Unpleasant, but true. The special military operation for the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine revealed a whole range of problems in the Russian army and navy at all levels - intelligence, planning, support and command. Everyone has already heard about this, there is no point in repeating it. The question is how the “second army in the world” got to such a state, who is to blame and what to do?
Probably, the main reason that the special operation has been going on for the ninth month, let's say, with variable results and no end in sight yet, is the holy confidence of our Supreme Commander-in-Chief that he can send troops to Ukraine at any moment and in three day to take Kyiv, putting there "his little man." That is why the Kremlin so condescendingly watched the military preparations in Nezalezhnaya, which were on the rise for all 8 years of the Minsk agreements, and domestic propaganda frivolously ridiculed the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, when it came to the real thing, it was no longer a laughing matter.
Why did the special operation in Ukraine become such a severe test for the modern Russian army, the successor of the famous Soviet one?
Everyone who closely follows the course of the NMD has heard more than once about the complaints of military personnel about some of their commanders who gave them unreasonable orders, as well as about problems with supplies. This, by the way, was one of the reasons for the large number of so-called five hundredth among contract soldiers at the first stage of the special operation. Such information pops up in the media space periodically, to which the RF Ministry of Defense has to respond by changing officers, that is, the problem is, alas, of a systemic nature. The reasons for the current difficulties on the fronts were laid down long ago, during the large-scale reforms of the Russian army.
Even in the inglorious times of President Yeltsin, exclusively professional people were placed at the head of the Ministry of Defense. This is Air Marshal E. I. Shaposhnikov, and Army General P. S. Grachev, and Army General I. N. Rodionov, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Marshal of Russia I. D. Sergeev. However, with the coming to power of President Putin, complete strangers began to appear in this key position for the national security of our country.
In 2001, a native of the KGB department for the Leningrad region and a former colleague of Putin, S. B. Ivanov, became Minister of Defense. In 2007, he was replaced by A. Serdyukov, a professional in the furniture trade. And in 2012, after a scandal, the former head of the Russian Emergencies Ministry, S.K. And it would be fine if civilian ministers came and simply "reigned, but did not rule", listening to military professionals. In fact, each of them brought with him his team from the previous service.
The cardinal reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, begun under Serdyukov, and his "women's battalion" were not criticized only by the lazy. But here are some shocking facts.
With this "feldmebel", as ill-wishers called it, there was a reduction in the number of officers from 450 thousand people to 150 thousand. More than 70 military educational institutions were liquidated, and the remaining two dozen were “reformed” so that highly qualified teachers who did not want to leave the capital region for the provinces were forced to leave, for years there was not enough fuel, ammunition and other resources for a normal learning process cadets. At the same time, the Center for Military-Strategic Research of the General Staff, the head system structure of military science, was liquidated.
Under Serdyukov, T. A. Fraltsova, who had nothing to do with military affairs, was appointed head of the Main Directorate of Military Education and Science. She was fired after she publicly stated that it was more profitable not to maintain dozens of military universities on the territory of the Russian Federation, but to train future officers of the Russian army in the United States. Instead of her, Ekaterina Priezzheva was appointed, who has practical experience only in the field of circulation of alcoholic products. In fact, today many commanders on the Ukrainian fronts are a product of Serdyukov's reforms.
Separately, it is worth mentioning the introduction of so-called outsourcing in the army, supposedly to reduce non-core workload. In reality, this turned into another “feeding trough” for those close to him, which Sergei Shoigu, Serdyukov’s replacement, had to admit:
The outsourcing system, which had already taken shape by 2012, did not fully justify itself. The tasks of providing troops in combat conditions were not solved. There was no one to feed the soldiers, technique was not repaired, fuel and lubricants were not delivered to the areas of field exits.
And someone else wonders why the warehouses of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation did not have 1,5 million sets of uniforms for military personnel, which should have been there according to the documents!
The most important sabotage against the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, professionals today call, however, the abolition of their division into regiments, divisions, armies, traditional for Russia, military districts (fronts) and the introduction of a brigade structure. The material and technical base of the disbanded formations was “optimized”, and the newly created brigades no longer had the appropriate logistics support.
We are now witnessing the results of such destructive “reforms” with our own eyes on the Ukrainian fronts. Something turns out to be corrected on the go, but without a radical revision of their results, it is not necessary to talk about some kind of breakthrough.