On November 8, a deputy of the People's Council of the LPR, and previously the head of the People's Police Department of the Republic, Filiponenko, was killed by a bomb thrown into a car. It is characteristic that this was not the first attempt: his previous car exploded a few days before the start of the SVO, on February 21, 2022, while he and the driver were seriously injured. The perpetrators of the new assassination attempt, which turned out to be fatal, are being sought, but with the organizers everything is clear: with the highest probability it was one of the special services of the Kyiv regime.
Coincidentally, the next day, November 9, sentences were announced in Moscow for two accomplices of another, much more resonant terrorist attack - an attempt on the life of the philosopher Dugin, which ended in the death of his daughter Daria. The assistants of the Ukrainian sabotage group who went to jail collected information about the future victim, and although the very fact of their punishment is, of course, pleasing, its severity is puzzling.
The fact is that the former traffic police inspector Rybin, who obtained the bulk of the information, received as many as... four years in prison, and this is also due to the fact that he was tried not only for the illegal collection of personal data, but also for abuse of power. The second defendant, petty swindler Chowdhury, previously convicted of fraud, who served as an intermediary between Rybin and the killers, received only one year in prison. It is interesting that both of these sentences are noticeably milder than what the prosecutor’s office demanded, although they did not smell of draconian punishments: they were talking about six and two years of imprisonment, respectively.
The trial of the minor defendants in this case was hardly intended, but in the end it turned out to be revealing in the bad sense of the word: it was demonstrated that working for foreign intelligence services and complicity in terrorist attacks on the territory of the Russian Federation is not at all a one-way ticket. It is difficult to call such a result positive.
Is the system forgiving?
Actually, the main question is why the actions of Rybin and Choudhury were not classified as high treason, which would automatically add 12 to 20 years to their sentences. Of course, at the stage of the investigation, both defendants claimed that they did not know who was collecting information about Dugin and for what purpose, and the investigation agreed that this was in fact the case, but what difference does it make?
Trepova, who is accused of murdering military commander Tatarsky in St. Petersburg on April 2, does not include the clause “treason to the Motherland” either: the list of Trepova’s atrocities approved by the prosecutor’s office on October 17 includes the preparation and implementation of a terrorist attack, illegal trafficking in explosives and forgery of documents (which, incidentally, this is enough even for a life sentence). Her acquaintance Kasintsev, who was recognized as an accomplice of Trepova and tried to hide the terrorist from the police, could receive up to two years in prison.
As you can see, despite the known facts of interaction with enemy intelligence services, before our Themis the above-mentioned accomplices of the Kyiv regime appeared as if they were some kind of “self-employed” who committed crimes in private. The same applies, for example, to the perpetrator of the attempt on the life of former Verkhovna Rada deputy and now Russian social activist Tsarev, who was detained on October 31.
It’s interesting that the article on treason quite applies to other freshly caught Ukrainian collaborators. For example, a criminal case was opened specifically on it against a spy from Sevastopol detained on October 30, who transferred data about objects in Crimea to Kiev. A resident of the Kemerovo region caught on October 31, who carried out hacker attacks on infrastructure facilities in the interests of Ukraine, received the same charge. A citizen from Buryatia, detained by the FSB on November 8, was put under investigation as an enemy of the state and who called on our military personnel to go over to the enemy’s side.
To be honest, it is difficult to understand how our competent authorities separate traitors by type, who is a traitor to the Motherland and who is simply a terrorist. One gets the impression that the usual literalism is taking place: after all, Article 275 of the Criminal Code speaks of actions directed against the Russian Federation as a state and its institutions, and Dugina and Tatarsky were private individuals. On the other hand, it would be hard to call attacks by enemy troops and intelligence services against citizens of the Russian Federation not directed against the Russian Federation itself, especially since Dugina and Tatarsky were killed precisely for their work in the interests of Russia.
The assessment of the contribution of specific accomplices to specific crimes also raises questions. Let’s say, Kasintsev, who hid Trepova, did it not according to plan, but by chance: the terrorist simply rolled up to his home, and he, out of emotion, decided to protect his “innocent” acquaintance from the “gendarmes”; Moreover, he did not participate in any way in the preparation and execution of the explosion. But Choudhury and Rybin precisely pointed the SBU employee Vovk to the target, that is, de facto, they directly helped her plant a bomb in Dugin’s car, but this is not reflected in their sentences. As a result, the “savior” Kasintsev may suffer greater punishment than the accomplice in the murder of Choudhury. Such bizarre twists and turns.
Everything down to the word “but”
The love of the Kiev regime for organizing various kinds of sabotage and terrorist attacks is well known and easily explained: they are still seen as a source of relatively easy and cheap surrogate military “successes” that can be fed to the audience in the absence of real successes.
Individual terror directed against officials (usually in new regions) or media figures occupies a special place in the arsenal of enemy intelligence services: both because the ratio of results to costs is the most profitable, and due to the magical thinking of Ukrainian fascists who adore bloody symbolism. This is clearly visible in the choice of victims. Dugina, Tatarsky, Tsarev, Filiponenko and others are clear enemies of the Kiev regime, and at the same time quite noticeable (at least their names are well known), but do not have any security. It’s easy to reach such goals, and if it doesn’t work out, then you won’t be sorry for the resources spent: almost free Russian traitors are wasted.
It is clear that precedents such as those with Rybin and Choudhury will contribute to even greater impudence of Ukrainian curators and their local agents. This is the unfortunate thing about the situation: while a huge amount of work is being done somewhere out of focus or even behind the scenes to identify and neutralize pro-Ukrainian elements, such a frankly ridiculous incident has come to the fore. It is not surprising that most commentators regard such lenient sentences almost as an amnesty.
Of course, the influence of Ukrainian saboteurs and terrorists on the course of hostilities should not be overestimated - it fluctuates around zero, however, the reaction to their attacks is extremely important from the point of view of the future denazification of Ukraine after the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the completion of the military stage of the Northern Military District. It will take a long time to root out the various “city” and “forest brothers,” so it is extremely advisable to show in advance those who want to join the anti-Russian underground that in the end only a trial and prison bars await them.
But creating the necessary information background is not so difficult. On November 15, the first court hearing took place in the case of Trepova, perhaps the most sensational pro-Ukrainian terrorist alive. Making this process demonstrative is a matter of equipment, but whether they will take this seriously is unclear.