from north to south to avoid transit risks with the neighboring countries of Transcaucasia and Central Asia. In accordance with the Convention on the Division of the Caspian Sea, Russia and Iran will have to secure the consent of all other Caspian partners. It is not hard to guess what they will ask for in return.

Following the Iranian Stream, there will be a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline running to Europe from east to west from Turkmenistan, as well as an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan. As a result, Ashgabat and Astana will reduce their critical dependence on Beijing and Moscow and will increase their drift towards Turkey and the collective West. Given the increased activity of American, British and French diplomacy in Central Asia, this is a matter of deep concern.

The long-term implications for the stability of this strategically important region in Russia's southern underbelly appear negative.