Updating the Russian surface navy: problems and prospects

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The Russian Navy is still an impressive force, although the navies of NATO countries publicly recognize, in fact, only its underwater component as their real “headache”. The French military website Meta-Defense writes about this. The construction of new, truly high-quality Russian submarines is proceeding dynamically, but with regard to the renewal of the surface fleet, the situation is much less rosy than it sounds in the official discourse.

The backbone of the Russian Navy continues to be ships inherited from Soviet times. This is the only aircraft carrier "Admiral Kuznetsov", as well as two nuclear-powered cruisers Kirov [project 1144 "Orlan"], two conventional cruisers Slava [project 1164 "Atlant"] and ten destroyers of the "Udaloy" class [large anti-submarine ships of project 1155 "Frigate"] and “Modern” [project 956 “Sarych”], commissioned between 1985 and 1998. Now they require very significant stages of maintenance and modernization, reducing the high seas fleet by half on average, especially since numerous incidents have occurred at Russian shipyards during these works, sometimes with significant delays in the return of ships to service

– writes the French portal.



There are not isolated cases when work on modernizing these large ships lasts for many years. In this regard, the story of the heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov is indicative, the modernization of which (after fifteen years of deliberation on the topic “shouldn’t it be scrapped?”) began in 2013, with the initial intention of completing it in five years. Then the final dates for the ship's commissioning were regularly shifted, according to the latest data - its launch for sea trials is scheduled for November of this year.

“Chronic diseases” of Russian shipbuilding


Domestic shipyards are gradually increasing their volumes; they can rightly boast of a noticeable increase in the total number of ships commissioned annually. However, the construction programs for new large surface units, the list of which currently includes only heavy frigates of Project 22350, are facing significant difficulties, especially in terms of construction time. Delays and postponements with chronic regularity accompanied the commissioning of each of the ships of this series (Admiral Gorshkov, Admiral Kasatonov and Admiral Golovko).

The frigate Admiral Isakov, laid down in 2013 and awaiting launch in September of this year, did not escape this either. Although not by much (to 2026-2029), the deadlines for completing the construction of the four subsequent ships in the series, laid down in pairs in 2019-2020, have already been postponed. The latter will be given double striking power: UKSK (Universal Ship Firing Complex) with 32 cells instead of the previous 16.

The program to replace some of the Russian destroyers with Project 22350M ships, also called “Super Gorshkov”, has not yet started. This suggests that the first destroyer of this class, with a larger displacement and better armament than the original 22350, will enter service no earlier than 2032

– notes Meta-Defense.

Indeed, in addition to the Admiral Gorshkov class frigates, the main efforts of Russian industry in surface shipbuilding continue to be focused on the production of corvettes, small missile ships and patrol ships. The French resource, which has never before been seen in any “pro-Russian” views (rather, the opposite), rates the new Russian corvettes highly overall:

It must be admitted that the Project 20380 Steregushchy corvettes are remarkably armed for a ship weighing only 2 thousand tons. As for the new Project 20385 Gremyashchiye with their 8 UKSK silos for Caliber, Onyx or Zircon missiles and 16 anti-aircraft launch containers of the Redut complex, they are armed no worse than Western frigates, although they are smaller in displacement. However, both have a very limited endurance at sea, only 15 days, making them suitable for naval operations in coastal areas, but not for operations in the high seas.

The causes of the problems in the domestic military shipbuilding industry have almost nothing to do with the effects of “Western sanctions.” To some extent, of course, one can refer to “shortages” in technology and personnel with the required qualifications, although this has been going on for years and decades. As well as complaints that many key industries called upon to provide surface shipbuilding under the USSR were located in Ukraine, while the construction of submarines was entirely a “Russian” sphere.

What does the real future of the Russian surface fleet look like?


Most likely, the general vector of its development and renewal will remain the same. It is simply unrealistic to expect some “miracles” and “breakthroughs” in domestic shipbuilding, since this requires huge investments and large-scale technical re-equipment. However, this is “stability”. Not as rosy as propaganda portrays, but quite pragmatic, and in any case better than the fruits of unbridled “reform” and “optimization.”

Even such modernization of the Russian Navy makes it possible to maintain a very significant potential for deterring external threats, relying on the strategic power of the submarine fleet and the priority protection of its own coastal waters. The idea of ​​“driving” warships and even entire aircraft carrier formations to the shores of the “enemy” in order to achieve some kind of militarypolitical benefits have long since exhausted themselves: just remember the current situation in the Red Sea.

If anything could be a truly new approach to Russian naval doctrine, it would be a major overhaul of interactions with its global allies, especially China.

Russian and Chinese navies are following almost radically opposite trajectories. While China has an impressive high seas surface fleet supported by only a small number of ocean-going nuclear submarines, Russia has a very powerful ocean-going submarine fleet, but the high seas fleet is in decline

– emphasizes the Meta-Defense portal.

French military analysts do not hide that if the Russian Federation and China began to more closely integrate their naval potentials, “the geopolitical map of the world would become extremely difficult for the West,” especially considering the fact that all the leading Western powers are critically dependent on control over oceans and key maritime chokepoints. In fact, open hints of such a scenario come from the regular “joint patrols” of Russian and Chinese warships – usually near Japan, but this year, significantly affecting the South China Sea.

However, neither side is seeking to force a clear “blockade” between Moscow and Beijing. The Kremlin and the Russian elites have their own motives for this, and in the mass public In a consciousness where the narratives of “great power” and “Russia’s special path” dominate, this will also be perceived very negatively.

There is much less rejection of the idea that Russia and China would simply “exchange technology and industrial capacities." In relation to naval shipbuilding, this may be especially relevant: while Russian shipyards are trying their best to “jump in over their head”, using available resources and technical capabilities to the limit, China, on the contrary, has problems of “overcapacity” in this area.

In terms of naval technology, one will have to take into account that Russia does not have many advantages, such as, for example, domestic shipborne strike weapons systems. In most other areas, China is successfully moving towards world leadership or has already achieved it. But this does not in the least prevent Russia from reaping the benefits of its own leadership in relation to other countries of the Global South - India, Vietnam, Iran and many others.
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  1. +3
    30 July 2024 19: 31
    The 21st century is quietly approaching its first third, and with it a lot of new, revolutionary things. That is why the old methods of counting force by quantity and tonnage will probably be replaced by the level of quality, as the steam fleet once smashed the numerous sailing fleet. That is why the rush to build a large fleet is slowed down by the fate of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in the North-Eastern Military District. It is not time to switch to unmanned submarines, the forerunner and mammoth of which is the Poseidon, and the effectiveness of various surface Maguras.
    1. -2
      30 July 2024 21: 32
      the black sea is a dirty puddle hi no fleet will survive there.
      1. -3
        30 July 2024 23: 44
        A puddle is bigger, a puddle is smaller, but the principles are the same. And who needs a large fleet, to drift, because going to the shore is unpredictably dangerous. Sea trade routes are no longer needed by the Russian Federation and China today, land routes have been established and are sufficient in a special period. A large fleet, as a striking force, is already becoming a big target today, the Black Sea Navy of the Russian Federation is an example of this, like the first swallow...
        1. -4
          31 July 2024 11: 34
          which ones are the same? The black sea is being shot from shore to shore. hi If you drive all the American fleets there from the Crimea, they will be drowned in half an hour without going to sea.
  2. +3
    30 July 2024 21: 01
    For some reason, when I read something about the state of affairs in the navy, a question always arises both for the authors of these articles and for those who write comments to them. Do you even imagine the real role that the AUGs are called upon to perform in the event of a nuclear war? Or do you think that they serve solely to "show the flag"? No! Their main task is to cover the deployment sites of their attack submarines, and the closer these positions are to potential targets, the shorter the flight time of the missiles and the lower the chance of intercepting them. In real combat, the AUG will never operate within the range of coastal and ship-based anti-ship missiles (they will not approach the shore, and ships and submarines will simply not be allowed to attack). So, sad as it is, the Stars and Stripes are doing well, even taking into account their "ancient" sea-based ICBMs, and the fact that they are preparing to write off the Ticonderogas will not change the general situation. But we have a complete mess with covering the deployment of our strategists...
    1. -2
      30 July 2024 21: 34
      There are so many of these missiles and their delivery options that they are just show-offs for savages. hi Hundreds, if not thousands, will fly back.
      1. 0
        30 July 2024 21: 40
        I support Russia doesn’t need aug, it makes no sense and is unaffordable
        1. -2
          30 July 2024 21: 41
          Russian submarines of the United States lose without any aug and then search with the whole herd....
          1. -2
            30 July 2024 21: 50
            I fully support the main advantage of a submarine, its stealth, it does not need to be accompanied by surface ships, this unmasks it (unless it is a random dry cargo ship)
            1. 0
              3 August 2024 12: 58
              There is no need to present everything so simply. NK with air defense systems usually block the “zone” (create a missile defense/air defense line) where our ARKV SN are located, so that Poseidon-type UUV aircraft cannot destroy them with impunity. Multi-purpose submarines do the same thing - they organize a line for intercepting enemy submarines on the way to the ROP of our strategists. So, NK are definitely needed. And in general, the fleet must be BALANCED in terms of branches and strengths of the Navy. This is an axiom, and whoever has not matured enough to understand this postulate, let him play “tanks”, because he is not smart enough for more. It may be offensive, but essentially true!
              AHA.
              1. 0
                3 August 2024 21: 38
                yes, of course, it is necessary to cover the areas around the submarine bases from enemy aircraft, but our fighter aircraft and coastal air defense systems are very effective for this, the NK SAMs are designed for self-defense of the ship itself, which is quite weak, and it is unrealistic to clear the sea of ​​enemy aircraft with them, the cruiser Nakhimov must stand in the middle of the Barents Sea and provide cover, and other NKs are unlikely to cope with this task effectively
    2. 0
      30 July 2024 21: 48
      when someone talks about covering nuclear submarine deployment sites



      Who in their right mind can imagine the suppression of the coastal defense of the western and eastern coasts of the USA by our surface ships? Apparently the one who destroyed the cruiser Moskva wants to destroy thousands of sailors off the coast of the USA because no surface ships can repel an attack by many coastal missiles
      1. +1
        31 July 2024 11: 35
        Well, why are you reasoning so childishly? Who is talking about suppressing coastal defenses or do you have visions of dashing amphibious landings? In order to at least understand a little what an AUG is and its purpose, inquire about its composition, performance characteristics and purpose of the ships included in it, the composition of the aircraft carrier's air unit and the capabilities of the aviation based on it, find out the range of anti-ship missiles, sea and land versions. Maybe when you find out, it will dawn on you that the operational deployment zones of strike submarines are not a place in the wake formation behind the flagship, but hundreds of square miles protected from enemy aviation and anti-submarine weapons. I really hope that having understood that an AUG does not cover the deployment of its submarines exclusively with the hulls of the ships included in it, you will stop reasoning like a child.
        1. -2
          31 July 2024 21: 06
          the composition of the AUG is an aircraft with the ability to have 6 aircraft in the sky, and something else ... namely, from the navy, old BPK 8 VMP, two even more obsolete cruisers and one nuclear, a dozen corvettes and a dozen frigates, all of these coastal except for the cruiser, the ships have a flawed air defense rely on the support of coastal aviation and (6 aircraft in the Kuzi will not replace it of course), and limited strike capabilities, BPK frigates and corvettes have an important function of submarines of the Barents Sea and the sea near the bases, except for Nazhimov, which alone will not protect your entire armada, except for just one nuclear, that is, a whole fleet of tankers is needed, and supply ships that need escort frigates corvettes and minesweepers ... which are not there, ... if all 1164 1155 frigates and corvettes are engaged in the convoy of transports and their direct responsibility of coastal submarines, then from your navy armada can insert a damaged defenseless cousin with Nakhimov......who do you want to surprise and amaze with your funny armada of two ships, somewhere far from your shores....? what tasks can it solve? ... don't make me laugh... young man
          1. +1
            1 August 2024 07: 41
            Vladimir, it seems that you are debating with yourself. You write something yourself, you answer it yourself, any dialogue is, first of all, an exchange of opinions. I was talking only about the main purpose of the AUG in the conditions of a modern nuclear war, and not at all about the state of the modern Russian fleet. Today it simply does not exist.
            1. -2
              1 August 2024 09: 35
              in the conditions of a modern nuclear war, AUGs do not play any role at all, AUGs are against the Papuans, for example, it turned out that AUGs are also useless against the Houthis.... if we talk about the naval component of the Navy, then this is certainly the SSBN and other submarines, thank God the wisdom of Admiral Amelko and President Putin is realized in the fact that Russia is making great efforts to develop the submarine majority of the fleet, this is the right course, we need more submarines of all types, submarines are the basis of our fleet today, because we simply cannot afford such a large fleet, including an aircraft carrier fleet like the USA and China, we need to be realistic, and if we can't afford an AUG, then there is no need to discuss what it could do... what would be its tasks and composition, if mushrooms grew in your mouth, then it would not be a mouth but a whole vegetable garden,
              1. +1
                1 August 2024 11: 50
                But here I can only partially agree. With the fact that today we cannot afford it and that the chosen course of increasing the underwater component is the only one available today. In other respects - no. Submarines in operational deployment zones near the enemy coast, without surface forces are suicide bombers, "with a one-way ticket", when trying to reach places from where shooting with guaranteed destruction is possible, the submarines will definitely be detected and it is not a fact that they will make it in time or will be allowed to shoot back. Surface forces of the fleet without air cover are also suicide bombers. So we have chosen the only possible option today - deployment positions either under the ice, or where the near-zone forces and coastal aviation operate.
                1. -1
                  1 August 2024 17: 19
                  you are contradicting yourself, you are deeply wrong! submarines have their main advantage of stealth, stealth and once again stealth, otherwise there would be no point in them, asserting the importance of submarines, we must agree that they are secretive and will not be detected in deployment areas, otherwise why would we need submarines?.. ..
                  1 you yourself confirmed that I was right by mentioning ice, yes it is! deployment areas are under ice and the boat cannot be found there and the surface ships have nothing to do there,
                  2 your second statement confirms my rightness, you falsely claim that submarines can or should fly from their basing areas, we have already heard this not only from you! This is stupidity, because then they can be replaced with Iskanders and Yars, which are much more stealthy and cheaper, but you have shown that the range of submarine missiles is quite large, which means they do not necessarily have to approach the enemy shore directly with sonars and anti-aircraft weapons, a submarine can fire from the open ocean, where it cannot be found because the ocean is very large and the submarine is very small compared to the ocean, and anti-aircraft weapons have a very limited range and the US is not capable of embracing the ocean
                  3 thus the submarines do not need protection in the deployment areas!!!!!! that is, under ice or in the open ocean
                  4, the weak point can only be the submarine base, because its coordinates are known and the entire Navy should have the main task of covering submarine bases within a radius of 1000-3000 km, which means that all frigates and corvettes with em and cruisers need to be brought to the north and Kamchatka, to develop the coastal aviation of the Navy , maintain and expand underwater tracking systems, coastal batteries, and we don’t need an aircraft carrier
                  1. 0
                    1 August 2024 22: 14
                    Vladimir, I will answer in the same order as you:
                    1. To begin with, I suggest you take a world map and calculate the distance from the edge of the Arctic ice, where our submarines go to get rid of annoying escorts, at least to Washington or New York, and then calculate the distance from the Dardanelles Strait and the zones in the North Sea to Moscow and St. Petersburg. I think you will have no doubt that their firing positions are much closer than ours. And this is the flight time of missiles and the time for the missile defense system to operate. In addition, firing from underwater is not a problem today, but from under the ice, here you need to look for clean water, or emerge, breaking the ice with your hull.
                    2. Here you write that I falsely assert that the boats can or should fire from their base areas and that this is stupidity, because then they can be replaced with Iskanders and Yarses, which are much more stealthy and cheaper.
                    No, I categorically do not assert this, and the possibility and most likely the necessity of such shooting is not stupidity, but, unfortunately, the bitter reality of today. And you are in vain thinking that mobile ground-based complexes can replace something. They cannot replace either strategic or multi-purpose strike nuclear submarines, at least because even if the strike catches them on the march/combat patrol, they still need to reach their launch positions and fire a salvo, and this is time, when every minute counts. In addition, the only strategist with an intercontinental range of them is the Yars complex, while the Iskander is a pure tactician with a range of 500 km. For Europe from Kaliningrad, it may be enough, but to the USA? And the power of the warheads of these complexes is significantly inferior to the power of the warheads of strategic silo- and sea-based ICBMs. So, the possibility of firing from the basing areas is not from the "good" life, but precisely in order to increase the combat survivability and safety of the submarines, because there is nothing to cover them with further in the open sea. And another point and this is an accomplished fact - on August 6, 1991, as part of the Begemot-2 exercises, from the waters of the Barents Sea from the K-407 Novomoskovsk submarine, the entire ammunition load was fired in a salvo with an interval of 14 seconds, and this is 16 R-29RMU2 Sineva missiles with a maximum range of 8300 km - 11 km, depending on the throw weight. Probably it was not in vain that they arranged such a demonstrative thing, no one before or after did this. The Americans fired a maximum of four. Calculate on the map, where will they fly?
                    3. Regarding the difficulties of detecting submarines in the ocean – let it be known that since Soviet times, every time our strategists went out on combat patrol, a NATO multipurpose submarine was always “tied” behind them in neutral waters. And a game of “tag” would begin, our submarine would try to shake off the escort and leave, and the NATO members would try not to lose it. Sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn’t. Now imagine what the chances of our submarine’s survival would be if not one submarine, but several were on its tail, and Poseidons were hanging in the sky, given that they simply don’t have their own anti-submarine and anti-missile defense systems, just as they don’t have their own aviation in the air. And the enemy’s task is not to escort, but to destroy? And to complete the picture, compare the number of submarines in the Russian Federation with the number of submarines in the USA.
                    4. Well, as for the bases' coverage - I can't argue with you here. I completely agree with you - it should be such that not a single bastard could even get close to them.
                    1. 0
                      1 August 2024 23: 09
                      I’ll answer you in the same order
                      1 the most protected capitals of the world are Beijing and Moscow because they are far from the sea, and all Western capitals are coastal cities and it is simply impossible to create air defense in them against blue and mace, Moscow is surrounded by S300 complexes and now also by shells
                      2 ice is broken by the hull; the technology has been worked out and tested, don’t worry, the submariners know their stuff
                      3 The fact that the enemy can lie in wait for a submarine at the base is due to the bungling of the criminal, stupid admirals of the USSR and Gorshkov personally, who filled the closed seas with useless targets, cruisers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes to cut up the rations, and left the submarine bases without proper cover. Unfortunately, even now the slow-witted admirals have gathered all the ships in the closed seas, and the Barents Sea and the Kamchatka part of the Pacific Ocean are criminally exposed. They removed Yevmenov, and I hope Moiseyev will transfer all the first and second rank surface ships to the oceans, or should he be removed too?
                      4 about the importance of covering the submarine bases so that enemies don't lie in wait for them there, I write constantly, and Putin has already said this and Shoigu at one time, but the criminality of the overfed admiralty is off the charts, the purge of the generals started by the respected president is supported by the people, and by me personally too, new generals are coming, and with them victories, it should continue in the navy, some of the admirals have already been removed and rightly so, they are being replaced by those who, I hope, better understand that both submarine bases must be covered, which I wrote about in the previous post, we should cover the bases and not dream like pink ponies in blue dreams about "deployment areas", "auga kugas" and we need to sell Kuzya and buy surveillance equipment and aviation to protect the submarine bases
                      1. 0
                        2 August 2024 08: 50
                        Vladimir, I am not trying to convince you of anything, I was just very interested to hear your opinion about the future of our fleet with arguments why it should be this way and not otherwise. You have "slid" to repeating the banal nonsense of our propagandists like "everything is lost, there is no money, there is no need to dream or think, we will all die, but someone will remain, everyone steals - but when the master comes, the master will judge us." But if you still try to "turn on" your brain, you do not start repairs in your own house by buying building materials, but probably first determine what exactly needs to be repaired and only then buy what is needed for the repair. If you are ready to continue the discussion, let's continue it, but let's not use someone else's nonsense. Let's proceed from a simple principle: we know the tasks set, we know our capabilities, we try to find ways to solve these problems.
                      2. 0
                        2 August 2024 22: 39
                        thank you, I understand, the tasks of the fleet and the future of the fleet as I see it ideally
                        1 strongest submarine fleet in the world, quiet, inconspicuous 40 SSBNs, 30 tactical submarines and 40 submarines
                        2 unmanned submarines 100-200
                        3 stationary underwater situation monitoring systems, within a radius of 1000 km from submarine bases
                        3 coastal aviation... 40 PLO-BE200 aircraft, naval missile-carrying aviation, A100 4 units
                        4 surface ships, 80 minesweepers, 40 small karakurt ships, 24 frigates and 24 corvettes, 1 nuclear cruiser, all first and second rank ships are located in the north and Kamchatka,
                        5 on closed seas a limited number of only third-rank ships, including all small missile ships, and in the Sea of ​​Japan and the Black Sea 6 napla
                        5 coastal missile systems of all types
                        6 landing ships, such as Serna 40 and Dugong 20, and 2 landing ships per fleet
                      3. 0
                        3 August 2024 19: 07
                        Vladimir, everything you wrote is not just fantasy, it is a fairy tale. But seriously, it seems to me that one cannot draw conclusions about the necessary quantitative composition and types of ships in the fleets, relying only on emotions. Probably, it is still necessary first of all to take into account the threats that Russia faces today and the range of possible tasks that the fleet will have to solve in order to eliminate these threats as effectively as possible. Therefore, I will not undertake to draw conclusions about how much and what is needed for aviation and the surface fleet, I can only express my opinion only on the composition of the naval nuclear component.
                        It seems to me that you will not object to the fact that due to circumstances today we are put in the position of the defending party, and our only guarantee against attack is the presence of our nuclear weapons (nuclear triad) and the ability to guarantee their use, with the achievement of consequences unacceptable to our opponents. The highest degree of secrecy as carriers of nuclear weapons today are possessed by the nuclear submarines of the Northern and Pacific fleets, which means that the primary task of development should be the constant increase in the power of the underwater component. And what I definitely agree with you on is that our nuclear submarine fleet should not only be as good as the American one, it is simply obliged to surpass it, well, at least qualitatively. How can this be achieved? It seems to me that along with the construction of new Borei-class SSBNs and Yasen-class SSNs, today it would not be at all superfluous to carry out a deep modernization of the Akula-class SSBNs, turning them into carriers of strategic cruise missiles with an intercontinental range. And here you have almost ready carriers for the naval version of the Burevestnik cruise missile or something similar. If I am not mistaken, today we have 3 Akulas withdrawn from the fleet to the reserve, and the fact that they lag behind the boats of new projects in terms of noise level is quite solvable at the tactical level - they just need to be deployed in a position where the fleet with its available forces can provide them with guaranteed cover from enemy anti-submarine warfare systems. In order to eliminate threats from the AUG and strategic submarines of the enemy and wean them off "hanging around" in areas of possible launches, I believe that the issue of creating such underwater fighter forces, capable of covering the deployment of their strategists and destroying enemy submarine and surface forces, is quite ripe. The main indicators are small size, high speed and maneuverability, low noise. To do this, I believe it is necessary to either revive a class of nuclear submarines such as the Project 705K Lira submarines of the USSR, or develop, by analogy with the Poseidon, an autonomous unmanned vehicle with a similar purpose to the Lira (although this option seems more complicated to me). They should be armed with anti-ship missiles with a range exceeding the action of the anti-submarine defense system and carrier-based AUG aviation, which will allow them to operate without entering potentially dangerous zones, as well as torpedo tubes of 533 and 650 mm calibers. And note that all this is only necessary to preserve the fleet's current balance of strategic forces in the future. And we will build aircraft carriers and long-range ships later, perhaps.
                      4. 0
                        3 August 2024 22: 18
                        I agree and support the revival of sharks, and the priority development of SSBNs and submarines to cover them, but I think that all this is only possible within a radius of 3000 km from the bases for financial and technical reasons, so deployment areas outside this circle cannot be covered and there the submarine will mainly use stealth as the main advantage, but within a radius of 3000 km from submarine bases it is necessary to ensure their safe movement of air defense and air defense in the water area, for which the entire Navy is intended except the SSBNs themselves
                      5. 0
                        4 August 2024 09: 24
                        Vladimir, I wanted to write for a long time, but somehow it slipped through. It’s always nice to communicate with a person who cares and has his own opinion.
                        Regarding the organization of cover in the far sea zone, I completely agree with you, but here again we come up against the issue of aircraft carriers, because without aviation such cover is “zero”, and the presence of an aircraft carrier is a mandatory formation of an AUG. But the reality is that this does not “shine” even in the distant future. So I remembered their proverb: “God created all people different, but Colonel Colt invented his six-shooter revolver to equalize their chances,” and I thought - since we can’t approach the same distances for launches as them, it’s worth trying to drive them away as far as possible .
                  2. 0
                    3 August 2024 13: 28
                    Quote: vladimir1155
                    pl do not need protection at deployment sites!

                    1. What do you understand by the concept of “cover”? what
                    2. There are no "deployment sites". There are “routes” of deployment (transition of units to ROPs - areas of firing positions) and ROPs - areas from where it is planned to apply missile launchers to targets designated for destruction. Yes
                    3. The ideal situation can be considered when the ROP is turned into an AD/A2 zone. But this is not “cover,” it is isolation of the ROP from the penetration of enemy PLS.

                    Quote: vladimir1155
                    but we don’t need an aircraft carrier

                    You, on the shore, definitely don’t need it. And we, sailors, need it so much in the DMZ! And preferably AVMA class and preferably a couple for each ocean fleet. Yes
                    But “Mr. Ataman has no gold reserves,” and Lefty was sold cheaply to the capitalists.... Again, Kulibins: the old ones have already retired, and the young ones are just coming into force. And they haven’t built enough forges and workshops for the workers yet... Again, there are problems with the small scope. But the Yankees and Nemchuras don’t really share them with the Hongfuzes. So the flea remains unskilled for now. laughing
                    AHA.
                    1. 0
                      3 August 2024 22: 02
                      1 under cover I mean PMO air defense and air defense of this area
                      2 I’m glad that you finally leaked your false argument about “deployment locations”, realizing its falsity... yes, I agree deployment routes in those places where they are calculated by the enemy. need to be covered, it is clear that they can only be identified within a radius of 1000-3000 km from the submarine base, if possible, that’s where it needs to be covered, which is what I wrote about more than once and I wrote this to you too
                      3 then you have an untranslatable play on words about lefty and pan ataman, and gold reserves and your personal desire to have av, at the people's expense..... but I will translate! Unfortunately, it often happens that a supposedly combat, supposedly necessary surface ship is useless for the Motherland, a burden, and serves exclusively as a means of sawing off the salaries of those officers who have forgotten the honor and duty and high service "to defend the Motherland", because on a particularly large NK you can comfortably get both rides and money and seniority.... while the brave infantry, risking their lives, crawls across the field in the mud, while valiant pilots, artillerymen, missilemen and others strike at the enemy, while courageous submariners in a cramped boat defend our Motherland., while small minesweepers in any weather and pitching carry out important and dangerous service, .... some sit out in bases, but why do they need our Motherland? that's why I do not accept your arguments and am waiting for proof
                      and the combat stability of your aircraft
                      b its usefulness in combat
                      in the efficiency (price-quality) of hundreds of billions of costs for this trough, compared to thousands of units of s300, a100, t90, su47, be200 plo, tens of thousands of geraniums and fabs, or hundreds of tu 160, yars and boreys
    3. -1
      31 July 2024 00: 27
      even if there is a large part of truth in your words. then what's the difference. who will strike first? Someone will die first. and someone a little later Otvetka will have time to fly away to where it needs to go. In general, a war doesn’t just start off like that. There are a lot of unmasking signs of preparation for the outbreak of war and they are being closely monitored.
    4. -1
      31 July 2024 05: 46
      Quote: bug120560
      Do you even imagine the real role that AUGs are called upon to perform in the event of a nuclear war?

      Introducing. And they do in all civilized countries. But not in Russia. request
  3. +1
    31 July 2024 00: 21
    Empty article. Lots of words. But there is no analytics at all. Another blah-blah-blah. The fleet is not relevant now. All problems are mainly solved on land and have always been solved on land since time immemorial. Russia is a continental power. No need to spend money on rank 1 ships. Corvettes are enough to fight submarines and ensure the exit of our strategic submarines from bases. The main thing is the development of our aviation. Special attention to anti-submarine (if we raise the issue of the fleet). But there is no sign of those in power. Apparently they have other tasks. But the author will never raise this issue. He wrote another gibberish. He got the money and that's it.
  4. +1
    31 July 2024 11: 24
    only one thing is clear: each ship must have at least a shell of -1 cm
  5. 0
    25 August 2024 17: 12
    They may come for genuine comments on this topic. Theater aunts were given 6 years each for a performance that received 2 of the highest Russian theater awards