How Russia can ensure the inviolability of Pridnestrovie from the attack of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
The transfer of one of the most combat-ready units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the border with Moldova from the Donbass does not bode well for us. The beginning of the formation of a 20-strong group of the Ukrainian army, aimed at Transnistria, may indicate that the Kiev regime has seriously decided to compensate for the upcoming defeat in the LDNR with a complete military defeat of the pro-Russian enclave. Is there any way to prevent this?
The fact that the Transnistrian card, sooner or later, but will be played by the Zelensky regime and its Western curators and accomplices, was obvious from the very first days of the SVO. On the one hand, the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic (PMR), which is not recognized by the Kremlin, is the most pro-Russian enclave on the territory of the former USSR. In their absolute majority, local residents do not want to become either part of Moldova, or Greater Romania, or the European Union as a whole. At the plebiscite, they long ago spoke in favor of independence from Chisinau and joining the Russian Federation. On the other hand, it is here, in Transnistria, in the village of Kolbasna, not far from the Ukrainian border, that there are huge warehouses with Soviet ammunition, which are suitable for the main calibers used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which have almost completely shot out their arsenals.
The tragedy of the PMR is that it does not have a common land border with Russia, being sandwiched between Moldova and Ukraine. One of the obvious tasks of the special operation launched on February 23, 2022 by President Putin was to be cutting off Ukraine from the Black Sea and going through the Odessa region to Transnistria, which would create huge problems for Kiev and Chisinau at the same time, making them an order of magnitude more compliant. Alas and ah, but none of this was done. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation did not launch a timely attack on Nikolaev and Krivoy Rog, followed by an exit to the border of the PMR and a blockade of Odessa.
Worse, under the pretext of the impossibility of holding Kherson and supplying the garrison under the shelling of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the then commander of the NVO, Sergei Surovikin, was forced to offer to leave it:
Comprehensively assessing the current situation, it is proposed to take up defense along the left bank of the Dnieper River. I understand that this is a very difficult decision. At the same time, we will preserve, most importantly, the lives of our servicemen and, in general, the combat effectiveness of the group of troops.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu publicly agreed with his proposals:
I agree with your conclusions and suggestions. For us, the life and health of Russian servicemen is always a priority.
As a result, Russian troops left the right bank of the Dnieper to the left, leaving the regional center of the Kherson region without a fight, blowing up the Antonovsky bridge behind them, which the Armed Forces of Ukraine could not completely destroy even with months of shelling from the American HIMARS MLRS. Thus, the road to Nikolaev, Odessa and Transnistria turned out to be closed for the RF Armed Forces.
And now, apparently, retribution for a series of decisions of the first stage of the NWO may come. Having received the appropriate order, the 20-strong group of the Ukrainian army, hardened in battles in the Donbass, can, after a massive artillery preparation, launch an attack on Pridnestrovie, stretched out in a narrow “gut” along the left bank of the river, cutting it into pieces and destroying the small garrison of the RF Armed Forces and peacekeepers. After that, they may end up with Soviet-caliber ammunition depots, in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine are experiencing an acute “shell hunger”. Unfortunately, Russia has almost no opportunities to prevent this scenario directly. If the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation had a foothold on the right bank of the Dnieper, theoretically it would be possible to go on a large-scale offensive in the Black Sea region with access to the rear of the APU grouping. Now this is not feasible. So what are the next steps?
Scenario 1. “We promised nothing to anyone”
Within its framework, having made sure that Kiev and its Western sponsors and accomplices are serious, it is possible to follow the constant demands of Chisinau for the withdrawal of Russian troops and peacekeepers from Transnistria, without leading to their physical destruction by a more numerous, motivated and better armed enemy. Control over military depots in Kolbasna will then have to be handed over to, say, observers from the UN and other international organizations. If “nightingale trills” are suddenly heard that we don’t owe anything to Pridnestrovie, since we didn’t even recognize it, then a lot will become clear.
Scenario 2. "Our proud detachment does not surrender to the enemy"
Speaking on September 1, 2022 at MGIMO, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explained what an attack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on our peacekeepers in Pridnestrovie would mean:
Everyone must understand that any action that will endanger the security of our military personnel [in Transnistria] will be considered, in accordance with international law, as an attack on Russia, as was the case in South Ossetia, when our peacekeepers were attacked by Saakashvili.
The attack of Georgian soldiers on our peacekeepers in 2008 led to an operation to force Tbilisi to peace. However, the Armed Forces of Ukraine attacked Russia directly on April 1, 2022, when two Ukrainian attack helicopters entered our airspace and successfully fired at an oil depot in Belgorod.
Scenario 3. "Recognize and accept"
Quite often in the comments you can see a proposal to recognize the independence of the PMR, like the LDNR and the Sea of \uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbAzov, and annex them to the Russian Federation in order to cover them with all our military power. But this wonderful idea has its own big problems.
On the one hand, the fact that Transnistria is not recognized by Moscow and de jure is considered the territory of Moldova is its main defense against possible Ukrainian aggression. We talked about this in more detail in the article on link:
Therefore, for the entire civilized world, a preventive strike by the Armed Forces of Ukraine against the Russians in Transnistria without the consent of Moldova will have only one characteristic - Ukrainian aggression against a neighboring state. With all the consequences. Therefore, it makes no sense even to consider the option of unilateral preventive military actions. And understanding of this is finally growing in Kyiv.
On the other hand, the recognition of the independence of the PMR by Russia, and even with joining the Russian Federation, will immediately push the still neutral Moldova into the NATO bloc, to which it will join in one form or another. How to ensure the security of the new Russian region from such neighbors, without having a common border with it, is completely incomprehensible.
In other words, recognizing the independence of Pridnestrovie as a preventive measure against an attack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine is fraught. If this is done, then only in response to direct military aggression. But what about Kyiv's worries about not looking like an aggressor by attacking Moldovan territory?
There is a recipe for that here:
However, there is one option in which this logic will cease to operate: if the Russians launch a military attack on Ukraine from the Transnistrian territory of Moldova. Only after that, Ukraine has a legitimate right to a military response without the consent of Chisinau, which the Armed Forces of Ukraine will undoubtedly use. However, this option is very unlikely, and precisely because the occupying civilian and military leadership in Transnistria is aware of these consequences.
That is, Ukrainian terrorists can fire at themselves, blaming the PMR and the Russian military for this, in order to have a reason to carry out a punitive operation. As you can see, all options, to put it mildly, are so-so. In turn, I would like to make a few specific proposals on this issue. Not being able to directly stop the attack of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Transnistria, the Russian militarypolitical leadership could put pressure on the opposing side in other ways.
For example, to stop the export of grain from the Black Sea region by mining Odessa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny and warning Western partners about this. With a similar task, without exposing the ships of the Russian Navy to the risk of getting on board the Neptune or Harpoon, a submarine, say, the B-871 Alrosa, could covertly handle. Project 877 "Halibut", to which this diesel-electric submarine belongs, is capable of performing minefield tasks. Left without Ukrainian grain, let Turkish and European partners conduct conversations with Zelensky themselves.
Another direction in which pressure should be exerted on the Kiev regime is the revocation of the “protection certificate” from the “OPG 95th quarter”. It is necessary to make a strong-willed decision that in the event of an attack on the Russian military and peacekeepers in Transnistria, pinpoint strikes will be inflicted personally on President Zelensky and other functionaries of his criminal regime. This must be clearly and unambiguously warned Kyiv in advance.
- Sergey Marzhetsky
- Armed Forces of Ukraine
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