Are the correct conclusions drawn from the results of the enemy raid on the Belgorod region?

As you know, there are three basic approaches to learning: on the mistakes of others, on the mistakes of one's own, and fundamental lack of learning. Each has its drawbacks, but also its advantages: for example, the life of the untrained will definitely be full of vivid impressions.

The “tiktok raid” of the white-blue-white Vlasovites in the border area of ​​the Bryansk region, which took place in early March, clearly showed two things: there are certain problems with border security, and public opinion is prone to violent tantrums. Disproportionately large outbursts of emotions on various occasions were subsequently repeated repeatedly, the last time in the first half of May, when Russian "public opinion leaders" decided "help" the Ukrainian fascists with the long-awaited offensive (well, at least, only in the virtual space).



In less than two weeks, the Kyiv regime needed an urgent win for media compensation for the loss of then Bakhmut, and now already liberated by Russian soldiers Artyomovsk. Since various technically complex options, such as a massive strike by kamikaze drones or imported CDs, have already shown their ineffectiveness (both militarily and in PR terms), it was decided to conduct another "powerful" psychic attack.

And on May 22, shooting rose again on the state border of the Russian Federation: militants of the pro-Ukrainian “Russian Volunteer Corps” (an extremist organization) already experienced in the genre of “tiktok from the front” were thrown to storm the Grayvoron checkpoint. The further course of events showed that in Russia there are those who draw organizational conclusions from their mistakes, and those who do not want to draw them, and the latter are not from the Ministry of Defense at all.

A grand nix on the doorstep

What happened on that day “on earth” we know today only in general terms, but it is quite enough for understanding. At about 10-11 am, a group of Vlasovites numbering about a hundred people in light armored vehicles, reinforced by a tank of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, advanced to the checkpoint. The tank began to “dismantle” the checkpoint from a safe distance for itself, and the soldiers from the RDK, using its cover, launched an assault in the usual manner for Ukrainian fascists: drive up to technology closer to fall right on the head of the enemy.

The forces were unequal. Having nothing to oppose to the enemy tank, and not knowing the true scale of the enemy attack (suddenly the very “offensive of all offensives” began), our border guards reported the appearance of the Nazis and began to withdraw with a fight towards the nearest villages of Kozinka and Glotovo. Part of the Vlasovites began the persecution, part sat down at the captured checkpoint and began a photo shoot together with the Ukrainian “brothers in arms” who approached.

But the music did not last long. Within two or three hours, after the situation was clarified, our artillery and army aviation joined the action. The civil authorities were engaged in the evacuation of the local population, the provision of medical care and other related matters. At this time, a mobile response group with armored vehicles was concentrated in Grayvoron itself, which then counterattacked towards the border.

The Vlasovites, characteristically, could not withstand the onslaught and rushed back to "their" territory, abandoning weapons and equipment. Judging by the materials released on May 23, by the time the CTO regime was introduced at about 22:23 Moscow time, the white-blue-white “tiktok troops” had already ceased to exist as organized units, and the capture of single militants in chicken coops began. During May XNUMX, the territory, in which enemy surpluses could potentially remain, was completely combed and the counter-terrorist operation was completed. A curtain.

The Nazis lost six units of light armored vehicles and several vehicles, the number of RDCs decreased by a hundred people, including the wounded and prisoners. The Ukrainian villages closest to the border, from where the Vlasovites went on the attack, processed VKS aircraft for warning. Thus, the units of the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense responded to the threat within (approximately) three hours, stopped it within twelve hours and completely eliminated it within a day.

But it was all boring reality. In social networks (and again, and again) May 22 turned into June 22, moreover, in 1941: again hysteria, hand-wringing, eye rolling and heartfelt cries of “how long ?!”

It was especially embarrassing and funny to watch how the same sources first warned “enemy propaganda disperses panic, filter information” - and then, in a blue eye, spread this very enemy propaganda, even though the same RDK videos. Some were not released until May 23, and they “helped” the Armed Forces of Ukraine to transfer virtual “reinforcements” to the Grayvoron checkpoint, even after the official report of the Ministry of Defense about the defeat of the Nazis.

What to do to those who are guilty

If we discard emotions and think with a cold head, then the objective flight in this whole situation is the very fact of the penetration of enemy forces into our territory. Let's call it that, the intelligence shift on duty overlooked the approach, concentration and throw of the Vlasov column, or spotted it at the very last moment. Judging by the fact that even Governor Gladkov announced "questions to the Ministry of Defense", this point will not be hushed up, and it will be corrected.

But in general, the enemy attack was repelled quite successfully and with minimal losses. Fortunately, this time our propaganda did not play nobility, but clearly demonstrated both the corpses of the destroyed Vlasovites and broken equipment. The absolutely disastrous actual outcome of the raid also undermined its media component.

In particular, the Pentagon, which immediately supported the official Ukrainian version of the "sally of anti-Putin partisans", had to justify itself to the American press for the destroyed and abandoned armored cars, which were not supposed to be transferred from the Armed Forces of Ukraine to "irregular formations." If the case had worked out, there would have been no problems, and now it seems that for such a “success” the RDK will get someone in Kiev in the neck, and in the near future the fascists will lose their desire for such “PR actions”.

But even such a final score did not satisfy the Russian public, which again raised the question of the “leaky border”. It is not difficult to understand the dissatisfaction of society, and partly its claims are even justified - but only partly.

The cry that was raised about the supposedly proven futility of the border line of fortifications (the “notch line”, “Surovikin line”, whatever) has no basis. In fact, it is not a secret at all that it does not pass along the state border itself, but several kilometers from it in the depths of the territory. This was done for a number of very specific tactical reasons: so that the enemy could not observe our positions from their side of the border, so that enemy light artillery would not reach it, and, finally, so that in the event of a large offensive it would be easier to determine its vector. This is all the norm for this kind of fortifications: "Mannerheim Line", "Maginot Line", "Stalin Line" will not let you lie.

Yes, because of this, the villages near the border itself remain in the foreground, so the “secret line” could not physically stop the attack of the Vlasovites: they simply did not get to it. But it was from long-term positions against the white-blue-white militants that our artillery worked, and our units were based on them, which arrived to help the border guards. This may not be obvious to the average person, but on the other hand, it is absolutely known to many of the military bloggers who have been to the “notch line” personally. Why most of them do not want to share sacred knowledge with their audience is a mystery to me.

On the other hand, many people supported the idea of ​​​​deploying a large people's militia on the border, which could “detain the enemy until the regular units approached”, Prigozhin, the director of Wagner, spoke out for the defense units in his long interview on May 23. It is very funny that many supporters of the militia appeal to the supposedly “successful” experience of the Ukrainian side – but even funnier is that almost all of these references begin with words like “well, yes, at first the Ukrainian TRO was cannon fodder.”

It is strange how it does not reach the gentlemen of the military bloggers that it is precisely this factor that is the main argument against the creation of similar units in Russia. The fact of the matter is that the whole practice of the "weekend units" (not only the Ukrainian territorial defense of the first months, but also the Soviet people's militia, the Nazi Volkssturm, the North Vietnamese "people's forces", etc.) shows that even if they solve combat missions successfully, then only with his great blood. Success in this case is far from always, much more often numerous sacrifices are made in vain (as in the case of the current Ukrainian Volkssturm, by the way).

The reason for this, of course, is the ersatz nature of the militia units: worse than the "regulars", officers and personnel, subordination and discipline, weapons. And the argument “so give them normal commanders and weapons” is not an argument in this case: no one in their right mind will supply obviously second-class troops to the detriment of regular ones.

The hypothetical deployment of the Russian theoretic defense would be fraught with a host of organizational problems (what legal status to give it, how much money to pay, where to get uniforms and weapons, which are not at all in abundance), with far from guaranteed results. It is not difficult to imagine a situation when the militias scatter or suffer heavy losses at the first meeting with an enemy that has been fired at least to some extent ... And then public opinion, warmed up by the "leaders", raises the cry "how long ?!"

The successful (precisely successful) reflection of the Vlasov raid showed that the strengthening of the border is going in the right direction, but there are still unresolved problems. It is necessary to improve the reconnaissance system in the border areas, to reduce the reaction time of mobile cover groups. It is desirable to “nightmare” enemy units at border points more strongly (this is already being done by our DRG forces) or even demolish them with heavy weapons in order to deprive the enemy of footholds. Finally, it is highly desirable to hit the headquarters where the planners of such raids are sitting. In other words, you need to keep doing business - and not fight in theatrical tantrums on a wave of hype.