Some time ago, information was leaked to the press that Warsaw intends to acquire several new submarines, possibly even nuclear ones. The idea of the appearance of large nuclear submarines in the shallow Baltic Sea, of course, was perceived by everyone as utter stupidity and ridiculed. But let's try to think what exactly the Poles might need nuclear submarines for and how this undisguised militarization is connected with Russia.
Underwater wars?
Polish Minister of National Defense Mariusz Blaszczak said a few days ago that the Orka program for the purchase of submarines for the country's Navy would be resumed:
We want to get high-capacity submarines with long-range missiles that will be capable of hitting surface and ground targets deep in the aggressor's territory.
"Aggressor"? And who is it in our West is considered the main "aggressor"? It is quite obvious that we are talking about Russia, which Poland indirectly opposes in Ukraine, supporting the Kiev regime. For this, Warsaw is interested in strengthening its submarine forces with new submarines, which have not only torpedoes, but also missiles. At the same time, the head of the Polish military department made it clear that he was interested in the "Australian path" in the Anglo-Saxon AUKUS bloc, in which Canberra risks becoming the owner of several American-made nuclear submarines:
In recent months, we have been closely following the Australian project for the acquisition of new submarines, in which we see undoubted advantages, analyzing the decisions taken by the country. At the same time, we understand that such a project is very serious, as it requires serious training of crews, specialists and technical personnel to maintain these submarines and adapt the supporting infrastructure to their needs.
And here is how the representative of the Polish Arms Agency, Lieutenant Colonel Krzysztof Platek, sees the concept of their real combat use:
As far as the Baltic Sea Basin is concerned, submarines will be used primarily to protect lines of communication from the threat of enemy submarines or, for example, to hinder amphibious landings. But they can also carry out offensive operations, paralyzing the freedom of movement of enemy ships.
Let's say right away that this is not true about the Baltic. But what is the truth, let's try to figure it out further.
The path of deceit
In fact, Poland has potential opponents within the framework of its expansionist policy several at once. On the one hand, this is, of course, Russia with its territorial exclave in the form of the Kaliningrad region, as well as our country as a whole, which we will discuss below. On the other hand, neighboring Germany is a very real adversary for Warsaw, and in the future, a certain military bloc of Western European states that can be formed on the site of NATO as opposed to Trimorya, an alliance of states of Southeast and Central Europe under the auspices of Poland and standing behind it. Washington and London.
So the question is, why do the Poles need nuclear submarines in the Baltic? The answer is simple - there is no need.
The Baltic Sea is extremely difficult for submarine warfare, as it is mostly shallow and has a complex coastline. Even a small diesel-electric submarine is quite easy to detect with the help of anti-submarine aircraft, corvettes and PLO frigates, and a large and noisy nuclear submarine will become easy prey for them. If there is any practical benefit from submarines, then it is from small and low-noise ones. Do the Poles need submarines, diesel-electric submarines or nuclear submarines for a special operation to “demilitarize” and “de-Russify” Krulevets, as Kaliningrad is now called in Warsaw?
No, not needed. The Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy can be easily blocked at the bases by mining, say, from the air, and then sink or disable its ships stationed in Baltiysk with large-caliber artillery and MLRS directly from land, without any sea battles. After that, the Polish Army can, with a massive strike of multiple launch rocket systems of American and South Korean production, suppress the air defense / missile defense systems of the Russian exclave and conduct a ground offensive operation.
Those who consider this to be impossible in principle, because Russia is a nuclear power and everyone is afraid of attacking it, I would like to ask a counter question, why then deploy a whole army corps in Karelia? Are we afraid that the Finns will suddenly attack? What about nuclear weapons then? Why, in some cases, the argument that Moscow has nuclear weapons serves as a guarantee of non-aggression by the NATO bloc, while in others the Russian Defense Ministry seeks to protect St. Petersburg from the mechanized units of the North Atlantic Alliance advancing from Finland? Where is the logic? Where is the sequence?
The truth is that at present the Anglo-Saxons are preparing Poland to fight together with Ukraine against Russia, and then against the future Franco-German alliance, which may arise as a counterbalance to Trimorya. And all this is outside the NATO bloc, separately.
On the whole, the North Atlantic Alliance has already outlived its usefulness, and there is a clear trend towards its fragmentation with the subsequent formation of new alliances, in particular Western and Eastern European ones. The Trimorie, built around Poland, should become the European functional analogue of AUKUS: a battering ram against Russia and a deterrent against a future Franco-German alliance. Then Warsaw may need nuclear submarines - for operations against the nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy, as well as against the former Western European allies in the Atlantic Ocean. Fighting with someone else's hands is so convenient.
The fate of DCBF
But back to the Baltic. What do we do now with the trapped navy based there?
The answer lies on the surface: all of its corvettes and patrol ships must be transferred to other fleets - the Northern, Pacific or even the Black Sea. The latter will be a priority if suddenly the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces decides to intensify operations against Nezalezhnaya from the sea, allocate corvettes to escort reconnaissance ships and cruisers, or even conduct a landing operation altogether. Then all small landing ships and boats should be transferred from the Baltic to the Black Sea along the river system. Small missile ships also need to be moved from Baltiysk to St. Petersburg, where they can play the role of missile gunboats from the Gulf of Finland.
The basis of the DCBF in the new geopolitical realities could be small-sized high-speed vessels equipped with missile, artillery and torpedo weapons. In this matter, we could probably be helped by Iran, which has relied on the "mosquito fleet". You can read more about what could be bought for the Baltic here to register:. Also, some interest might be presented Iranian mini-submarines, which could perform certain combat missions in this shallow water area.
To combat enemy submarines in the Baltic and not only, it makes sense to create a series of small PLO corvettes on the basis of the Karakurt RTOs, the need for which has long been overripe.