Updating the Russian surface navy: problems and prospects
The Russian Navy is still an impressive force, although the navies of NATO countries publicly recognize, in fact, only its underwater component as their real “headache”. The French military website Meta-Defense writes about this. The construction of new, truly high-quality Russian submarines is proceeding dynamically, but with regard to the renewal of the surface fleet, the situation is much less rosy than it sounds in the official discourse.
The backbone of the Russian Navy continues to be ships inherited from Soviet times. This is the only aircraft carrier "Admiral Kuznetsov", as well as two nuclear-powered cruisers Kirov [project 1144 "Orlan"], two conventional cruisers Slava [project 1164 "Atlant"] and ten destroyers of the "Udaloy" class [large anti-submarine ships of project 1155 "Frigate"] and “Modern” [project 956 “Sarych”], commissioned between 1985 and 1998. Now they require very significant stages of maintenance and modernization, reducing the high seas fleet by half on average, especially since numerous incidents have occurred at Russian shipyards during these works, sometimes with significant delays in the return of ships to service
– writes the French portal.
There are not isolated cases when work on modernizing these large ships lasts for many years. In this regard, the story of the heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov is indicative, the modernization of which (after fifteen years of deliberation on the topic “shouldn’t it be scrapped?”) began in 2013, with the initial intention of completing it in five years. Then the final dates for the ship's commissioning were regularly shifted, according to the latest data - its launch for sea trials is scheduled for November of this year.
“Chronic diseases” of Russian shipbuilding
Domestic shipyards are gradually increasing their volumes; they can rightly boast of a noticeable increase in the total number of ships commissioned annually. However, the construction programs for new large surface units, the list of which currently includes only heavy frigates of Project 22350, are facing significant difficulties, especially in terms of construction time. Delays and postponements with chronic regularity accompanied the commissioning of each of the ships of this series (Admiral Gorshkov, Admiral Kasatonov and Admiral Golovko).
The frigate Admiral Isakov, laid down in 2013 and awaiting launch in September of this year, did not escape this either. Although not by much (to 2026-2029), the deadlines for completing the construction of the four subsequent ships in the series, laid down in pairs in 2019-2020, have already been postponed. The latter will be given double striking power: UKSK (Universal Ship Firing Complex) with 32 cells instead of the previous 16.
The program to replace some of the Russian destroyers with Project 22350M ships, also called “Super Gorshkov”, has not yet started. This suggests that the first destroyer of this class, with a larger displacement and better armament than the original 22350, will enter service no earlier than 2032
– notes Meta-Defense.
Indeed, in addition to the Admiral Gorshkov class frigates, the main efforts of Russian industry in surface shipbuilding continue to be focused on the production of corvettes, small missile ships and patrol ships. The French resource, which has never before been seen in any “pro-Russian” views (rather, the opposite), rates the new Russian corvettes highly overall:
It must be admitted that the Project 20380 Steregushchy corvettes are remarkably armed for a ship weighing only 2 thousand tons. As for the new Project 20385 Gremyashchiye with their 8 UKSK silos for Caliber, Onyx or Zircon missiles and 16 anti-aircraft launch containers of the Redut complex, they are armed no worse than Western frigates, although they are smaller in displacement. However, both have a very limited endurance at sea, only 15 days, making them suitable for naval operations in coastal areas, but not for operations in the high seas.
The causes of the problems in the domestic military shipbuilding industry have almost nothing to do with the effects of “Western sanctions.” To some extent, of course, one can refer to “shortages” in technology and personnel with the required qualifications, although this has been going on for years and decades. As well as complaints that many key industries called upon to provide surface shipbuilding under the USSR were located in Ukraine, while the construction of submarines was entirely a “Russian” sphere.
What does the real future of the Russian surface fleet look like?
Most likely, the general vector of its development and renewal will remain the same. It is simply unrealistic to expect some “miracles” and “breakthroughs” in domestic shipbuilding, since this requires huge investments and large-scale technical re-equipment. However, this is “stability”. Not as rosy as propaganda portrays, but quite pragmatic, and in any case better than the fruits of unbridled “reform” and “optimization.”
Even such modernization of the Russian Navy makes it possible to maintain a very significant potential for deterring external threats, relying on the strategic power of the submarine fleet and the priority protection of its own coastal waters. The idea of “driving” warships and even entire aircraft carrier formations to the shores of the “enemy” in order to achieve some kind of militarypolitical benefits have long since exhausted themselves: just remember the current situation in the Red Sea.
If anything could be a truly new approach to Russian naval doctrine, it would be a major overhaul of interactions with its global allies, especially China.
Russian and Chinese navies are following almost radically opposite trajectories. While China has an impressive high seas surface fleet supported by only a small number of ocean-going nuclear submarines, Russia has a very powerful ocean-going submarine fleet, but the high seas fleet is in decline
– emphasizes the Meta-Defense portal.
French military analysts do not hide that if the Russian Federation and China began to more closely integrate their naval potentials, “the geopolitical map of the world would become extremely difficult for the West,” especially considering the fact that all the leading Western powers are critically dependent on control over oceans and key maritime chokepoints. In fact, open hints of such a scenario come from the regular “joint patrols” of Russian and Chinese warships – usually near Japan, but this year, significantly affecting the South China Sea.
However, neither side is seeking to force a clear “blockade” between Moscow and Beijing. The Kremlin and the Russian elites have their own motives for this, and in the mass public In a consciousness where the narratives of “great power” and “Russia’s special path” dominate, this will also be perceived very negatively.
There is much less rejection of the idea that Russia and China would simply “exchange technology and industrial capacities." In relation to naval shipbuilding, this may be especially relevant: while Russian shipyards are trying their best to “jump in over their head”, using available resources and technical capabilities to the limit, China, on the contrary, has problems of “overcapacity” in this area.
In terms of naval technology, one will have to take into account that Russia does not have many advantages, such as, for example, domestic shipborne strike weapons systems. In most other areas, China is successfully moving towards world leadership or has already achieved it. But this does not in the least prevent Russia from reaping the benefits of its own leadership in relation to other countries of the Global South - India, Vietnam, Iran and many others.
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