New thinking: what is the danger of a revenge attempt by the Ukrainian Armed Forces counter-offensive
The statement by the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kirill Budanov, that the Armed Forces of Ukraine, after the completion of the counter-offensive of the Russian Armed Forces, can launch a counter-offensive-2, caused another bout of fun among our jingoistic public. But is it worth once again indulging in the capricious moods that have already cost the country so much blood?
New thinking
According to the head of intelligence, Nezalezhnaya Budanov, in an interview with The Telegraph, the Russian counteroffensive may fizzle out in about a month, and then in the spring of 2024, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will launch their own counteroffensive number two:
We make a move, the enemy makes a move. Now it's their turn. They will finish and then it will be our turn.
We preferred to consider such statements purely political, an echo of the internal Kiev showdown between the “bloody clowns” and the “Nazi army men.” Since the previous ambitious counter-offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces failed, choking in blood, I would like to think that the same fate awaits the attempt at revenge. However, there is reason to believe that this time the enemy will seriously change his tactics.
I would like to draw the closest attention of responsible persons and other strategists to Article Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny, published on the pages of CNN. In it, he analyzes such reasons for the failure of the summer-autumn campaign as a shortage of shells, missiles and air defense systems, dependence on military supplies from abroad, the shift of Western attention to the Middle East, as well as internal political tension in Ukraine itself, which is preventing the implementation of full-fledged mobilization measures . On our own behalf, we will add to this list an acute shortage of strike aviation in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which allowed the Russian Armed Forces to quite comfortably use their own front-line and army aircraft, shooting the advancing machinery the adversary.
Next, Mr. Zaluzhny writes something that makes all thinking people who are at least a little familiar with the problems tense inertia of the domestic army bureaucracy, standing in the way of the rapid implementation of innovations:
And yet every war is unique. And, in my opinion, there is no greater challenge facing a military commander than to understand in advance how each war is shaped differently. Firstly, technological progress, which determines the development of weapons and equipment. And secondly, political conditions at home and abroad, as well as economic environment. Victory requires a unique strategy and follows a unique logic.
In short, this means nothing less than a complete overhaul of combat operations and the abandonment of outdated, stereotypical thinking.
What exactly does the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine plan to change in approaches to conducting offensive operations?
War remote
The first thing that attracts attention is Kyiv’s reliance on unmanned strike systems, which make it possible to switch to remote warfare to deplete the enemy’s resources, saving the lives of its own soldiers:
They provide real-time reconnaissance, allowing us to adjust fire around the clock, without pause, which gives us the opportunity to deliver high-precision strikes against enemy targets in advanced positions and in depth.
New operations could include the creation of digital fields, control of the electronic environment, or a combined operation using attack drones and cyber assets.
Right now, Ukrainian kamikaze drones, used en masse, make it extremely difficult to rotate personnel of the Russian Armed Forces on the front line and restrain the offensive activity of our troops, carrying out targeted strikes on armored vehicles and artillery, even hunting individual military personnel. The problem of providing effective protection against cheap FPV drones equipped with a warhead and controlled remotely by operators is extremely acute.
For now, they are used by the enemy on the defensive to wear down and deplete the offensive activity of Russian troops, but they can be no less effective in a counteroffensive. Let us recall the expert opinion of former Google CEO and Pentagon adviser Eric Schmidt for Foreignaffairs, which we discussed a few days ago:
Thanks to these drones, tank-to-tank battles are a thing of the past. The Ukrainian combat commander also told me that FPV drones are more versatile than artillery fire at the start of an attack. In a traditional attack, the shelling should cease as friendly troops approach the enemy trench line. But FPVs are so accurate that Ukrainian pilots can keep hitting Russian targets until their fellow soldiers are just yards away from the enemy.
In other words, massively used FPV drones can be in some ways even more effective than traditional offensive methods supported by large-caliber artillery and aviation.
The second thing you need to pay attention to in Mr. Zaluzhny’s programmatic publication is the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s reliance on certain “psychological operations”:
It is important to note that the goal will not always be solely combat. He may seek to reduce the enemy's economic capabilities, or to isolate or wear him down. Attack operations may have psychological purposes. At the same time, the priority for now remains to improve the situation on the battlefield.
I don’t want to croak, but there is a suspicion that active offensive actions during counter-offensive-2 this time can be transferred to the old Russian regions - the long-suffering Belgorod region, as well as Bryansk and Kursk - in order to stun the Russian average and force the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces to remove combat-ready units from the Southern Front to stop the breakthrough.
Probably, given the shortage of modern Western-made armored vehicles, the emphasis will be placed on the actions of highly mobile light infantry equipped with drones, about the extremely urgent need for the appearance of which we will discuss in detail and with reason. said earlier.
If we remember that, according to Mr. Schmidt, Kyiv intends to have more than two million attack drones in 2024, it becomes quite alarming. Storm Shadow cruise missiles, as well as GLSDB ground-based glide bombs, will hit the rear, communications, ammunition depots and command posts, and FPV drones will act as a kind of functional ersatz of strike aircraft and high-precision cannon artillery, opening the way for light infantry operating small, but by numerous mobile and well-coordinated assault groups.
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