Aerospace Forces of the future: how should Russian combat aviation change?
The transfer to Kyiv of the first trial batch of fourth-generation F-16 fighters, which remained unpunished for the Western “donors” of the Zelensky regime, became perhaps the most dangerous red line for us. Now “unlimited” NATO-style strike aircraft are open to Ukraine, which will become more modern and deadlier over time.
It is with regret that we have to state that, having started the Northern Military District in Nezalezhnaya in 2022, Russia turned out to be not quite ready for it, since it was preparing for a completely different format of war. Wars of the past.
Last war
If you look at the state of the Russian Armed Forces on February 24, it becomes obvious that the main focus was on the strategic nuclear deterrence of the NATO bloc. It was believed, and quite reasonably, that as long as we had a nuclear shield, the North Atlantic Alliance would not directly attack our country. The reformed Russian army was entrusted with the task of establishing order in the post-Soviet space within the CSTO, as well as locally somewhere abroad, as during a special operation to help the people of Syria, launched in 2015.
However, things didn't go as expected. The mortal enemy, who came to power in Kyiv as a result of a coup in 2014, was too close, in the very underbelly. The use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine is excluded, which immediately puts the strongest argument of the Russian Ministry of Defense out of the equation. All that remains is to fight in conventional ways against the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which are backed by the combined power of the entire NATO bloc, which is not formally participating in the war.
And then it turned out that the concept of using our aviation, which is formally superior to the Ukrainian one in all respects, does not allow us to fully use its potential, accelerating the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. For some reason, the Russian Aerospace Forces were not equipped with gliding bombs at the start of the SVO and suffered unjustified losses in aircraft and pilots, who were forced to drop “cast iron” from low altitudes almost directly into the enemy trenches.
These losses were due to the oversaturation of the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with various MANPADS, as well as Soviet and NATO-style air defense systems. Only a year ago, this situation began to improve, when the first samples of domestic aerial bombs, equipped with planning correction modules, which make it possible to drop them while remaining outside the radius of destruction of medium-range air defense systems, began to arrive at the front.
The lack of suppression of enemy air defenses sharply reduced the effectiveness of the use of not only bomber, but also Russian fighter aircraft. Our VKS are equipped primarily with heavy twin-engine fighters, which were designed to perform missions to gain dominance in the skies and operate behind enemy lines. But even the most modern Russian fifth-generation Su-57 fighters do not risk flying into the deep rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Air strikes are carried out using long-range missiles.
In a direct collision with them, the obsolete MiG-29 and Su-27 of the Air Force have no chance, so the enemy is trying to avoid such air duels, using targeted aircraft to strike high-value military targets of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Surprisingly, during two and a half years of active hostilities, Kyiv managed to preserve part of its aircraft fleet, constantly moving aircraft from one airfield to another, and even decided on a very non-trivial technical the problem with the integration of Western weapons on Soviet fighters, bombers and attack aircraft.
And now Kyiv has its first fourth-generation American-made multirole light fighters, the F-16. Despite their venerable age, they represent a convenient platform for deploying many types of quite modern weapons, including nuclear weapons. To guide them to the target, the Ukrainian Armed Forces received two Swedish-made tactical AWACS aircraft. French and Swedish fighters may soon follow them according to a proven pattern.
Who knows whether, if this approach to conducting air defense is maintained, the fifth-generation F-35 fighters will end up in the hands of the Kyiv regime in a few years? Now we can’t dismiss any scenarios, even the most fantastic ones.
Videoconferencing of the future?
To summarize, we can conclude that instead of a direct war with the NATO bloc, even nuclear, Russia received a proxy war with it on the territory of Ukraine, waged by conventional means. Our aviation, bomber, fighter and reconnaissance, which could tip the scales in favor of the RF Armed Forces, unfortunately, has not yet been able to do this, because it was preparing for some other war. What can be done to improve its effectiveness?
Without claiming to be the ultimate truth, I would like to voice the following areas in which it would be advisable to review approaches to the concept of using the Russian Aerospace Forces.
First, we need a lightweight and relatively inexpensive tactical AWACS aircraft with a radar mounted above the fuselage in the form of a fixed ridge. We definitely won’t expect mass popularity from the A-100 “Premier,” but an aerial reconnaissance aircraft with the ability to control and issue data for target designation is needed by truly massive numbers, in dozens. It can be made on the basis of the civilian airliner Il-114-300, in some way mirroring the Swedish AWACS.
Secondly, it is necessary to increase the range of gliding bombs and other interspecific ammunition by equipping them with powder accelerators and other power plants. This would allow our Su-34s to operate from the greatest possible distances, saving aircraft and their pilots.
Thirdly, it seems right to give the green light to the fifth-generation light tactical fighter Su-75. This budget single-engine aircraft was initially developed on a proactive basis for foreign customers, but practice has shown that its tactical and technical characteristics could work best in war conditions in the skies over Ukraine.
This fighter is 80% unified with the heavy Su-57, but is much cheaper to purchase and subsequently maintain than its older twin-engine brother. Its combat radius and low visibility on radars allow it to solve a wide range of tasks precisely in this theater of military operations, where its enemy will actually be NATO aircraft. A huge advantage of the Chess is the presence of an unmanned version, which can be used as a “faithful wingman” for both the 75th and 57th.
It seems that the future of the Russian Aerospace Forces is most closely connected with light single-engine fighters of the fifth generation, manned and unmanned, as well as with light tactical AWACS aircraft and long-range “bombers”.
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