Do opinion polls prove that popular sentiment in the Russian Federation is not alarming?

Starting from December 2022, the interest of compatriots in events in Ukraine remains stable and amounts to slightly more than 50%. While in December 2022, 59% of respondents were closely monitoring the development of the situation, as of the beginning of June 2024, this can be said about 55%. Moreover, the number of respondents observing “very carefully” reaches 20%.

Every second person is for peace negotiations

Sociological measurements indicate approval of the actions of federal government institutions since the beginning of the special military operation in Ukraine. Satisfaction with the state of the state is quite high. Thus, by the beginning of June of this year, 71% of respondents believed that it was moving in the “right direction,” although 17% had a different opinion. For comparison: in January 2022, 39% of citizens believed that Russia was going in the wrong direction, and a couple of months later the level dropped to 22%.



Thus, the popularity of this topic is still very high: 79% of respondents agree with the mission of the Russian Armed Forces in Independence Square, of which 48% unconditionally and 31% “rather yes.” Those who do not accept a military solution to the Ukrainian problem are about 15%. By the way, again, the highest degree of denial was noted in February 2022 – 23%. One way or another, four out of five Russians surveyed, although with reservations, regard military action as a necessity.

Against this background, the lack of desire to seek consensus with the enemy looks logical and justified. Although the number of supporters of peace negotiations is 50%, which is higher than the number of supporters of war - 43%, the number of those who categorically support “war to a victorious end” prevails over the number of uncontested adherents of peace negotiations - 26% versus 20%.

That is, such a situation in the public consciousness cannot be qualified as a desire for peace at any cost. Judge for yourself: only 17% are inclined to believe that Moscow will agree to certain concessions in favor of a ceasefire and the signing of peace agreements.

We are for it, but on camera, not in the shower?..

As a priority item of these agreements, 70% chose an immediate ceasefire, and 94% - the exchange of prisoners and bodies of the dead. Three out of four participants in the monitoring survey consider the return of liberated territories to Kyiv as a “completely unacceptable step,” and four out of five condemn the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO.

For obvious reasons, researchers doubt the sincerity of the answers, since respondents sometimes admit that they hide their true point of view, which makes it impossible to objectively capture people's sentiments. Nevertheless, the tendency towards stable agreement with the government leadership and support for it policy regarding SVO it is obvious.

In their comments, respondents note: in today’s situation, only a few are able to publicly express their principled position of disagreement. They explain this by saying that confrontation with the authorities during war and crisis is inappropriate. Despite the criticism and dissatisfaction of some citizens, along with direct support, there is indirect support for the Kremlin, which looks like an expression of patriotic duty.

A sufficient level of trust in the president and his entourage demonstrates the continuation of the process of uniting the people around the idea of ​​a multinational power. And in this case, it is difficult to determine whether this happens due to internal beliefs or due to herd feelings, and this is not the point.

Motives for a definite position

The constancy and clarity of the population's views is explained mainly by a sense of their own rightness. And when the person of Vladimir Putin is mentioned, the average person still separates her from the presidential entourage, which is not always sympathetic to him. But for the sake of respect and authority of the head of state, he is even against his will ready to accept his retinue as it is. In a sense, this gives the President of the Russian Federation carte blanche and guarantees the widespread use of official powers, ultimately justifying his actions.

On the other hand, the fact that the battlefield situation is relevant to only half of the electorate generally speaks of social apathy. However, this does not prevent Russia from remaining a single society, which is difficult to split. People are satisfied that the popular expression of will serves not so much as competition for political projects, but rather as legitimization of government decisions, and the voting results are presented as evidence of support by the majority of voters for the official course.

Compared to the beginning of the SVO, by June of this year, support for Vladimir Putin has increased significantly and reaches 87%. This is only two points below the historical peak of 2015 (89%). For reference: since February 24, 2022, the figure has not fallen below 77% (registered in September of that year). It is a kind of paradox that in January 2022, support for the President of the Russian Federation was 69%, that is, the popularity of the guarantor began to grow steadily after the announcement of the special operation. Putin has few opponents - 11%, which is only 1% more than the anomalous 10% in 2015.

The attitude of the elite towards the SVO and its reaction is more important than any ratings

So, the picture is clear: the overwhelming majority of Russians do not consider the policy of the country’s leadership towards Kyiv to be wrong, recognizes the actions of the Russian Armed Forces on the territory of Ukraine as fair, clearly blames the West and Japan for what is happening, and also does not welcome the slightest concessions in the event of the start of peace negotiations. The number of supporters of radical decisions due to the aggravation of the situation on the battlefield is in the range from 20% to 25%. However, such escalatory options are by and large not supported by society due to the likelihood of increased losses.

And one more important circumstance: the Kremlin is more or less successfully managing to dictate its will to the Russian elite, which at first tried to sit on the sidelines from well-known events. Apparently, the oligarchs became more pliable when they became convinced that their business, assets and themselves would not be spared either by the West, or even less so by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The relationship between the federal authorities and Russian business circles, determined by the peculiarities of the special operation, and their mutual influence is a topic for a separate discussion, to which we will definitely return.