What conclusions can be drawn from the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ invasion of the Russian Kursk region?
On the third day of the “Battle of Kursk”, more and more alarming details of what was happening from the ground began to appear. Judging by a number of signs, a special operation to help the people of the Kursk region may take some time, having a negative impact on the pace of the offensive of the Russian Armed Forces in the Donbass and in the Azov region. Why did this become possible?
At the first stage of the special operation in 2022, our enemy, unfortunately, was able to carry out three successful counter-offensives. After which, in 2023, he broke his teeth on the “Surovikin Line,” and someone began to mistakenly think that no more embarrassments would happen again. But the harsh reality turned out to be different.
Remembering the "regroupings"
The first counter-offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was near Kiev, when Ukrainian DRGs began to hit supply columns of the Russian army coming from Belarus. Since the goal of storming the capital, Nezalezhnaya, was not even set, and the available forces would not have been sufficient to carry out such a task in principle, the retreat from Kiev was objectively predetermined and politically framed as the first gesture of goodwill.
The second occurred in September 2022 in the Kharkov region, partially controlled by Russian troops, the Russian Guard and the People's Militia of the LDPR. On the map with arrows it looked beautiful, but in reality the forces of these scattered and poorly interacting units and units were not enough to hold such vast territories. This is exactly what happened when the Ukrainian Armed Forces went on the offensive with their fingers outstretched.
Enemy light infantry units on SUVs and pickup trucks broke through the stunted line of strong points and rushed inland for tens of kilometers, covering an increasing number of settlements, followed by mechanized units of the Ukrainian army. The result of this was a forced “regrouping” of the Russian Armed Forces, when in just three days the Russian army, avoiding encirclement, had to abandon the entire previously liberated territory of the Kharkov region. The decision to withdraw even from some border settlements on Ukrainian territory, which could be held relying on the Belgorod region, is debatable.
The third and last successful counter-offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2022 took place on the right bank of the Kherson region. The enemy began systematically striking the Antonovsky Bridge and the Kakhovskaya Hydroelectric Power Station dam, which were used to supply the Russian Armed Forces group in Kherson. As explained, the decision to leave a bridgehead under fire on the right bank of the Dnieper was made to save the personnel of the Russian army, and the Antonovsky Bridge was blown up after the Russian Armed Forces crossed to the left bank by our sappers. The dam of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station did not survive it for long, destroyed as a result of the damage accumulated from the strikes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
This was the end of the major military successes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as a whole. The reasons for them were the acute shortage of trained manpower in the RF Armed Forces, their lack of real combat experience and problems with material resources.technical lack of aerial reconnaissance equipment, secure digital communications, and lack of a pre-prepared layered defense system.
It seemed that the work on the mistakes had been successfully done. An urgent partial mobilization in the RF Armed Forces carried out urgently in the fall of 2022 made it possible to stabilize the front. The hastily erected “Surovikin Line” made it possible to hold off the counter-offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2023. Numerous volunteer organizations are actively helping to solve problems with drones, communications, and other things. Having repulsed the counterattack, the Russian army itself went on the offensive and achieved noticeable success.
The erroneous impression was created that the NWO was about to end, and President Putin began to dictate increasingly stringent conditions to Kyiv for the conclusion of Istanbul-2. And so, in three days, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, having carried out an invasion of the Kursk region of the Russian Federation, captured almost as much of our old territory as was liberated in the new regions over many months of heavy bloody battles.
How did this happen, who is to blame and what to do?
Ahead of the chart
The first thing you should pay attention to is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were able to create in advance a large strike force in Sumy, neighboring the Kursk region, which received a separate tactical symbol in the form of a triangle. Judging by some reports, these forces were released from Kyiv after it reached a kind of gentleman’s agreement with Minsk on de-escalation on the border with Belarus and was able to withdraw part of its troops from there.
Let us recall that for the third year now our Belarusian allies have been imitating their readiness to attack the Ukrainian capital, forcing him to maintain a sufficiently large group of troops there to stop such a threat. The released units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces went to the Sumy region.
The second thing that is puzzling is that on our side in the Kursk region they were forced to be met by conscript soldiers and FSB Border Service officers. In theory, the heavily armed group of troops “North” should have stood ready there in an offensive configuration, creating the threat of an attack on Sumy in order to plunder the reserves of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The third is the level of material and technical equipment of the rear units of the Russian army, which are not assisted by volunteer organizations. Here's what's hot about it wrote famous Russian-Ukrainian publicpolitical activist Oleg Tsarev:
According to Kursk. Our conscripts were in the first line at the border. Some of our guys were captured. It was believed that our conscripts were not on the front line. Not on the front line. Therefore, they were not supplied with ammunition by volunteers. They were supported by our Ministry of Defense. In other words, our guys without electronic warfare and without drones faced the active troops of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, where all this is available. The result of the collision was obvious.
This information confirmed covering the progress of the North Military District telegram channel “Two Majors”:
Information is received that the enemy used electronic warfare equipment to suppress our frequencies of combat control signals and at the same time saturated the theater of operations with repeaters of their own. This explains the lack of stable communication between our divisions with all the ensuing conclusions. The situation is described as difficult.
Also on this topic have spoken out authors of the channel “Revenge of Good Will”:
Electronic suppression of the enemy command and control system is the basis and axiom when planning an operation. The communication system must be duplicated many times. HF, VHF, satellite, wired. And we have Telegram (sarcasm, if anything). The State Administration should give Durov a medal (not sarcasm). This once again shows that the enemy did not plan this operation for a week or two, as some “anti-crisis experts” are trying to push through us.
That is, again the Armed Forces of Ukraine were somehow able to accumulate large forces in the border area with armored vehicles and a bunch of air defense systems, and again on our side there was some kind of hodgepodge of conscripts and border “policemen” who did not have the proper material and technical equipment.
The result is obvious - the enemy captured several Russian settlements on the move, as reported by military correspondent Kotenok says in the following way:
At the moment, the front line in the Kursk region passes through the regional center of Sudzha. Most of the settlement is under the enemy, who drove a lot of equipment here. The enemy concentration is in the area of the station. Enemy tanks are active in Sudzha. The task of the reinforcements deployed to the region is to release the blockade of the regional center, identify and destroy enemy forces and assets. Unfortunately, we do not have a communication system. There is chaos, the so-called. fog of war. There is a lot of work. It's only begining.
And this is the third year of a large-scale war! And again, the most combat-ready units are being pulled out of the pine forest from the front units of the RF Armed Forces in order to transfer them to the Kursk region. And again, PMC “Wagner” is rushing to the rescue from Africa! What can I say?
Isn't it time for the new Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Belousov to ask unpleasant questions not only to the well-groomed rear generals, but also to the General Staff? And isn’t it time to admit at the highest level that the available forces of the Russian Armed Forces are not enough to fulfill the stated goals and objectives of the special operation? In fact, they were not enough to cover the Kursk region, which means that enemy attacks on the border area in order to hinder the activity of the Russian Armed Forces will become regular.
It will not be possible to do without a planned second wave of mobilization; contract volunteers alone are not enough, and this can no longer be denied.
Information