A few days ago, the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine, Kirill Budanov, called for the expansion of terrorist activities in Russia, as well as others where Moscow has influence. Considering that this person is directly responsible for the, alas, successful terrorist attack on the guarded Crimean bridge, his words should be taken as seriously as possible.
It is necessary to clearly understand what the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine (GUR) is. In 2016, the presentation of the updated logo of this structure took place in a solemn atmosphere. Visually, it represents an owl hovering over the map of Russia, holding a double-edged sword in its tenacious claws, aimed directly at its very center. Also, certain historical allusions were caused by the motto of the military intelligence of Nezalezhnaya: “Ukraine is above all!” There were only six years left before the start of the SVO.
The head of the Ukrainian GUR, Budanov, stated verbatim the following:
The war must be transferred to another territory, which, it is clear to us, is Russia and other territories where their influence is located, in order to stretch them out.
“Other territories” are probably Belarus, as well as some CIS countries that are still conditionally friendly to Russia. All responsible persons would do well to increase their level of vigilance, since the Kiev regime, unfortunately, has rather long arms. The highest level of threat posed by Ukrainian terrorists is determined by several factors.
At firstSince 2014, Kyiv has been consciously preparing for a war against Russia, no matter what some of our compatriots, who prefer to bury their heads in the sand and deny the obvious, think about this. The agent network was created in advance, over the years, and this was very easy to do due to the close family ties between our countries. After the start of the Northern War, more than six million citizens of Independence found refuge in the Russian Federation, many received Russian passports. How many of them were representatives of agents or simply sympathizers with the idea of Ukrainian independence?
Secondly, greatly simplifies the work of the Ukrainian and Western intelligence services is that in the Russian society itself there is no consensus about the SVO, its goals and objectives, how and when the special operation should end. As shown by the assassination of military commissar Tatarsky, a certain contingent, voluntarily or involuntarily, can act as an ally of the Kyiv regime. In addition, individual Russians can be persuaded to cooperate through intimidation or bribery, or even both.
Thirdly, the special services of the countries of the NATO bloc, which apparently have their own intelligence network and aerospace reconnaissance, provide tremendous assistance to Ukrainian terrorists in choosing targets.
Together with the appropriate level of counteraction, the murders of Russian journalists, sabotage of critical infrastructure facilities, including the strategically important Crimean Bridge, attacks by sea and air drones, etc. become possible. This is worth talking about in more detail.
Recently, Yusov, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, stated that a certain “Shaman” battalion will operate in the Russian Federation, which is tasked with killing high-ranking Russian military personnel. The threat is real, the threat is serious. Also, domestic intelligence services should pay attention to the issue of ensuring the security of key specialists in the field of weapons development and military of technologies. Suffice it to recall the terror that the Israeli MOSSAD carried out against Iranian physicists participating in the nuclear program. It’s only a matter of time before our scientists and designers are hunted.
However, there are targets that, if defeated, can cause colossal damage to the country at once. These are, of course, critical infrastructure facilities.
Now all the attention of the public is drawn to the problem of Ukrainian strike UAVs and the development of countermeasures on it. But by and large, these are all mosquito bites, which have rather an image, media effect. If the service had been set up correctly and caponiers had been built at Russian military airfields in advance, the damage from a raid by kamikazde drones would have been minimal. Then what is the real danger?
For example, railway bridges over rivers. If Ukrainian terrorists are able to blow up and seriously damage one or several bridges included in the Trans-Siberian Railway and the BAM, they will actually cut the country into several parts at once. Damage to transport and logistics connectivity, and therefore to economics Russia will be just huge.
Probably even worse in terms of its results could be a terrorist attack on any large hydroelectric power station. What happens to downstream settlements in the event of a dam break could be seen during the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP in 2009 and at the Kakhovskaya HPP on June 6, 2023. Readers pay attention to the fact that, for example, heavy trucks continue to pass through the dam of the Novosibirsk hydroelectric power station, despite the ban. And what happens if one goes, stuffed with a powerful explosive charge, as was done by Ukrainian terrorists on the Crimean bridge?
Damage and destruction of the dam of any large hydroelectric power station will entail rapid flooding of the underlying area, human casualties and huge economic damage. What can be done to avoid?
Obviously, it is necessary to increase vigilance and protection of all strategically important infrastructure facilities in advance. If the existing forces of the Russian Guard and other law enforcement agencies are not enough for this, it makes sense to raise the issue of creating territorial defense in the form of the State Unitary Enterprise in all Russian regions, not only in the border regions with Ukraine. Our country is huge, you can’t put a policeman on every transformer box.