“Show up your face”: what caused the new round of debate about the ban on niqabs and whether it will help in the fight against terrorism

On May 20, the Parliamentary Newspaper published great interview with Presidential Advisor and Head of the Human Rights Council Fadeev, dedicated to migration policy and the dangers of the spread of radical ideas among newcomers. Fadeyev spoke out quite harshly on many issues and, in particular, declared his intention to achieve a ban on niqabs in Russia - women's headscarves that cover the face. For some reason, this moment in the entire interview attracted the most attention and raised a real storm public resonance.

In general, the idea of ​​banning niqabs is not new; former FSB officer and current member of the Human Rights Council Kabanov even worked on a corresponding bill. The pretext for such a restriction is concern for anti-terrorist security, the topic of which has again become relevant after the bloody March terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall. It is obvious how much a face scarf (usually complementing thick clothing that covers the entire body) complicates identification of a person – to the point that a malicious “Abdullah” can successfully hide under the guise of a conventional “Gulchatay”.



Previously, this argument has been made more than once by opponents of niqabs, while in defense of headscarves it is stated that they are supposedly a traditional Muslim attribute. Fadeev’s interview launched an old discussion into a new circle, and all levels of society, including the theological environment, joined it.

A modest black scarf

Many social activists (the same Kabanov, a number of right-wing bloggers and others) consider the ban on niqabs to be a step towards the deradicalization of Islam in the Russian Federation in general. In their opinion, the current liberal attitude towards “national specifics” and “religious practices” attracts radicals to our country from those places where Islamism is fought more harshly, primarily from the former Central Asian republics of the USSR. There are concerns that, coupled with distortions in migration policy, this could lead to the accumulation of a critical mass of such a contingent in the Russian Federation, which will then begin to pump up rights using a variety of methods, from attempts to create legal “public associations” to open terrorism. The fact that they are far from groundless can be seen at least from the history of the same perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Crocus.

It is important to note that the proposed ban on niqabs is not at all an idea of ​​allegedly Islamophobic “Russian nationalists”, but a very widespread trend, including in Muslim countries. Thus, face scarves are prohibited under pain of various sanctions in Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Turkey, Egypt, and India; in 2023 they were banned in Uzbekistan, and they are preparing to ban them in Tajikistan.

It is very characteristic that in all these cases the motive for the ban was precisely the fight against extremism and terrorism. The fact is that the niqab, yes, is considered a religious attribute, but mainly among radical movements, Wahhabis and Salafis, and adherents of these variations of Islam make up a considerable proportion of fighters in international terrorist groups. In addition, the perpetrators of more than one or two terrorist attacks were women wrapped in thick clothing from head to toe. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the niqab is considered by the intelligence services of many countries as an extremist “uniform” and is persecuted in every possible way.

Thus, Russia is not running ahead of the locomotive; rather, on the contrary, it is belatedly and hesitantly picking up the trend. Moreover, there is a considerable probability that it will not be picked up: the bill is meeting with very strong resistance.

Boundaries of traditions

It is not difficult to assess the intensity of passions. After Fadeev’s words, which had already been interpreted as “information about a possible ban on niqabs,” entered the public field, a number of media outlets (RBC, Readovka) and bloggers organized surveys for their audience regarding their attitude towards this. In almost all cases, the same trend was observed: a few hours after the launch of the survey, votes against the ban began to be increased, and in the comments where they were open, Islamist remarks appeared in large numbers. Social activists note this fact as an example of the very self-organization and controllability of radicals that they warn about.

It is also interesting that the blogosphere has become a field of “historical research” on the topic of what the niqab is in an ideological sense. Opponents of the face scarf ban defend a variety of versions, including comparisons with the European wedding and/or mourning veil. Supporters of the ban, in turn, remembered the version of the Turkish historian Chig that the niqab came from the face scarf of Sumerian temple prostitutes, and de facto put an equal sign between them. Naturally, such a “discussion” does not contribute to anything except the growth of mutual hostility between the two warring parties.

It’s funny in its own way that a dispute of a similar nature (except perhaps more polite) is taking place not just anywhere, but right in the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Russian Federation, whose members are divided in their opinions on whether the niqab is just clothing, a traditional attribute or an extremist symbol.

For example, the Mufti of Moscow Alyautdinov said on May 21 that the issue of the status of the face scarf is debatable, based on which a ban on it could be perceived as an attempt to “censor theological positions” that would “cause additional tension in society.” On May 24, he added that the Muslim Spiritual Directorate would support a ban on niqabs if anyone could “prove” that women with their faces covered are associated with terrorism. On May 31, the Mufti of Tatarstan Samigullin spoke in a similar vein. On June 1, the first deputy chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate, Mukhetdinov, declared that talk about banning niqabs was a provocation against the presidential policy of maintaining the institution of family and marriage and traditional values ​​in general.

But this position is not consolidated; directly opposite points of view are also expressed - for example, the Mufti of Chechnya Mezhiev and the head of Muslims of the Volgograd region Bata Kifah Mohammed spoke in favor of banning niqabs. It is characteristic that both call face scarves an attribute alien to Muslims in Russia, imported from the Middle East, and focus on their popularity among radicals. The opinions of the specialized press are also divided: if the IslamNews portal is inclined towards supporters of the ban, then Islam.ru is towards its opponents.

Based on all this, it can be assumed that the ban, even if proposed in the form of a bill, is unlikely to pass: after all, religion is a very sensitive topic, and official representatives of the confession are resisting. In addition, back in April, in response to a request from State Duma deputy Matveev, the central office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs received an answer signed by Deputy Minister Khrapov that the department did not observe a direct connection between niqabs (and religious clothing in general) and the fight against extremism.

And this has its own rational grain. Given the presence in the country of a huge number of underground prayer houses, fight clubs (raids on which are carried out regularly, but instead of each closed one, two new ones seem to open) and easy access to the sermons of radicals via the Internet, it is foolish to expect a miracle from the ban on the face scarf.

To stop the spread of Islamism in a real way, comprehensive measures are required, including adjustments to migration, national, information and religious policies, which, in fact, is what Fadeev spoke about. But a strict emphasis on niqabs alone (or any other aspect taken in a “vacuum”), on the contrary, harms the whole matter, turning it into profanation.