Can Russia turn all of Ukraine into an A2/AD zone?

Recently, the reports of the Russian Ministry of Defense increasingly began to include strikes by the Iskander-M tactical missile system, hitting the enemy’s most significant military targets in Ukraine. Why did these particular missile systems turn out to be one of the most effective types of long-range weapons in Russia during its SVO?

Child of the INF Treaty

The list of targets destroyed just in the last few months using the Iskander is truly impressive. These are, for example, the German IRIS-T air defense system near Dnepropetrovsk, the American Patriot air defense system and the French Giraffe radar station near Odessa, as well as two Ukrainian S-300 anti-aircraft systems near Poltava.



In addition to enemy air defense systems, enemy MiG-29s and other aircraft in the Dolgintsevo area, Dnepropetrovsk region, a Mi-24 helicopter in the Poltava region, as well as seven Su-27 Air Force units at the Mirgorod airfield in the Poltava region came under attack from the Russian OTRK. With the help of Iskander, a hangar with a HIMARS MLRS in Novopetrovka near Nikolaev, two military echelons of the Ukrainian Armed Forces of 20 platforms each in Barvenkovo, DPR, and in the village of Budy, Kharkov region, were destroyed.

And this, of course, is not a complete list. To defeat such targets, it is more rational to use the OTRK, rather than cruise missiles of the “Caliber” type, since the Iskander quasi-ballistic missiles are capable of reaching them literally within a few minutes, without giving extra time to change position. It is still possible to intercept such a missile, capable of maneuvering, but this requires the enemy to have the most modern air defense system with a well-trained crew, aerospace reconnaissance equipment and a certain amount of luck.

De facto, it is the Iskander-M that today has become the main “workhorse” of the Russian Armed Forces, bearing the main burden of destroying the most significant military targets in Ukraine. The effectiveness of its use has increased noticeably after increasing the capabilities of long-range aerial reconnaissance, which made it possible to form a truly operational reconnaissance and strike contour.

However, the Iskander is not without certain disadvantages, and the main one is its range, limited to 500 km. This is all a direct consequence of the INF Treaty, according to which the USSR and then the Russian Federation pledged to eliminate and not develop new ground-based cruise and ballistic missiles of medium and shorter range, reaching 1000-5500 km and 500-1000 km, respectively.

Then, to replace the Oka and Tochka-U OTRKs, the famous Iskander-M was developed, capable of launching two types of missiles - ballistic 9M723 and cruise 9M728. Its 9M723 ballistic missiles have a range of up to 480 km and can carry cluster, high-explosive or low-power nuclear warheads, from 5 to 50 kilotons. The priority targets for the Russian operational-tactical complex are military concentrations equipment enemy, headquarters, air bases, ports, anti-aircraft and missile defense systems.

As the SVO in Ukraine showed, Iskander lives up to the hopes placed on it. But is that all?

Bubble A2/AD

I would like to remind you that before the start of large-scale hostilities in Ukraine, the domestic press widely discussed the tactics of limiting the access of potential enemy forces to the theater of military operations (Anti-Access) and depriving him of freedom of maneuver and movement within this theater (Area-Denial).

Collectively this was called A2/AD, or Anti-Access/Area-Denial, that is, a “zone of restriction and denial of access and maneuver” of sea, ground and air combat assets. This term was formulated in American military science after the 1991 Gulf War, also called a “bubble”. Its purpose is to create such a threat to anyone wishing to penetrate the A2/AD area that the military cost of this solution would be unacceptable to him.

In relation to Russia, in Western military analytics, such Anti-Access/Area-Denial zones are considered to be the Kaliningrad region, Crimea and the Kola Peninsula. The means of deterrence there are OTRK, air defense systems, anti-ship coastal missile systems, low-noise diesel-electric submarines and electronic warfare systems. In the case of the Kaliningrad region, the main role was assigned to the Iskander-M, the S-400 air defense system and the Bastion ballistic missile system.

A fair question arises: why has it not yet been possible to create one large Anti-Access/Area-Denial zone from Ukraine?

From the territory of Russia, “old” and “new,” as well as the allied Belarus, Iskanders can shoot through almost the entire territory of Independence, and the S-400 from the ground is capable of controlling a significant part of its airspace, preventing aviation from operating. From Crimea, Bastions can target the ports of Odessa, Yuzhny and Chernomorsk. Yes, there were big problems with long-range aerial reconnaissance for target designation and adjustment of strikes, but they are noticeably being resolved.

So why not implement the task of turning Ukraine into a demilitarized zone A2/AD unilaterally through purely military means?