What will be the reaction of China to the transformation of South Korea into a "nuclear outpost" of the United States

References to the color red, apparently, will be popular in the diplomatic environment for a very long time to come. So the DPRK Foreign Ministry on February 2 issued a communiqué in which it accused the southern neighbors and the Americans of bringing the situation on the peninsula to the "extreme red line." It is understandable that North Korea has fewer of these lines than Russia, but what happened?

The fact is that on February 1, the first large joint exercises of the American and South Korean Air Forces took place this year (however, the previous ones were not so long ago - in early November last year). The most modern and powerful Western F-22 and F-35 fighters were presented at the maneuvers in commercial quantities, and the main "stars" of the event were B-1B missile-carrying bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons.



The latter circumstance is unpleasant in itself - and even more so against the background of the statement by US Secretary of Defense Austin, made before the start of the exercises on January 31, that the United States is ready to defend the South Korean "allies", including with the help of its nuclear arsenal. While Austin's words are by no means nuclear blackmail (because that's the prerogative of all dictators), it's easy to understand the North Korean government's annoyance.

However, Pyongyang is not alone in getting annoyed. Recently, there have been a lot of signals that can be regarded as preparations for the Republic of Korea not just to deploy an American one on its territory, but to create its own nuclear weapons.

“Thought they were toys?! The tops are already visible ... "

The sociological preparation of the natives for such a step towards the glory of "democracy" has been going on for many years. On January 31, just under Austin's statement, the results of another opinion poll were published, according to which three-quarters of the South Korean population support the idea of ​​nuclearization. On February 1, there were reports in the press that “in the week” (that is, approximately until February 5), the Hyunmoo-5 “high-power” ballistic missile, the range of which is estimated at 3000 km, will be tested.

With purely technical point of view, there are no obstacles for Seoul to create its own nuclear arsenal "right now." The country has a powerful industry, including military and nuclear. For a thermonuclear weapon, some additional R&D will probably still be required, but an implosive plutonium bomb is by now not a miracle of technology, and can be brought to a serial model within a couple of years.

The problem of carriers has long been resolved: the South Korean army is armed with a wide range of missiles of the Hyunmoo family, including both ballistic and cruise missiles, land and sea-based. Among them there are samples with a flight range of 500, 1000 and 3000 km, so that coverage of almost the entire territory of the DPRK is already provided today.

De facto, Seoul also has a doctrine of the use of strategic weapons: the so-called "Plan of Massive Punishment and Retaliation" declared back in 2016. Its key element is the use of ballistic missiles in non-nuclear warheads (there are high-yield high-explosive and thermobaric warheads) to defeat the main command authorities - especially Comrade Kim personally, as the only one who can give the order to launch nuclear missiles in the DPRK. The weak point of the South Korean strategy is considered to be the possibility of a "ricochet", that is, failure or incomplete destruction of especially protected command bunkers - and nuclear warheads will largely correct this shortcoming.

The main obstacles to nuclear weapons are political. The US does not need "allies" who cannot be easily reined in if necessary, and the notorious "bomb" is an excellent argument against American diktat. However, the global situation has changed a lot in recent years, and the States are no longer able to guarantee military superiority over China, so the concessions on the issue of native nuclear weapons by the "allied natives" no longer seem unbelievable.

It is significant that just on February 1, South Korean Foreign Minister Park went on a four-day visit to the United States, to beat his forehead and ask for a "decisive answer" to the "provocations" of his northern neighbors. Together with Austin's statements, this suggests that we will soon hear about the deployment of American tactical nuclear weapons in Korea along the same lines as in Europe. In theory, some agreements are also possible regarding the Korean nuclear weapons themselves, although it is not a fact that they will rush to make them public.

"... a rocket from a swamp, and you will be the fuel!"

The potential transfer of B61 bomb carriers to Korea fits in nicely with the recent record in Brussels that NATO needs more "friends" (read: cannon fodder) in the Pacific region. Like the announcement of the deployment of B-52 missile carriers in Australia by 2026, this will have a largely political effect. The very configuration of the peninsula, which is extremely saturated with air defense systems, makes the use of air-based tactical nuclear weapons even against the DPRK extremely difficult, not to mention China.

But the hypothetical rearmament of the South Korean missile forces from conventional to nuclear weapons would be a very serious step towards a real, not a diplomatic war. Unfortunately, ordinary residents of the South, intimidated by the propaganda image of the terrible Kim in a padded jacket and with a pair of mortars in his hands, do not seem to understand that American or pro-American nuclear weapons on the peninsula are not needed at all for “protection” from the North.

Actually there are only two options. The first one seems to be more probable: the Americans are planning to make Korea the Pacific analogue of Great Britain - that is, like an "independent decision-making" stationary nuclear battery, which will unnerve China by the very fact of its existence. If we assume that Seoul has at least a hundred missiles with monobloc warheads and a range of 3000 km, then it will already be able to target a significant part of the coastal regions of China, and with the development of delivery vehicles, begin to threaten Russia too.

In general, the risks posed by the appearance of such a “delayed nuclear mine” are very high. Based on this, is it possible to assume that Beijing, or at least Pyongyang, will react to the possibility (not even the fact) of nuclear arming Seoul with military force “before it is too late”? With some probability, yes. It can even be assumed that the DPRK will deliver a preemptive strike already on the occasion of the deployment of American tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.

Isn't this what Washington's plan is, isn't it provoking China and/or North Korea to "aggression" against the southerners? In the end, before the eyes of the Americans there is a precedent for the Russian NWO, which began, among other things, to prevent a nuclear threat from the fascist Kyiv regime. Throwing the Korean Peninsula into a major and possibly nuclear war would be extremely beneficial for the US.

First of all, this eliminates the DPRK as an independent nuclear force: in the course of a hypothetical conflict, its arsenals will be partially spent and partially destroyed, as well as the corresponding production facilities. China will be forced one way or another, less or more to support Pyongyang, spending its resources on it, and if the threat of military defeat hangs over the DPRK, then Beijing will not get away from direct intervention, with all the associated costs and risks. In addition, the South Korean "ally" of the United States, obviously, will go to waste anyway - which means it will cease to be a competing industrial (in particular, military-industrial) center.

Is it possible to somehow "resolve" this situation without leading to hostilities, the question is difficult, but most likely not. An attempt to thwart the American threat, voiced by Austin on January 31, with the latest Chinese warning such as “if nuclear weapons appear on South Korean territory, this will lead to an immediate strike” is unlikely to work (and is unlikely to happen at all). So what remains, perhaps, is only to strengthen military-technical cooperation with the DPRK, which serves as the vanguard of anti-American forces in the region.