"Banzai" in Persian: latest news on the use of Iranian UAVs

Literally a day after posting previous material on the burning topic of Iranian kamikaze drones, I got a report technical examination of the wreckage of Shahed-131 - the predecessor of Shahed-136, adopted by the Russian army under the designation "Geran-2". It caught my eye that the captions under a number of illustrations are in yellow-Blakit language, and the main text is in Russian, but obviously translated automatically. It seems that the American hosts sent their pamphlet to the Ukrainian "brothers in arms" in its original form, and the interpreter from the Armed Forces of Ukraine quickly got tired of translating from English into a non-existent language.

Nevertheless, the report gives a fairly complete picture of the design of the Iranian kamikaze. I must admit that some of my interpretations of the meager data I provided last time were erroneous and overly optimistic.

Cyborg killer close-up

"Cyborg" is, of course, too strong a word. The term “flying moped with a bomb” already circulating on the net fits this device much more (although you should not consider it an insult).

Shahed-131 is indeed "primitive" by the standards of the 21st century. There is no survey system on board, the main modes of operation are flight according to satellite navigation data or inertial guidance (when the position of the device is counted from the conditional “zero coordinates”, based on its speed, direction and flight time; a kind of “movement in azimuth”). Direct control by the operator is also possible, but only when the kamikaze is in direct line of sight (for example, in the field of view of the camera of another, more advanced drone). About the automatic following the leader, the distribution of goals between the kamikaze group - in a word, about "packing" - in the case of "one hundred and thirty-one" there is no question.

It is curious that a mixture consisting mainly of diesel fuel was used as fuel on the sample that underwent an “opening” (apparently, from the Yemeni theater of operations). Although the control system has a block signed with the abbreviation "automatic takeoff and landing", the latter is not provided for by the design, it does not have any system parachutes or any other elements for a safe landing. Thus, the return of the kamikaze to the base and its reuse are not expected: launched - be kind enough to blow something up.

As for the “blow up” at Shahed-131, everything is definitely in order. In the middle part of the hull (the nose is occupied by a battery and several counterweights) there is a powerful cumulative fragmentation warhead of 15 kilograms of explosives - this is enough to break through the frontal armor of any tank, a couple of meters of reinforced concrete or a ship's hull from side to side. To defeat unarmored targets, a cylindrical charge is tightly lined with striking elements in the form of hard-alloy cubes with a side of 7 millimeters. Several kilos of such "bullets" can shred manpower and equipment over a large area.

“But the report refers to the Shahed-131, and the Russian army uses the Shahed-136,” yes, this is true, but the characteristics of these devices do not differ radically. Most likely, “one hundred thirty-sixth” is the same “one hundred and thirty-first”, but technologically optimized, possibly transferred to another element base, (probably) capable of receiving a GLONASS signal, etc. In short, the difference is about the same as between the "six" and "penny". It is known for sure, for example, that the 136th model also does not have its own "eyes".

In general, it is clear that the characteristics of a kamikaze make it much more suitable for hitting stationary (or at least inactive) targets than maneuverable ones. In the context of hunting for HIMARS and Krab, this means that you need to identify their hideouts and ammunition depots, and bombard them with Geraniums. Therefore, it’s even funny that the first victims of the Iranian kamikazes were the self-propelled guns of the Ukrainian fascists - apparently, their crews behaved too relaxed, did not change their position for a long time and were poorly camouflaged, which turned their vehicles and themselves into “stationary” targets.

Geranium-2: Doomsday

Judging by the events of the past few days, Russian troops are actively engaged in the search for a niche and optimal tactics for the use of new weapons. The results are quite encouraging.

On September 23 and September 24, flocks of "flying flowers" densely cultivated Odessa. On the first day of the raids, strikes were carried out on the objects of the Odessa port, including the building of the headquarters of the Ukrainian Navy; in the second - by headquarters of the operational command "South", warehouses of ammunition and fuel. It is characteristic that if the attacks on September 23 brought rather a psychological result, raising that very “grand nix” all over Odessa, then on September 24 the “mopeds with bombs” achieved concrete practical success, in the form of the destruction of enemy reserves and a certain number of staff workers.

On September 26, a domestic-made Geranium-2 and Lancet-3 group raid was carried out on the positions of the Ukrainian towed artillery division near Ochakov, it is alleged that about two dozen kamikazes of each type participated in the attack. As a result, the division was practically defeated, losing up to 10 guns of various types (the former Soviet D-30, Hyacinth-B and Lend-Lease FH-70) and several thousand shells in a blown up ammunition depot. In addition, other targets in the neighborhood were hit during the raid: a fuel depot, an air defense command post and a security company headquarters.

During the raids on Odessa on September 23, our troops lost one Mohajer-6 - a reconnaissance and strike UAV of Iranian origin, similar in characteristics to the Turkish Bayraktar TB2; ironically, it was the video of the drone floating in the sea that served as the first ironclad proof of its use by the Russian army.

Obviously, during the operation, this particular UAV served to correct the Geranium raids and objectively monitor the results. But how it ended up in the water is not entirely clear: combat damage is not noticeable on the hull, so it could have been “shot down” by enemy electronic warfare, or lost due to technical problems or piloting errors.

Mohajer-6, like its Turkish “colleague in a dangerous business”, is capable of carrying light bombs or ATGMs, which makes it also a potential “HIMARS hunter”: hypothetically, loitering with a target load over enemy territory, the “sixth” could hit enemy MLRS and self-propelled guns on their own, immediately after detection. On the other hand, such tactics can lead to heavy losses of the UAVs themselves, which are quite vulnerable to any air defense systems. According to rumors, Mohajer-6 is equipped with excellent optoelectronics, not inferior to the Turkish counterpart, so using them as reconnaissance aircraft can bring greater dividends than as attack aircraft.

Geranium-2, on the whole, confirmed its great potential. Iranian media proudly reported on the success of domestic weapons on the fields of Ukraine, while Zelensky hastened to express his indignation: already on September 23, the Iranian ambassador in Kyiv was deprived of accreditation and a demand was made to reduce the number of diplomatic workers.

An information campaign has also been launched to discredit Iranian kamikazes. On September 23, a video appeared from the Dnepropetrovsk region, in which another Geranium explodes in the air, hit by small arms fire. Although there is nothing special about it (after all, the drone is two meters long and three wide, and is easily detected visually and by sound), a single video is accelerated as evidence of the "ineffectiveness" of Iranian kamikazes, which "shoot down on approach." Also, the thesis is being replicated that the allegedly preserved plumage planes (the very details with inscriptions) indicate that such and such a particular drone did not work properly, but was destroyed by anti-aircraft fire.

Finally, in some places it is alleged that the Russian Federation bought one thousand "one hundred and thirty-sixths" from Iran for $ 8 billion - that is, 8 million for each "flying moped", or twice the price of one Bayraktar. Although the actual price of "Geranium" is not disclosed, statements about 8 million apiece are clearly ridiculous, and are designed to obscure the effect of the use of kamikaze: they say, "yes, the result was achieved - but at what cost?"

Obviously, if Iranian drones were really ineffective, they would not have caused such hysteria among the Nazis. It is also obvious that after some time, kamikaze attacks will become "habitual", and will no longer have such a strong psychological effect - but high-explosive fragmentation will remain unchanged.
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  1. prior Offline prior
    prior (Vlad) 2 October 2022 12: 43
    I would like to ask if Iranian drones are so good, why has not their production been mastered by the domestic industry yet ?!
    Why hasn't cheap fake drones been produced to detect enemy air defense?! They launched a flock of these and wait for where the air defense will work, then go there and hammer. And let missiles worth many thousands of dollars be spent on a cheap drone.
    1. rotkiv04 Offline rotkiv04
      rotkiv04 (Victor) 2 October 2022 13: 03
      Quote: prior
      I would like to ask if Iranian drones are so good, why has not their production been mastered by the domestic industry yet ?!
      Why hasn't cheap fake drones been produced to detect enemy air defense?! They launched a flock of these and wait for where the air defense will work, then go there and hammer. And let missiles worth many thousands of dollars be spent on a cheap drone.

      such tactics for the General Staff are too difficult to understand, they are not used to dealing with all sorts of toys, Gerasimov is a specialist in fire shafts
      1. steelmaker Offline steelmaker
        steelmaker 2 October 2022 17: 27
        Gerasimov specialist in fire shafts

        Judging by the CBO, he has no idea what it is.
      2. Zenn Offline Zenn
        Zenn (Andrei) 2 October 2022 20: 48
        According to the requirements of our Defense Ministry, Bayraktar does not pass, and even more so Iranian UAVs.
        The requirements are such that it is possible to produce prototypes and exhibition samples, there is no talk of mass production. So the Moscow Region and its requirements exist, but there are practically no UAVs in the army.
        The war showed that mopeds with bombs are quite combat-ready, I believe that after this our entire Military-Industrial Commission should resign, but judging by how Borisov was transferred from the first deputy of the military-industrial complex to Roskosmos, there will be no one to answer.
    2. Sergey Kairis Offline Sergey Kairis
      Sergey Kairis (Sergey Kairis) 5 October 2022 11: 43
      And why master this primitive and arrange another cut, if Iran gladly sells them to us cheaper ...
  2. Vladimir Tuzakov (Vladimir Tuzakov) 2 October 2022 12: 56
    Iranian drones saved our military-industrial complex from complete disgrace from the lack of powerful strike UAVs. Habitual practice, acquiring foreign equipment, it is being finalized according to its developments and for local conditions. So far it seems only repainting under Geranium -2 and others, then they will probably bring in their more thorough developments, which are available for many still non-serial developments .. The article humiliatingly describes Geranium -2, considering the previous model. Shahid - 136, has a warhead - 36 kg., Powerful and sufficient for many tasks. An old tradition from the beginnings of the USSR, on the basis of purchased samples and sometimes licenses, to develop and develop their own line of products, perhaps there will be an Iranian UAV pedigree ..
  3. Sam Rimer Offline Sam Rimer
    Sam Rimer (Sam Rimer) 2 October 2022 13: 44
    It is very shameful for a superpower to buy military equipment from a third world country. There are 50 percent. population - illiterate herders of donkeys and camels. For Russia, this is the loss of technological sovereignty and the prestige of a great power.
    1. vik669 Offline vik669
      vik669 (vik669) 2 October 2022 14: 19
      So we have shikoko percent. population - drivers of sheep and goats, not counting defective managers and other servants of the people. For Russia, this is - you have to be more modest, my dear Russians, or you won’t praise yourself, no one will praise!
    2. sat2004 Offline sat2004
      sat2004 2 October 2022 15: 34
      It is very shameful when donkey drivers create something better than those who donkeys have seen only in the picture.
      1. guest Offline guest
        guest 2 October 2022 17: 34
        Yes, why in the picture, in some offices of the General Staff, it looks like these donkeys are sitting.
    3. Alexey Lan Offline Alexey Lan
      Alexey Lan (Alexey Lantukh) 2 October 2022 16: 37
      Iran is not Arabs. Iran is Persians. Persians are an ancient people with a great culture. They are on the verge of creating an atomic bomb. And it is not shameful to buy something necessary from any country. It is shameful for Russia to test flying ammunition in Syria and not establish production for its army. It was shameful to start a war without being ready for it.
    4. maiman61 Offline maiman61
      maiman61 (Yuri) 2 October 2022 16: 38
      Yes Yes! Someone whistled that Russia had taken second place in the world in terms of the number of drones. Lagging behind only the USA! So who is worse, a donkey and camel driver or a whistler?
    5. guest Offline guest
      guest 2 October 2022 17: 30
      And to retreat from the army of a third world country, how is it not a shame in Liman?
  4. calligrapher Lev_Nikolaevich (Dmitriy) 2 October 2022 14: 13
    The success of "flying mopeds" suggests that the only thing that really works is that which does not depend on real-time control - flight in an inertial frame of reference or GPS.
    In this regard, there is a suspicion not only about miscalculations in assessing the combat capability of the enemy's air defense, but also in assessing its electronic warfare systems.
    In addition, listening in the reports of the Ministry of Defense about the defeat of numerous targets deep behind enemy lines, and seeing great modesty in the area of ​​​​their defeat on the line of contact, the thought begins to creep in that the targets hit in the distance are mostly false, and verifying their authenticity at such a distance is essential problem.
    Now it is no longer a secret that the enemy put the production of dummies of military equipment on a production track, and I would not be surprised that this was done even before the start of the NWO.
    As for the imported equipment supplied, VO also already had information about the industrial production of their inflatable copies. One must think that they were also supplied, and in abundance.
    If all this is so - there is a puncture of military intelligence.
    1. Alexey Lan Offline Alexey Lan
      Alexey Lan (Alexey Lantukh) 2 October 2022 16: 38
      Interestingly, we have false copies of equipment in service.
      1. boriz Offline boriz
        boriz (boriz) 2 October 2022 20: 44
        There is, a lot was written about it at one time. There were pictures of inflatable tanks and other equipment. The only question is how many they made ...
        Here it is, back in 2009.
  5. 1_2 Offline 1_2
    1_2 (Ducks are flying) 3 October 2022 19: 59
    this shahid needs a cheap one-time turbine, the internal combustion engine hums too much and is low-powered - the speed of the UAV is low