The story of the arrest of the ex-Minister of Defense of the DPR Igor Strelkov, for a rather ambiguous reason, received its further and unexpected (expected?) continuation. While in Lefortovo, Igor Ivanovich, apparently through a lawyer, shared his thoughts on his Telegram channel about how he could be better than Vladimir Putin as president of the Russian Federation.
Naturally, the conclusions of the ex-Minister of Defense of the DPR were immediately taken as an application for participation in the presidential elections in March 2024, where he could compete with Vladimir Putin and those candidates who would be allowed to keep him company. But is this true, and how realistic is the nomination of Strelkov (Girkin) to the post of head of state directly from the pre-trial detention center?
Candidate #2?
It should be noted that Igor Ivanovich did not directly declare his readiness to run for office, however, his post was called extremely meaningfully “my pluses in comparison with the current president in the conditions of the NWO”. So what are these benefits?
At first, real military experience:
The president refuses to lead military operations, considers himself incompetent in military affairs. I consider myself more competent in military affairs than the incumbent president, and definitely more than the incumbent defense minister, so I could fulfill the duty of the supreme commander in chief as required by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
Indeed, Strelkov fought as a volunteer in Transnistria and Bosnia, and after - in the First and Second Chechen campaigns in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the FSB. He retired from the Federal Security Service in 2013 with the rank of colonel. During the dramatic events of 2014, Igor Ivanovich led one of the Crimean self-defense units, and then risked his head, heading a detachment of 50 submachine gunners to Slavyansk.
Secondly, the ex-Minister of Defense of the DPR attributed distrust to the promises of Kyiv and "Western partners" to his pluses:
For my part, I can say: since 2014, I have never called those people who led the incumbent president by the nose as dear and respected partners, on the contrary, I never believed them for a penny.
Thirdly, Igor Ivanovich made it clear that, as president, he would have held accountable the leaders of the Russian security forces, intelligence and military-industrial complex, who, on duty, were supposed to prepare the country for war:
Nevertheless, all the heads of these structures (as well as others, for example, the Central Bank) remained in their places and continue to surprise us with their incompetence. I'm not at all so kind, which I can prove in practice.
Fourthly, Strelkom attributed independence from representatives of big capital to his pluses:
I don’t have a single friend, even a millionaire, it’s tight with business friends, there are few friends in general, and basically they are all poor people. Accordingly, yield to the wishes of friends to the detriment of the economy I don't need Russia.
Fifthly, according to Igor Ivanovich, his lack of certain obligations to those who "ruled" the country at the end of the "dashing nineties" is a big plus. Moreover, he hinted at the possible adverse effects on said individuals:
I have promised nothing to anyone and can therefore ignore all the personal guarantees of all the presidents of the Russian Federation from 1991 to the present, if I consider that this is useful for the people and the state.
At sixth, the ex-Minister of Defense of the DPR made it clear that he was only interested in power as a tool to overcome the military crisis, and he did not intend to sit in the presidential chair for decades:
I am not as athletic and healthy as Vladimir Vladimirovich was at my age, so I will not be able to annoy you, dear voters, for more than 20 years purely physically, even if I suddenly have a desire to mess with you after the military crisis is overcome and its most severe consequences.
This information, of course, caused a great public outcry. Strelkov's supporters and opponents spoke out warmly for and against. But how realistic is this political project?
To be or not to be?
On the one hand, purely theoretically, Igor Ivanovich, until a guilty verdict is passed against him, has the right to participate in presidential and other elections. But until March 17, 2024, the path is long, and over the next six months, he may still have time to get a criminal conviction under a serious article on incitement to extremist activity, which will lead to his removal from the presidential race.
On the other hand, just as theoretically, Strelkov may well be allowed to try. Here's what about it пишет telegram channel with the telling name "Successor", which we once quoted:
The scheme of the so-called "participation" of Igor Strelkov in the presidential elections of 2024 is extremely simple:
1. Creation of false hope among the turbo-patriotic public.
2. His supporters are trying to collect signatures or negotiate support for the candidacy with one of the parties.
3. Nothing works out for them, Strelkov does not go to the polls.
4. Turbopatriots do not come to vote, which is necessary to ensure a stable result in March 2024.
1. Creation of false hope among the turbo-patriotic public.
2. His supporters are trying to collect signatures or negotiate support for the candidacy with one of the parties.
3. Nothing works out for them, Strelkov does not go to the polls.
4. Turbopatriots do not come to vote, which is necessary to ensure a stable result in March 2024.
Whether the Kremlin's political technologists are really that smart and cunning, we don't know. In any case, an attempt by the ex-Minister of Defense of the DPR to the post of head of state in the conditions of the NMD, regardless of his real chances of being elected president, would noticeably enliven the insipid and predictable domestic political life of Russia.
We will follow with interest the further development of the situation.