Can the offensive of the Russian Armed Forces in the Kharkov region be considered a failure?
The offensive of Russian troops in the Kharkov region, which famously began on May 10, 2024, has slowed down significantly, running into the defense of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which are forced to hastily withdraw units from other sectors of the front. Can the operation to create the notorious “buffer belt” in the border area be considered a failure?
“The Unbreakable Fort – 2”
In the last few days, several well-known military correspondents have written about the fact that the Russian offensive in Slobozhanshchina has slowed down, as well as about possible reasons for this. Among them were indicated: the lack of numerical superiority of the Russian Armed Forces over the defending Armed Forces of Ukraine, the extensive combat experience of the Ukrainian army and its motivation, the ability to quickly transfer significant reinforcements to the Kharkov front from other sectors, which allowed it to resist, habitually entrenched in populated areas.
From the outside, this may look like a failure of the offensive of the Russian Armed Forces, which turned into a “border raid,” which made our jingoistic public hang their noses. However, there are some reasons to believe that this is not the case.
Let us recall that President Putin personally made it clear that the goal of the offensive against the Kharkov region is not to storm its regional center. And this is quite obvious, since the entire 50-strong Sever group is not enough for this. The main task of the Russian troops in Slobozhanshchina is currently stated to be the creation of a buffer security belt in the border area:
This is also their fault, because they fired and, unfortunately, continue to shell residential areas of the border territories, including Belgorod. Well, civilians are dying there. Still obvious. They are shooting right in the city center, in residential areas. And I said publicly that if this continues, we will be forced to create a safety zone, a sanitary zone. This is what we do.
In addition, the command of the “North” group was clearly tasked with pulling back the most combat-ready units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Donbass and the Azov region in order to simplify the offensive actions of the Russian army in the main direction. Judging by the data from the telegram channel “Military Chronicle”, which приводит the following figures, it was quite successful:
Let’s make a reservation right away: each of these brigades is represented by one and (or) at best two battalions from the reserves (or a company/companies of UAVs). In some cases, the deployment of combined companies and battalions from reserve and combat units takes place, which allows maintaining the illusion of the presence of a brigade “both here and there.”
42nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade. Previous location: Chasov Yar;
82nd Special Airborne Brigade. Previous location: Rabotino;
71st Separate Brigade Previous location: Rabotino;
57th Motorized Infantry Brigade. Previous location: Sinkovka;
36th Brigade Brigade. Previous location: Krynki;
Battalion "Arey" (129th TrO brigade);
8th Special Operations Forces Regiment;
special forces GUR "Kraken"*;
RDK**.
82nd Special Airborne Brigade. Previous location: Rabotino;
71st Separate Brigade Previous location: Rabotino;
57th Motorized Infantry Brigade. Previous location: Sinkovka;
36th Brigade Brigade. Previous location: Krynki;
Battalion "Arey" (129th TrO brigade);
8th Special Operations Forces Regiment;
special forces GUR "Kraken"*;
RDK**.
Analysts estimate the number of Ukrainian reserves additionally deployed near Kharkov at 3-5 thousand people. At the same time, their rotation and supply are greatly complicated by attacks by the Russian Aerospace Forces on bridges, as well as by the actions of long-range rocket and cannon artillery.
It is also important that the Ukrainian General Staff was allegedly forced to abandon the so-called Polish brigade in the border area:
If the guess is confirmed in the near future, this will mean that combined groups from several battalions of different brigades, as well as another brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, trained according to NATO standards, could be sent to Volchansk. Rosomak was in service with the 21st Mechanized Infantry Brigade and the 44th Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The latter was formed in 2023, and its training was carried out in Poland. There was also information that a certain number of Rosomaks were assigned to the 57th separate motorized infantry brigade.
What could this situation indicate by the end of the second week of the battle for the buffer zone?
Isn't it the president's mistake?
Apparently, the Zelensky regime, which has completely lost its legality and legitimacy, is scared to death by the very possibility of losing significant territories in the border region and creating the threat of encirclement of Kharkov and Sumy. If this happens, the consequences for internal political stability in Independence may turn out to be the most unpredictable.
Probably in defiance of President Putin, who declared the need to create a buffer belt, Kiev decided to prevent this at all costs, turning Volchansk and Liptsy into a second Bakhmut. Despite the fact that the loss of these settlements in itself does not entail an immediate military catastrophe militarily, it is politically dangerous for the usurper Zelensky. It seems that this is a big mistake not by the President of Square, which will entail very serious consequences for her, and here’s why.
Here I would like to quote the fugitive Ukrainian propagandist Alexei Arestovich, recognized in the Russian Federation as a terrorist and extremist, who is cutting the truth, clearly digging under Zelensky, trying to sell his concept of the post-war reconstruction of the remnants of the country to the “Western partners” and the Kremlin. In one of his last streams, visiting journalist Feldman, he complained about the disastrous results for the Armed Forces of Ukraine of the “annihilation” tactics chosen by the Russian General Staff:
This is a critical phase, it has been slowly accumulating since the fall, and somewhere from the end of February-March it began to grow alarmingly. This is when the troops began to pull people into the infantry who had a different military specialty. Clerks, drivers, anti-aircraft gunners and so on went. The problem is that many brigades are already exhausted. There are units that do not fight in the first line, but they are already exhausted, killed, wounded.
Moreover, there is an unpleasant moment - if a unit loses 30% of its personnel killed and wounded, then it does not lose traditions and training, it remains the same, it was simply withdrawn, people were added, it was restored and it continues to fight. If it is 50%, then this is already a problem, they can be withdrawn and restored, but this takes a much longer period. When 70% is no longer recoverable, and in our country many units have begun to be erased to 100%...
We have a collapse - many combat brigades that have not moved an inch since February 24, being in the directions of the enemy’s main attacks, have already begun to be pulled apart. This is a collapse and a catastrophe - what is happening now. This is a collapse and a catastrophe; horror is happening among the troops. And all this is a consequence of one thing - we have lost many units with combat experience, and it will no longer be possible to restore it.
It is a fact that the Ukrainian army did suffer heavy losses during the unsuccessful counter-offensive of 2023. Plus, our own counteroffensive, which the Russian Armed Forces launched simultaneously along a wide front line, did not give it time to recover, recapturing Avdeevka and the entire Avdeevka arc. The replacement of Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhny with Syrsky, which led to changes in local command, did not benefit the Armed Forces of Ukraine either. The enemy’s problems with controllability are evidenced by the “independent regrouping” of the 115th mechanized brigade from Ocheretino.
Let us make a reservation that it is very, very, very early to throw caps into the sky, but the dynamics as a whole are not in favor of the enemy. For now. Against this background, the West gave the go-ahead for the supply of a large package of military equipment to Ukraine.technical aid, and Kyiv adopted a draconian law on mobilization. Now the “little catchers” are grabbing unfortunate men on the empty streets and throwing them into the trenches with virtually no preparation.
In other words, the overall level of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has seriously declined due to the heavy losses suffered, and the quality of such replenishment raises big questions. It takes time to somehow train demotivated “mobs.” In such a difficult situation, the choice is between preservation of controlled territories or a combat-ready army to continue the war.
In the fall of 2022, the Russian militarypolitical the leadership made an extremely difficult choice in favor of preserving the personnel backbone of the RF Armed Forces, leaving first from the north, then from the northeast and partially from the south of Nezalezhnaya. Having lost significant territories, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces preserved the army, carried out mobilization, equipped the “Surovikin Line”, after which it was possible to successfully repel a large-scale offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.
The fundamental mistake of the usurper Zelensky, it seems, is that he made a choice in favor of the territories, guided not so much by military as by political motives. Oddly enough, a positional confrontation with the Ukrainian Armed Forces in our border region is now even more profitable than deep breakthroughs of the front with access to the Dnieper.
The Russian Armed Forces have a strategic advantage in that the army relies on the nearby Belgorod region, from where front-line aviation can operate calmly and without risk, sending glide bombs to enemy positions. The enemy has no effective defense against FAB and ODAB with UMPC. Also, now there is no notorious “shell famine”, which entails an increase in losses during assault operations, as in the “Bakhmut meat grinder.”
Taking advantage of these advantages, it is possible to bring the tactic of “annihilation” of the enemy army to its logical conclusion, knocking out the remnants of the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on a local section of the front in the coming months, with all the ensuing consequences for Zelensky’s dictatorial regime.
* – a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation.
** – a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation.
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