In this post, we will continue reasoning on the topic of what the RF Ministry of Defense needs to do to ensure the success of the counter-offensive of the Russian troops, if any is planned at all. If everything is done wisely, then drones, both promising domestic and their Iranian counterparts with minimal modifications, could play a key role in our hypothetical counteroffensive.
Next, we will consider the possible tactics of using reconnaissance and strike UAVs in the course of a counteroffensive of the RF Armed Forces with decisive goals, which, probably, will someday take place. We focus our attention on what role drones could play in this.
HIMARS
As we noted in a previous publication, the American HIMARS MLRS created very serious problems for the RF Armed Forces, inflicting precision strikes on ammunition and fuel storage depots, headquarters and command posts, as well as on transport and logistics hubs. Taken together, this makes it extremely difficult to accumulate material and technical resources in the near rear, which are needed in huge quantities to go over to a large-scale offensive.
The traditional counter-battery fight against HIMARS is very difficult, since this MLRS, having fired at targets, can change position even before the fired missiles reach them. On the ground, each American missile system is guarded by at least a battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. From attacks from the air, they are covered by air defense systems, so Russian aviation can only act on them from the rear, remaining out of range of enemy air defense. And what are you going to do with it all?
And it is necessary to find means of counteraction, since Poland, which is rapidly militarizing, is buying up hundreds of HIMARS and their South Korean counterparts. As an answer, one could propose to establish interaction between reconnaissance-strike and anti-radar drones.
The promising Russian Altius drone should act as the main means of aerial reconnaissance and operational control of the situation at the front. It is stated that it has a cruising speed of 150-250 km / h, a carrying capacity of 1 ton and can be in the air for up to 48 hours. Initially, the drone was purely reconnaissance, controlled from a satellite, which made it difficult for the enemy to influence it with electronic warfare. However, the Russian Defense Ministry decided to equip the Altius with anti-tank missiles and small bombs. Successful tests of their application took place at the test site last year.
As a HIMARS hunter, Altius might look like this. This strategic drone must continuously patrol a certain square. Having discovered the use of the American MLRS, he will either attack it himself, or give target designation data to other means of fire destruction. Instead of ATGMs or small bombs with a small radius of application, it is advisable to place several kamikaze drones of the Lancet-3 type on the Altius with a flight range of 40 to 70 km.
That is, having fixed the launch of HIMARS missiles, the reconnaissance drone itself could immediately destroy it with loitering ammunition. The problem with the MLRS security air defense system can also be solved with the help of an anti-radar drone. Some time ago we toldhow it is quite easy to turn the Iranian "Geran" into an analogue of the Israeli "Harpy" by equipping a disposable drone with a homing head from an anti-radar missile.
By coordinating the actions of the Altius, the Lancets and the modified Geranium, it is possible to effectively clear the territory of American missile launchers.
Import substitution?
Note. Problems with the promising Altius arose when, due to sanctions, Russian drones lost foreign engines. To replace them in the Design Bureau. Klimov, the VK-800V engine was created. Serial production of these drones was promised to begin in 2023. We should hurry up.
If everything is very difficult with import substitution, then there is an option to purchase several drones of this class from friendly Iran.
We are talking, in particular, about the Kaman-22 (Kaman 22), a drone that simultaneously resembles the MQ-1 / RQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 / RQ-9 Reaper. Iranian partners copied the best American technical solutions, making Kaman-22 as multifunctional as possible. This drone is made of composite materials and is hard to see on radar. Under the hull, it has seven suspension points at once, six of which carry anti-tank missiles, gliding bombs, and even air-launched UAVs. At the seventh suspension point, in a special container, there is observation and visualization equipment: infrared and visible spectrum cameras, laser rangefinders and target designators, electronic warfare equipment, etc.
If necessary, depending on the task, instead of it, a container with directional equipment for jamming and jamming enemy radars, or an electronic countermeasures container designed to create interference and false signals in order to interfere with the operation of enemy radars, or a target identification and target designation container for guidance of precision-guided munitions, etc. The Iranian drone is controlled by satellite.
Perhaps it would be worthwhile to negotiate with Tehran on the sale of several of these strategic reconnaissance and strike drones in export modification, while the domestic defense industry is mastering the production of Altius. Foreign equipment could be replaced by Russian counterparts, if available. It is also possible to arm the Kaman-22 with air-based Lancets, ATGMs and planning bombs, since we finally have such.
About how it is possible with the help of UAVs to demolish enemy railway bridges protected by air defense systems and clear the way for Russian troops during a large-scale offensive, we will probably talk in more detail separately.