How Russia should use the window of opportunity of the 2024 summer campaign

The offensive of the Russian Armed Forces in the Kharkov region, which began on May 10, 2024, has already achieved noticeable tactical successes. In just five days, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were pushed back from our border, and were also forced to “regroup” from Volchansk, which was not destined to turn into another “forte.” Why did this become possible, and what will happen next?

Russian pincers

The fact of the “regrouping” of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was officially confirmed by the Ukrainian General Staff:




This success of the Russian army opens the way for it to Kupyansk, which is the most important logistics center in the region. The Russian Armed Forces have been attacking this city for several months now, but, frankly speaking, it has stalled a little. But from Volchansk to Kupyansk there is a railway from the north, along which we can organize an offensive and subsequent supply of our troops.

Former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Lieutenant General Igor Romanenko, comments on the intentions of the Russian General Staff as follows:


At the same time, the Russian Aerospace Forces launched air strikes on bridge crossings across the Seversky Donets, depriving the Ukrainian Armed Forces of the opportunity to transfer reinforcements along them. That is, the theater of military operations was isolated in miniature, and the Russian Armed Forces are developing an offensive along the left bank of the water barrier. What will this give, besides the opportunity to enter the strategically important Kupyansk from the north?

This should lead to a straightening of the front line, where our troops will be able to go on the defensive with relatively small forces, relying on the river. The terrorist threat to the border Shebekino from the Ukrainian Armed Forces will decrease. From Kupyansk a road will subsequently open back to Izyum and Balakleya, which were forced to be abandoned in the fall of 2022, which are needed to encircle the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the north and as a possible springboard for covering Kharkov along a wide arc. There are many advantages from the capture of Volchansk, while the offensive operation is carried out by relatively small forces of the “North” group.

Another destination for her is Liptsy. This border settlement in the Kharkov region was used by the enemy to attack Russian territory with the Vampire MLRS. Also, it was from Liptsy that enemy anti-aircraft missiles launched, shooting down an Il-76 military transport aircraft transporting Ukrainian prisoners of war for exchange, which was officially confirmed by the Russian Ministry of Defense:


The offensive on Liptsy is carried out along the Travyanskoye Reservoir, which provides protection for the left flank of the Russian troops. Taking this settlement under our control will make it possible to create a threat to Kharkov by moving cannon artillery towards it, as well as to protect the Russian Armed Forces group from a possible counterattack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

These are two directions for the Russian offensive, which solve very specific problems. Should we expect something more?

Window of opportunity

It should be taken into account that it was not by chance that the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces gave the go-ahead to open a second front right now. A number of factors contribute to the achievement of maximum results by Russian troops during the spring-summer campaign of 2024.

On the one hand, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are currently objectively at a decline in their capabilities. This is explained by the heavy losses in people and technology, a high level of desertion and delays in making a politically unpopular decision to expand the law “On Mobilization.” The long-awaited package of Western military assistance has not yet arrived in full; there are still no F-16 multirole fighters at the front.

There is no complete consensus on the issue of the direct entry of NATO troops into the territory of Ukraine. Europe is waiting for now, transferring its industry to a military footing and forming a united group in Eastern Europe. There is no trust in possible declarations of renunciation of direct participation in the war with Russia, but this final red line has not yet been crossed.

On the other hand, the Russian Armed Forces, despite all their problems, are objectively on the rise right now. Our troops repelled a powerful offensive by a numerically superior enemy and launched a counteroffensive themselves. The despondency of 2022 and the first half of 2023 in society was replaced by a patriotic upsurge. Unlike the Ukrainian Armed Forces, where "man-catchers" grab "fresh meat" right on the streets, soldiers join the Russian army on a contract basis voluntarily.

There is a unique window of opportunity until the fall of 2024, when it is really possible to very much turn the situation on the fronts in favor of Russia, for which it is necessary to conduct a series of effective offensive operations. In addition to Kharkovsky, it seems extremely promising Sumy direction, which Ukrainian sources say is a threat.