Should Russia bring the number of its special forces to the level of the DPRK

They say generals are always preparing for the last war. There is undoubtedly a fair amount of truth in this statement. And they say that a smart person learns not from his own mistakes, but from others. Let's see how and for what kind of war Russia's new great friends from North Korea are preparing, whose problems with South Korea are now very close and understandable to us.


We will not fully consider the Armed Forces of the DPRK, we will only note for ourselves a large number of large-caliber artillery and long-range MLRS systems, as well as an impressive arsenal of ballistic missiles available to the North Korean military. This is all that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation need in large quantities right now during the NWO in Ukraine. Most of all, it is interesting what stake Pyongyang has placed on its Special Operations Forces (SOF).

All the armies of the world have their own special forces, as well as the police, which deals with a wide range of tasks. However, in North Korea, special forces are so numerous that in 2017 they were allocated to special tactical troops. According to the minimum estimates, the number of special forces in the DPRK is 88000 fighters, according to the maximum - 121500. They are structurally divided into light infantry, reconnaissance and sniper units. North Korean warriors are considered the most highly motivated and trained in the world: they serve there for 5 to 8 years, they continuously train in the toughest conditions and are morally ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their country. Why does the DPRK need so many special forces that they had to create a separate type of troops from them?

Then that North Korea must always be ready for war with the capitalist Republic of Korea. In the event of the start of real hostilities, the special forces will quickly cross the border and begin to operate behind enemy lines. Numerous spetsnaz scouts will carry out activities to obtain intelligence information, capture and interrogate prisoners, search for and eliminate possible obstacles on the route of advancement of the main units, and, if necessary, conduct attacking actions. Destruction groups must carry out sabotage on highways: the destruction of roads, tunnels, bridges and airfields, communication centers, warehouses and storage facilities, the destruction of communications, the elimination of enemy military personnel and technical personnel located at strategically important facilities. Barrage groups will divert the attention of enemy anti-sabotage units.

In addition to purely "special forces" tasks, the DPRK MTRs are trained to interact with the regular units of the Korean People's Army. At the level of groups or individual teams, special forces snipers are able to effectively interact with army formations. If necessary, the North Korean MTRs must provide a "second front" behind enemy lines, as well as counteract the military intelligence of the Republic of Korea and the United States in their rear, and fight against anti-government forces at home.

Thus, the North Korean special forces are a very powerful and at the same time flexible tool, the importance of which can hardly be overestimated. How can this experience be of interest to us?


If we carefully analyze the experience of 8 months of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, it is obvious that (moto) infantry plays a key role in it. Rocket and artillery attacks are doing their job, but numerous Ground Forces are needed to liberate settlements and control this territory. What did the Russian military have to face in Ukraine?

At first, let's call a spade a spade, military intelligence turned out to be not set at the proper level. Yes, intelligence data can be received through various channels, but the importance of spetsnaz intelligence officers operating in the rear and capable of simultaneously adjusting fire can hardly be overestimated.

Secondly, the NVO could have gone according to a different scenario if the Russian troops had a sufficient number of trained special forces to operate in rough terrain. One of the main reasons why the Russian Armed Forces had to be withdrawn from near Kyiv, and then from the Kharkov region, is that the North and North-East of Ukraine are covered with dense forests. Acting under the guise of "greenery", the saboteurs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine could create gigantic supply problems for our group without any problems. If at least 20-30 thousand selected Russian special forces were involved there in support of the Ground Forces at the same time, continuously combing forests and sabotaging behind enemy lines, the NWO would clearly take on a slightly different character.

Thirdly, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine relied on the defense of fortified cities, hiding behind their own citizens as a "human shield", which was a very unpleasant surprise. It is obvious that the level of training of a special forces soldier for conducting urban battles, clearing buildings and releasing hostages is an order of magnitude higher than that of an average contracted motorized rifleman or “mobile”. If the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation had under 100 thousand special forces soldiers, the liberation of cities would have happened much faster and with fewer victims.

It should be noted that, in general, Russia is now on the right track. In 2013, we officially created the Special Operations Forces (SOF). They are formed only from contract soldiers, and these are our most combat-ready soldiers. It was they who made a big impression in Crimea in 2014, for which they were nicknamed “polite people.” When looking at their gallant appearance, it seemed that our entire army was the same. Starting from 2015, February 27 is celebrated in Russia as the Day of Special Operations Forces. MTR fighters took part in operations in the North Caucasus and Syria, as well as in Ukraine.

The question is only one - in their number. The exact number of SSOs is not known due to secrecy, but it is obvious that we do not have as many such fighters as there are in the DPRK. The objective reality in which we are confronted in a "proxy" war with the entire NATO bloc requires a significant increase in the forces of Russian special forces trained to operate in the most difficult conditions. If we had at least 30-50 thousand SOF fighters at the first stage of the SVO, it would not be difficult for them, with the support of the Ground Forces, to quickly take Kyiv. Even Ukrainian propagandists later honestly admitted that after February 24, their capital was almost defenseless for the first couple of days.
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  1. Sydor Kovpak Offline Sydor Kovpak
    Sydor Kovpak 27 October 2022 18: 39
    Here the technical side is very important. Just increasing the amount is not enough. We all see how the technological revolution is going on in military affairs. Quadcopters alone changed the course of hostilities.
  2. Vladimir Orlov Offline Vladimir Orlov
    Vladimir Orlov (Vladimir) 27 October 2022 20: 19
    It's like that. Both the MTR and the GRU are understaffed for the NWO. It would be possible to cooperate with the DPRK on training / exchange of experience and "vacationers" .. These certainly will not let you down
    And it’s also worth mentioning about the units of the SVR - someone should act in the rear (in occupied cities, for example): organize support groups from the locals, eliminate the most frostbitten SBU officers, make sure that copies of the SBU archives remain for the tribunal (especially pro-Russian citizens of Ukraine, thousands of whom have already perished in the dungeons), to obtain information about political plans, and a lot of things ... We would rely on intelligence data, and not on the talking head of Medvedchuk, we would probably not go to Kyiv on the 24th , as in a parade, take the keys ...
    1. kapitan92 Offline kapitan92
      kapitan92 (Vyacheslav) 27 October 2022 21: 04
      Quote: Vladimir Orlov
      It would be possible to cooperate with the DPRK on training / exchange of experience and "vacationers".

      It's vacationers! With an average salary in the DPRK of $ 10 per month, for $ 1000 per month, the boys would "plow", with the death of $ 10000 for a family, there would be no end to the Korean "volunteers".
      Even our rulers cannot do this! According to the General Staff, there are about 54000 mercenaries on the outskirts.
      1. smart fellow Offline smart fellow
        smart fellow (smart fellow) 28 October 2022 16: 24
        There, housing and utilities, education and medical care are free. You can't buy this for $10.
  3. vlad127490 Offline vlad127490
    vlad127490 (Vlad Gor) 27 October 2022 21: 27
    Earlier, there was infa that the DPRK offered to send its troops to help the Donbass in the amount of 100 thousand military personnel. Trained troops at the front are needed now. 300 thousand mobilized will be prepared, at best, by January 01, 2023, but this will not be enough. Why the Kremlin refused the DPRK soldiers is a big question.
    1. smart fellow Offline smart fellow
      smart fellow (smart fellow) 28 October 2022 15: 21
      Why the Kremlin refused the DPRK soldiers is a big question.

      Nobody offered. This is a deputy from the State Duma haypanul. The army of the DPRK is 600-700 thousand against 600 thousand of the Republic of Kazakhstan and twice the mob. resource (26 million people in the DPRK and 52 million in the Republic of Kazakhstan). 60 Americans are permanently stationed in South Korea. military (before that it was believed that there were 38 thousand of them, but after the creation of the newest naval base on Jeju Island, the number increased) and 300 thousand Amer. soldiers must be transferred to Korea within 2 weeks in case of war. In 2013, a pre-war situation arose on the peninsula, and all North Korean workers left Russia to defend their homeland.
    2. Pavel57 Offline Pavel57
      Pavel57 (Paul) 3 November 2022 08: 49
      The non-use of the DPRK military is most likely due to the political coloring of this step and the fact that the Koreans asked for such participation in response.
  4. Dan Offline Dan
    Dan (Daniel) 28 October 2022 08: 36
    military intelligence turned out to be not up to the mark.

    To read further and discuss something about "trained special forces for operations in rough terrain", in more detail about what should be the "proper level" of training of our military intelligence and where and how they showed their inadequacy to this level. Some kind of unprofessional reasoning from scratch .... By the way, those whom you called "mobs" with a slight familiarity of contempt, unlike you, are risking their lives. They are not "mobiles", they are soldiers called up from the reserve.
  5. Sergey Latyshev Offline Sergey Latyshev
    Sergey Latyshev (Serge) 28 October 2022 10: 29
    Ah, another explanation in hindsight.
    "be with us" ... and then you can list a lot of things ... "it would not be difficult ... to take Kyiv."
  6. Vladimir Tuzakov (Vladimir Tuzakov) 28 October 2022 12: 12
    Spetsnaz for special operations, but not for general military operations. Conclusion: to raise the level of the armed forces and there will be no need to look for panaceas for the SVO in the MTR.
    1. Nikolay Volkov Offline Nikolay Volkov
      Nikolay Volkov (Nikolai Volkov) 28 October 2022 17: 00
      level and amount. for huge Russia, this "compact army" is laughter and tears. and need to be made from conscript soldiers. not marchers and bedmakers