Should Russia bring the number of its special forces to the level of the DPRK

They say generals are always preparing for the last war. There is undoubtedly a fair amount of truth in this statement. And they say that a smart person learns not from his own mistakes, but from others. Let's see how and for what kind of war Russia's new great friends from North Korea are preparing, whose problems with South Korea are now very close and understandable to us.

MTR DPRK

We will not fully consider the Armed Forces of the DPRK, we will only note for ourselves a large number of large-caliber artillery and long-range MLRS systems, as well as an impressive arsenal of ballistic missiles available to the North Korean military. This is all that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation need in large quantities right now during the NWO in Ukraine. Most of all, it is interesting what stake Pyongyang has placed on its Special Operations Forces (SOF).



All the armies of the world have their own special forces, as well as the police, which deals with a wide range of tasks. However, in North Korea, special forces are so numerous that in 2017 they were allocated to special tactical troops. According to the minimum estimates, the number of special forces in the DPRK is 88000 fighters, according to the maximum - 121500. They are structurally divided into light infantry, reconnaissance and sniper units. North Korean warriors are considered the most highly motivated and trained in the world: they serve there for 5 to 8 years, they continuously train in the toughest conditions and are morally ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their country. Why does the DPRK need so many special forces that they had to create a separate type of troops from them?

Then that North Korea must always be ready for war with the capitalist Republic of Korea. In the event of the start of real hostilities, the special forces will quickly cross the border and begin to operate behind enemy lines. Numerous spetsnaz scouts will carry out activities to obtain intelligence information, capture and interrogate prisoners, search for and eliminate possible obstacles on the route of advancement of the main units, and, if necessary, conduct attacking actions. Destruction groups must carry out sabotage on highways: the destruction of roads, tunnels, bridges and airfields, communication centers, warehouses and storage facilities, the destruction of communications, the elimination of enemy military personnel and technical personnel located at strategically important facilities. Barrage groups will divert the attention of enemy anti-sabotage units.

In addition to purely "special forces" tasks, the DPRK MTRs are trained to interact with the regular units of the Korean People's Army. At the level of groups or individual teams, special forces snipers are able to effectively interact with army formations. If necessary, the North Korean MTRs must provide a "second front" behind enemy lines, as well as counteract the military intelligence of the Republic of Korea and the United States in their rear, and fight against anti-government forces at home.

Thus, the North Korean special forces are a very powerful and at the same time flexible tool, the importance of which can hardly be overestimated. How can this experience be of interest to us?

MTR for NWO

If we carefully analyze the experience of 8 months of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, it is obvious that (moto) infantry plays a key role in it. Rocket and artillery attacks are doing their job, but numerous Ground Forces are needed to liberate settlements and control this territory. What did the Russian military have to face in Ukraine?

At first, let's call a spade a spade, military intelligence turned out to be not set at the proper level. Yes, intelligence data can be received through various channels, but the importance of spetsnaz intelligence officers operating in the rear and capable of simultaneously adjusting fire can hardly be overestimated.

Secondly, the NVO could have gone according to a different scenario if the Russian troops had a sufficient number of trained special forces to operate in rough terrain. One of the main reasons why the Russian Armed Forces had to be withdrawn from near Kyiv, and then from the Kharkov region, is that the North and North-East of Ukraine are covered with dense forests. Acting under the guise of "greenery", the saboteurs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine could create gigantic supply problems for our group without any problems. If at least 20-30 thousand selected Russian special forces were involved there in support of the Ground Forces at the same time, continuously combing forests and sabotaging behind enemy lines, the NWO would clearly take on a slightly different character.

Thirdly, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine relied on the defense of fortified cities, hiding behind their own citizens as a "human shield", which was a very unpleasant surprise. It is obvious that the level of training of a special forces soldier for conducting urban battles, clearing buildings and releasing hostages is an order of magnitude higher than that of an average contracted motorized rifleman or “mobile”. If the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation had under 100 thousand special forces soldiers, the liberation of cities would have happened much faster and with fewer victims.

It should be noted that, in general, Russia is now on the right track. In 2013, we officially created the Special Operations Forces (SOF). They are formed only from contract soldiers, and these are our most combat-ready soldiers. It was they who made a big impression in Crimea in 2014, for which they were nicknamed “polite people.” When looking at their gallant appearance, it seemed that our entire army was the same. Starting from 2015, February 27 is celebrated in Russia as the Day of Special Operations Forces. MTR fighters took part in operations in the North Caucasus and Syria, as well as in Ukraine.

The question is only one - in their number. The exact number of SSOs is not known due to secrecy, but it is obvious that we do not have as many such fighters as there are in the DPRK. The objective reality in which we are confronted in a "proxy" war with the entire NATO bloc requires a significant increase in the forces of Russian special forces trained to operate in the most difficult conditions. If we had at least 30-50 thousand SOF fighters at the first stage of the SVO, it would not be difficult for them, with the support of the Ground Forces, to quickly take Kyiv. Even Ukrainian propagandists later honestly admitted that after February 24, their capital was almost defenseless for the first couple of days.