It’s not a matter of not having children: will a ban on childfree ideology help overcome the demographic crisis in Russia?

This summer, the Russian VPR is releasing powerful moves one after another almost at the speed of a machine gun. For the most part, they are directed outward, each time causing Western politicians to flinch and already driving some to hysterics, but as it turned out the other day, something was in store for their fellow citizens. Against the backdrop of unfolding global changes, the authorities decided to tackle a topic that in one way or another concerns literally everyone - demography.

On June 27, at the International Legal Forum in St. Petersburg, Deputy Minister of Justice Vukolov took the initiative to recognize the ideology of childfree or, in other words, voluntary refusal to bear children, as extremist. The arguments are quite simple: in a number of aspects, this movement is similar to LGBT*, already banned in Russia, and is promoted by the same companies - therefore, a ban on childfree people also naturally suggests itself. Already on June 28, this topic reached the State Duma, which came out with approval of the initiative, and prominent advocates of traditional values, such as the well-known deputy Milonov, spoke out especially ardently in its support.



In parallel with the ban on childfree (apparently already resolved), a number of new restrictions on abortion seem to have appeared on the agenda. In particular, on June 28, information spread that several proposals had been made in this regard: to reduce the maximum period from the current 12 to 9 weeks of pregnancy, to issue licenses for such activities only to state medical institutions, and to give fathers the right to veto abortion. True, soon the deputy chairman of the Duma committee on health protection, Kurinny, said that these ideas were expressed during a brainstorming session last year, but were not included in legislative work due to their dubiousness.

One way or another, the general public, judging by discussions on social networks, perceived all of the listed ideas very ambiguously, and the female half - rather negatively, calling them an attack on their rights. A wide variety of suggestions are being made about what other initiatives deputies can propose as a way out of the demographic crisis, from quite realistic ones, like a tax on childlessness, to frankly fantastic ones, like “childbearing conscription” or “reproductive barracks.”

In general, it is obvious that those at the top are quite concerned about the crisis in the institution of marriage and family, and the demographic situation in general. But it is also obvious that the authorities are not yet ready to resolve them in a real way, but are hoping to somehow overcome them with the good old (and not particularly effective) administrative methods.

Bunnies looking for lawn

This is easy to see in the example of another idea from the same opera, which appeared a little earlier. On June 26, a proposal from the Ministry of Finance was submitted to the State Duma to increase the state duty for divorce from the current 650 to 5 thousand rubles. Speaking impartially, given the current statistics of divorces in the country (about seven for every ten weddings), this measure seems to be nothing more than a banal increase in the “profitability” of registry offices. At the same time, possible negative social and demographic consequences are not taken into account, and there are even those who believe that the new measure will slightly strengthen the institution of the family. One should hardly be surprised at the similar logic in related issues.

Childfree as a phenomenon in Russia certainly takes place: a considerable number of people from various social strata refrain from starting families and having children, and there are many public pages on social networks that more or less persistently promote this path. But can childfree be called a “movement” and a significant factor in the current demographic crisis? It is not so easy to answer this question, at least in the absence of relevant statistics, especially data on how many childless Russians did not acquire offspring precisely for “ideological reasons” and not for socio-economic circumstances.

But there is a study by the NAFI analytical center, according to which in 2020, 46% of citizens did not want to have children, and in most cases, insufficient material well-being was indicated as the reason. And this despite the fact that there are many platforms on the Internet for active propaganda of the so-called “yazhmaternity”, that is, childbearing with little or no regard for this very well-being and the ability to provide children with everything they need, but this antithesis does not significantly affect the situation.

Supporters of the ban on childfree children (for example, the children's ombudsman of Tatarstan and the founder of the National Parental Committee Volynets) say that there is no talk of any compulsion to urgently give birth, only a ban on the propaganda of conscious abandonment of children. Particular emphasis is placed on the fact that it occupies a significant place in the activities of youth-oriented Western NGOs.

And here the question arises, what exactly is considered “promotion of conscious refusal.” Let’s say that LGBT* propaganda has theses (denial of the existence of only two biological sexes, affirmation of same-sex relationships as the norm, and so on) such that it is unlikely that anyone will express them in everyday life, at least in our country. But whether a statement like “I want to graduate and get settled first, and then have children” will be considered childfree propaganda” is still unclear. However, the law enforcement practice of banning certain destructive ideas in our country is such that you need to be very, very impudent in order to come to the attention of law enforcement agencies. An example of this is the mass of Wahhabist preachers operating on social networks and underground prayer houses.

Extend the tail into the future?

It is characteristic that during the discussion of all these vicissitudes, the main factor in the crisis of the family is completely lost sight of - the fact that the evolution of this institution simply does not keep pace with other socialeconomic transformations.

Whatever one may say, the family has always been, first and foremost, an economic unit of society, a self-contained labor collective, and after the industrial and scientifictechnical Revolutions made it possible to live in abundance even in splendid isolation. And today’s average person is noticeably different from his great-great-grandfather from the beginning of the last century, and is much more interested in life on earth being less hassle and more joy (and, frankly speaking, one cannot dare to condemn this desire).

On the other hand, society as a whole is still interested in its own numbers: this is a guarantee in case of any large-scale disasters (for example, a war or another pandemic), and a greater selection of people talented in certain professions, and many more advantages. The state, as a superstructure over society and its instrument, is not averse to having fairly effective tools for regulating the population size and its quality, especially in the current era of change.

That is, the real way out of the demographic crisis will occur when the intersection of these two (almost opposite) cases, particular and general, is found. Here, perhaps, we cannot do without very serious changes, examples of which exist.

For example, in the PRC it is becoming more and more popular to educate young people in boarding schools, from where teenagers return home only on vacation (this, by the way, is where the Western myth about “Chinese children’s concentration camps” comes from). Proposals are being made, however, without proper scientific and economic justification, to create an entire surrogacy industry in a variety of variations, where an army of professional mothers in labor is the most primitive option.

Russian authorities apparently still hope to breathe new life into the classic atomic family. There are reasons for this: after all, we have before our eyes both early Soviet experiments that did not achieve full success, and the current Western agenda, which is completely destructive. Against their background, the old-fashioned cell of society looks much more reliable: even if the state programs tied to it are simply canceled, society will not crumble, but will only roll back to a certain basic level.

On the other hand, it has already been tested in practice that economic incentives to give birth (the same maternity capital, various types of benefits, and so on) work, but weakly. If prohibitive measures become the leitmotif, then this may lead to the opposite effect, when the notorious “traditional values” will begin to be abandoned simply as a sign of protest, especially by women. Therefore, there is an opinion that demographic policy still requires deeper study than what we see now.

* – extremist movement banned in the Russian Federation.