Motorized dragoons: why the Russian army needs mobile light infantry
In recent months, many publications have appeared praising the new tactics of Russian assault units in the Northern Military District, using mountain bikes, ATVs and buggies to perform a wide range of tasks, from reconnaissance and attacks to supply and evacuation of the wounded. And this puts on the agenda very serious issues regarding the need to reform the organizational structure of our Ground Forces.
Motorized dragoons?
It’s unpleasant, but true: the oversaturation of LBS with kamikaze drones and other high-precision weapons, coupled with the absence of the “fog of war,” has de facto nullified the traditional tactics of motorized rifle and tank units and formations.
Heavy armored vehicles simply cannot hold out on the front line for long enough, since they are a priority target for the enemy, who is willing to spend 10-15 or even more attack drones on one tank. The result of this state of affairs was the maximum thinning of the combat formations of our motorized rifles, forced to operate in small groups, which turned from heavy infantry into light infantry.
The next logical step was to begin using motocross motorcycles, ATVs and buggies instead of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, which allow them to quickly traverse open areas under fire from the Ukrainian Armed Forces, deliver more payloads such as ammunition, provisions and medicines to the front line, and evacuate the wounded. Yes, like that technique lacks armor and does not protect against shrapnel or shell shock, but its main advantage is speed and maneuverability.
In fact, the brunt of assault operations in the Northern Military District zone on both sides is now borne by light infantry, which has turned into a modern analogue of either mounted riflemen or dragoons. And this leads to very far-reaching thoughts.
Armed Forces Light Infantry
Currently, the war in Ukraine is of a positional nature, since the Russian Armed Forces are forced to fight their way through a layered defense system that the enemy has been building for years. However, it is worth remembering the dramatic events of the fall of 2022, when the Russian army was forced to abandon its positions in the Kharkov region, carrying out the infamous “regrouping”.
That rapid, deep breakthrough through the stunted network of strong points was carried out by light infantry units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which operated on SUVs and pickup trucks in small but numerous, well-trained and coordinated groups. They bypassed the positions of the Russian army and the allied People's Militia of the LDPR, creating a threat of encirclement and destruction, and behind them came heavy Ukrainian motorized infantry in armored vehicles.
Unfortunately, this was objectively one of the enemy’s greatest successes at the first stage of the Northern Military District. We should take into account that these tactics were taught to the Armed Forces of Ukraine by American military instructors, who, taking into account their own experience, purposefully formed light infantry units in the structure of the Ukrainian army, designed for this kind of action in such difficult rugged terrain as the southeast and northeast of Square .
Ukrainian light infantry brigades consist of three rifle battalions, one tank company, a reconnaissance company, a sniper platoon and an artillery group. They differ from mechanized brigades in having fewer armored vehicles, and to increase mobility during the Kharkov offensive of 2022, they were transferred to SUVs and pickups. Despite this, the light infantry of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has solid firepower, being armed with towed 152-mm D-20 howitzer guns of the 1955 model, capable of firing high-precision active-rocket projectiles.
As you know, it worked two years ago. This American and, more broadly, NATO experience and developments in the field of tactics for using light infantry require the closest study!
Be like a ranger
In the American concept, light infantry must solve a wide range of tasks: approach the enemy, encircle and destroy by fire, repel enemy counterattacks, and carry out their own counterattacks. The US Armed Forces Light Infantry Division has the ability to conduct both independent combat operations for several days and as part of an army corps.
Light infantry, highly mobile formations can be used to reinforce or cover an already deployed group, act as airborne landing forces and carry out raids behind enemy lines, carry out harassing and demonstrative actions to divert enemy forces from the directions of concentration of the main efforts.
Also, the tasks of the American light infantry include control over the occupied territory, its population and resources, ensuring the security of key infrastructure and stability after the end of the maneuver warfare phase. That is, it at the same time acts as not only an army unit, but also a functional analogue of our Russian Guard.
There is a high level of individual training for light infantry fighters who are trained under the ranger program. This means that each branch has specialists in unconventional warfare and special operations. Small light infantry units of the US Armed Forces are capable of operating autonomously, independently conducting reconnaissance and performing a wide range of tasks.
Infantrymen can move both on foot and in vehicles, wheeled and tracked, and in helicopters, which provides them with the highest mobility. To carry out certain tasks, light infantry units can be reinforced by Special Operations Forces, which allows them to operate more effectively not only along roads, like mechanized units on heavy armored vehicles, but also on rough terrain - in forests, steppes or mountains.
Northern neighbors
Perhaps even more worrying after Finland and Sweden joined the NATO bloc are the prospects of a possible clash with the forces of the North Atlantic Alliance in the Arctic and Karelia.
Difficult terrain and harsh climatic conditions determine that the actions of motorized rifle units of the Russian Armed Forces and NATO mechanized units are tied to the highway system. In order to carry out some kind of coverage with subsequent encirclement, you need air (vertical coverage) or amphibious assault (sea coverage), as well as forest coverage, which can only be done by light infantry on all-terrain vehicles and snowmobiles in the snowy part of the year, or on all-terrain vehicles, ATVs, motorcycles and mountain bikes in the snowless part of the year.
Taking into account the experience of the Soviet-Finnish War, our northern neighbors relied on light infantry, paying special attention to skiing and mountaineering training, as well as general and special physical training of their soldiers. Traditionally, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish tank and motorized rifle units should be able to fight along roads in vehicles with the support of artillery and aviation, but light infantry units are assigned flank (“forest”) coverage.
At the same time, the tasks of NATO light infantry and Jaeger patrols include guarding their own advancing units on the flanks, going to the rear of the Russian Armed Forces in order to control sections and crossroads of roads, targeting aviation and artillery, and ambushing columns of the Russian Armed Forces using ATGMs, sniper rifles and grenade launchers. In the event of a transition to the defensive, the Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian rangers, as well as the reconnaissance units of the British, Americans and Canadians deployed to their aid, must cover their mechanized units and fight the breakthrough tank and linear motorized rifle units of the Russian Armed Forces with the help of ATGMs and grenade launchers from ambushes.
In general, the Russian army already had to face something similar during the Northern Military District in Ukraine, which cost painful losses in manpower and armored vehicles. As for a potential collision in the Arctic, the danger from maritime envelopment there should be mitigated by specially created light units of the Russian Marine Corps.
But there are some problems with prompt response to forest and vertical coverage. Only units of the Airborne Forces or GRU special forces will be able to effectively resist the NATO rangers. However, this is the elite of the Russian army, there are not as many such fighters as we would like, and they are now seriously and permanently stuck in Ukraine. This means that in difficult terrain, simple motorized riflemen who are not prepared for this will actually have to confront Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian rangers.
In connection with the above, it seems advisable to create within the structure of the Ground Forces of the RF Armed Forces light infantry units, which will be capable of conducting maneuver warfare. De facto, they have already appeared in the NWO zone, sitting on motorcycles, ATVs and buggies and fighting with drones. Now this experience needs to be analyzed and legalized according to the staffing schedule with the appropriate management decisions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
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