Is it possible to turn the Geranium into an anti-radar kamikaze drone

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One of the main problems for the Russian army during the SVO, in addition to the mess with communications, control and coordination of interaction between different units and subunits, was that the Russian Aerospace Forces did not secure full air supremacy. Ukrainian air defense has not yet been completely suppressed, on the contrary, it is only being strengthened due to the supply of NATO air defense systems. What can turn the tide in our favor?

Difficult target


Unfortunately, Ukrainian air defense has become a huge problem for Russian military aviation. Front-line assault and bomber aviation, forced to operate at relatively low altitudes, suffers painful losses from air defense systems and even MANPADS, generously distributed by Western sponsors of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It was too dangerous to bomb enemy fortified areas from a great height with the help of "strategists", since until recently we did not have enough guided planning bombs. Because of the risk of "friendly fire" covering their own air forces of the Russian Federation, it was necessary to use expensive long-range missiles without entering the zone of action of enemy air defense.



All this looks like an extremely irrational use of the available limited resource, logistical and, most importantly, human. Noticeable changes for the better began to occur in the last few months, when Russian aviation began to increasingly use glide bombs with correction modules. Functionaries of the Kyiv regime complain that such products are capable of flying up to 70 kilometers and it is almost impossible to intercept them. This allows the Russian Aerospace Forces to start systematically processing enemy positions, remaining out of reach of the Buk-type air defense system. However, the relatively few Ukrainian S-300s still pose a great threat to Russian aviation.

In this regard, I would like to draw attention to a very interesting foreign experience in solving the problem of suppressing air defense.

Horror diving


We are talking, of course, about the IAI Harpy family of Israeli anti-radar kamikaze drones. As you know, the Jewish state, surrounded by a dense ring of direct enemies and numerous ill-wishers, is actively engaged in the issue of ensuring its own national security. Work on the direction of cruise missiles and a promising concept of unmanned aerial vehicles, begun back in the eighties of the last century by Israel Aerospace Industries, logically led to the emergence of UAVs capable of both conducting reconnaissance and striking targets by direct collision using a wearable warhead.

The result was the appearance of the Harpy kamikaze drone, designed primarily to suppress enemy air defenses. The device is built according to the "flying wing" scheme, driven by a pusher propeller, which provides it with a speed of up to 185 km / h with a flight range of 500 km. The role of the homing head in the "Harpy" was performed by a special receiver of radar signals. The weight of the high-explosive fragmentation warhead reaches 32 kg.

The UAV is used as follows: it starts from a transport and launch container using a small-sized solid-fuel booster and follows a predetermined course to a combat patrol area, where it searches for signals emitting enemy air defense system radars. When detected, the "Harpy" dives on the air defense system, undermining itself with it. If the cunning calculation of the anti-aircraft complex managed to turn off the radar, Harpy again switches to patrol-waiting mode in search of the next target to attack. The device is disposable, can be in the air for several hours. The Harpy battery includes up to 18 anti-radar kamikaze drones.

At the beginning of the 2s, the Israelis developed a more advanced version of the Harpy called the Hapry 500, later renamed the IAI Harop. The flight range of this UAV has increased from 1000 to 6 km, the flight duration is up to 1 hours. India and Azerbaijan became foreign buyers of IAI Harop. It is known about the successful use of this anti-radar kamikaze drone against the Pantsir-SXNUMX air defense missile system during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war.

In 2016, Israel Aerospace Industries for the first time introduced the updated Harpy NG (New Generation) UAV, which is in service only with the IDF. In 2019, at the Aero India exhibition, IAI introduced a new loitering ammunition of the Harpy family - the Mini Harpy, which is positioned as the S-300 Killer. In August 2017, at the militarytechnical Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition (TADTE) The National Zhongshan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) for the first time showed a promising Taiwanese loitering ammunition called Chien Hsiang or Jian Xiang ("Rising Sword"), which is very reminiscent of the Israeli "Harpy". The United States also has its own developments in the direction of anti-radar drones.

It is obvious that such specialized loitering ammunition is also urgently needed by our army. Over and over again, releasing such drones in shifts, you can either suppress the enemy’s air defense system, purposefully destroying its radar, or make anti-aircraft gunners sit quieter than water, below the grass. The simultaneous use of anti-radar kamikaze drones and purely shock "Geraniums", as well as "Caliber" and "Iskanders" would allow Russian troops to literally clog the Ukrainian air defense. The Armed Forces of Ukraine would not be able to use their Buks and S-300s when bombers of the Russian Aerospace Forces are operating in the sky.

Can this be implemented technically quickly? Why not. Russia also has its own family of anti-radar missiles. What prevents, say, from taking the homing head from the Kh-58 missile and putting it on the Geran? The massive appearance of such aircraft in the skies over Ukraine will allow us to kill enemy air defense and provide the Russian Aerospace Forces with strong dominance there.
9 comments
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  1. +1
    5 May 2023 18: 35
    Probably, the problem lies in the specifics of the work of the enemy's air defense. It has already been said before that the system is tied to NATO space monitoring and usedоmost of the time is in passive mode. If the radars are turned on only during the launch of missiles to illuminate air targets, and then, after capturing the target of the GOS, the missiles immediately turn off and change location, then their operation time is very short, and is provoked by only real targets being in the air. In this case, the anti-radar missile must have a memory of the target's coordinates, and the possibility of capturing it on approach to them. Also, after a session of activity, the enemy's radar station can leave for a closed shelter. At the same time, the risk of losing the aircraft that provokes the operation of the radar remains, because the missile will already be fired at it. The way out of this situation could be strikes on "silent" radars, reconnoitered from the satellite. A distinctive feature of a real target may be the withdrawal track from a position or the construction of a shelter in the immediate vicinity of it.
    1. DO
      0
      6 May 2023 01: 52
      The way out of this situation could be strikes on "silent" radars, reconnoitered from the satellite.

      Most likely, if the Russian satellite constellation worked as effectively as the Western one, NATO would have long ago begun to disable our satellites.
      1. 0
        6 May 2023 15: 59
        We would not be in debt, because it is always easier to break than to build and put into orbit.
        1. 0
          6 May 2023 20: 58
          They would not have remained, but they have much more opportunities for both shooting down and putting into orbit.
      2. 0
        6 May 2023 20: 59
        But in principle, it cannot work as efficiently, compare at least the budgets and the number of satellites. And they have Musk, and we have Rogozin ...
  2. -1
    6 May 2023 21: 24
    Again, "is it possible?"
    Of course you can.

    but there are many potential pitfalls.
    Are there enough geraniums?
    Are there enough anti-radar heads?
    Can they be put on Geranium?
    How much cheaper is Geranium than the rocket used?
    To what extent does the performance characteristics of Geranium with this head correspond to the needs of use?
    And in general, is there anyone to do this?

    If at least one of the answers is negative in meaning, then alas. will be "as always"
  3. 0
    7 May 2023 13: 59
    Well, it's "clear as day" that UAVs with passive radar homing heads are very much needed and have been for a long time! In addition, it is possible to use kamikaze drones equipped not only with a warhead, for example, of a high-explosive type, but also with small-sized anti-radar UAVs, for example, on "electric traction", suspended under the wing... It is possible to make a "Geran-LC" ("false target") on the basis of, for example, "Geran-2"! Only the airframe and engine are taken from the "Geran-2"... there is no homing head, satellite navigation module, high-precision more expensive INS! Instead of a warhead container with dipole reflectors (or with heat traps...), a cheaper and simpler INS... Work in pairs: "Geran-2" and "Geran-LC"... in the mode: "leader" - "slave"! That is, "Geranium-2" controls the LC, and the LC "reacts" to the commands of "Geranium-2" as if to a radio beacon!
  4. 0
    7 May 2023 19: 08
    It is possible, but will they convert?
  5. 0
    20 May 2023 18: 47
    The answer is simple - not only possible, but necessary! Geranium flies for a long time, and it is very reasonable to do self-targeting, with an analysis, of course, of the source!
    But there is a nuance - our Ministry of Defense turned out to be so "advanced" that it could not understand even the most basic things! Robbing its army, showing individual equipment at exhibitions and parades, often completely unsuitable for a real war, deceiving everyone, while not having the slightest common sense, absolutely corrupt and cowardly - suddenly come to its senses and start doing something?! Somehow I don't really believe it... And most importantly - in the name of what?! What if we don't lose the war then?! And what about foreign property registered to family members? And for some, as far as I know, one deputy minister of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the entire family has American citizenship! What's more, even the main talking parrot has a second wife with American citizenship, and the first - with French!