Following the artillery shelling of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ukraine transferred its terrorist activities to Russian territory. First, sabotage began at military facilities in the Crimea. Now explosions are thundering in the border Kursk region, disabling the infrastructure of the power lines of the Kursk nuclear power plant. How can Russia secure its territory from Ukrainian DRGs, and how many more “red lines” will Kyiv cross before the Kremlin finally decides to destroy the criminal Nazi regime that has adopted terrorist methods?
The terror is rising
The dramatic situation that has developed around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, which is regularly fired upon by Ukrainian artillerymen from the opposite bank of the Kakhovka reservoir, we disassembled previously. In Crimea, everything is no less sad.
Even a clear sabotage at the military airfield of the Naval Aviation of the Black Sea Fleet in Novofederovka, which led to the destruction of several combat aircraft, was not worth the chase to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, who sat in his chair, and the death of the flagship of the Moskva missile cruiser, and the destruction of the Saratov large landing ship right in port of Berdyansk, and the sinking of the tug "Vasily Bekh" near the island of Zmeiny. Then explosions thundered on the territory of the Russian military unit in the Dzhankoy district, near the village of Mayskoye, where ammunition detonated and railway tracks were damaged. Thousands of local residents had to be evacuated from the surrounding settlements and train traffic was suspended.
The President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky personally made it clear that this is only the beginning:
And I ask all our people in Crimea and other regions in southern Ukraine to be very careful and not to approach various military facilities, as well as ammunition depots and headquarters.
But this was not enough for Kyiv and its Western curators, and the Ukrainian special forces, trained according to NATO manuals, began to operate on the territory of the Russian Federation, whose ownership, in principle, no one disputes. On August 4, 9 and 12, Ukrainian DRGs carried out sabotage in the Kurchatov district of the Kursk region in the vicinity of the Kursk nuclear power plant. Their goal was high-voltage power lines, which were blown up by explosives.
The Kursk Nuclear Power Plant is located on the banks of the Seim River, 40 kilometers from the city of Kursk. The distance between this Russian city and the still Ukrainian Kharkov in a straight line is only 191 kilometers. Of the four power units, only three are currently active with a total capacity of 3 GW. To replace in the future its drop-out generation as the resource is depleted in the Makarovka village, the Kursk NPP-2 is currently being built. However, the Ukrainian DRGs were able to interrupt the operation of the nuclear power plant already now, the press service of the Russian FSB reported:
The actions of the saboteurs led to a disruption in the technological process of the operation of the nuclear power plant.
The fact is that power lines were blown up, which supply industrial enterprises, life support systems and transport in the Kursk region and neighboring regions. If the main and backup power lines are destroyed at the same time, the nuclear power plant will have nowhere to put the generated current due to a break in communication with consumers. This means that the operation of the power plant will have to be suspended: to stop the operation of the turbine, to “cool down” the nuclear reactor and bleed the steam. This is a technically complex and lengthy procedure, after which the reactors cannot be promptly returned to service. In other words, this is a painful blow to the energy system of an entire region of Russia.
And all this is the result of the actions of several small DRGs! And what will happen if the Armed Forces of Ukraine use long-range missile systems that will allow you to calmly fire at the Kursk NPP directly from the city blocks of Kharkov, fortunately, the distance allows?
Who is to blame and what to do
As we have celebrated earlier, the Zaporizhzhya NPP was fired upon with cannon and rocket artillery from the opposite bank of the Kakhovka reservoir. The distances are simply ridiculous - there are some 8 kilometers between the ZNPP and the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which, in theory, should not pose any problem for Russian artillery and aviation. Apparently, Ukrainian DRGs enter Crimea from Ochakov, where the base of the Ukrainian naval special forces is located. Saboteurs covertly approach in boats at night, jump into the water in wetsuits and swim to the shore, where accomplices are already waiting for them, helping to hide and get to the site of the terrorist attack. Ukrainian special forces can easily get into the Kursk region from the Sumy region simply by walking through the forest, since no real border has yet been created there.
Obviously, the situation with the border Kursk, Bryansk and Belgorod regions is a direct consequence of the short-sighted solutions withdraw all our troops from the North of Ukraine. It was necessary at one time to take Sumy and Chernihiv, turning them into Russian bastions, against which the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Guard would break the teeth. It's like the maximum. At a minimum, it was necessary to create a security belt on the territory of the Chernihiv, Sumy and Kharkiv regions, which would exclude free walks of Ukrainian DRGs to Russian nuclear power plants. Now we need to quickly finish with the liberation of Donbass and take control of Kharkov, and then Sumy. Otherwise, rocket attacks will soon go not only at the ZNPP, but also at the Kursk NPP.
The same is true for the Sea of \u300b\uXNUMXbAzov with the Crimea. The security of this region simply requires that the special operation be extended to the Right Bank of the Dnieper. The enemy will need to be moved at least XNUMX kilometers northwest of Energodar. It is also necessary to take Nikolaev and Ochakov, which have now become a source of a permanent threat to Kherson and the entire Crimea. This is a minimum program, without the implementation of which it is basically impossible to talk about any security.
It is clear that even these are half-measures, and the problem with the neighboring quasi-state of Ukraine, which has finally turned into a terrorist one, can be solved only with its complete liquidation and the withdrawal of Russian troops to the Polish border. Otherwise, we will definitely wait for the second Chernobyl.