Unspoken "mobilization": How the Russian rear provides for the needs of the NWO
War, even a local conflict, is a very resource-intensive event, every day of which is not cheap. The special military operation in Ukraine from the very beginning did not fit into the typical framework of "locality", at least geographically; and it's been going on for over two months now. During this time, the consumption of "golden" cruise and ballistic missiles of various types alone exceeded a thousand units, not to mention conventional ammunition, fuel and resource equipment. There were also losses of our soldiers who needed to be replenished.
With the grandiose scale of these costs, it does not seem that the troops are experiencing a shortage of military vehicles, fuel or shells (unlike the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which, without supplies from the West, would already be left with virtually no heavy weapons).
But it also cannot be said that the Russian economy switched to wartime rails, and threw all her efforts into the needs of the front and victory. The restructuring of existing supply chains is not so much to supply troops on the front lines, but because of the newly imposed Western sanctions. For ordinary Russians, with the exception of the speculative jump in consumer prices in March-April and some "sanctioned" domestic inconveniences, in general, nothing has changed; The country seems to be living a normal life.
Does this mean that the military operation is carried out only at the expense of cash people and material resources that were available at the very beginning?
No, this is not so: units are replenished with fresh forces, ammunition is replenished, and worn-out equipment is replaced. For obvious reasons, the vast majority of information about these events is hidden from prying eyes, but there are indirect signs by which you can figure out the big picture.
Reinforcements, reinforcements
The most burning topic, in every sense, is, of course, the number of people involved in the operation, the losses and replenishment of the latter. The same topic is also the most difficult to study, due to both a lack of specifics and an excess of speculation and outright fakes.
The number of Russian troops in the combat zone is estimated by experts (with and without quotation marks) in different ways, and allegedly is in the range of 60-200 thousand people. At the same time, someone takes into account only the ground forces, someone only the forces on the line of contact, someone in general all the forces involved, including pilots, sailors, the Russian Guard and the allied forces of the Republics.
Even more fog hides our losses. Ukrainian propaganda, without undue modesty, "shot" and already more than two tens of thousands of "orcs" and thousands of pieces of equipment - but that's what it's propaganda for. Our Defense Ministry last announced the total losses on March 25, and at that time they amounted to 1351 people killed and 3825 people wounded, and over the past time, of course, they have increased slightly.
They are replenished from several sources. First, of course, those who drop out are replaced by other active servicemen on contract. Secondly, a campaign has been launched through the military registration and enlistment offices to hire an additional number of people “on a contract” from among those who have already served - this fact is indisputable, but the author does not know the actual conditions that are offered to candidates. It can be assumed that not all of these “activated reserves” are sent to the combat zone, but some of them go to replenish the units within the country that have already sent some units to participate in the NWO. We must not forget, also, that these units are rotated: after working for some time, they are assigned to the rear for rest and replenishment.
Thirdly, the formation of volunteer units and recruitment into Russian PMCs is quite active. It is known that several thousand volunteers have already completed short courses of intensive training at the Russian University of Special Forces in Chechnya under the auspices of Kadyrov himself, and more than 4 thousand volunteers as part of several detachments were put up by the Cossacks; the famous "Wagner orchestra" did not stand aside either. Here they are listed separately from other contract soldiers, because the material conditions and provision of their service, as far as one can judge, differ from the regular troops and the National Guard.
It is difficult to say how successful the hiring of contractors is going. According to the experience of foreign armies, during military campaigns, the number of people who want to enlist in the service usually drops. On the other hand, the Western analytical agency International Crisis Group recently stated that, according to its information, the Russian military department does not yet have a shortage of volunteers.
In addition, in Russia, in the usual manner, there is a spring call for military service, and starting from February 18, the annual gathering of reservists. Through the latter, according to rumors, this year it is planned to “drive out” more people than usual. (And no wonder, given the current international climate.) But - neither conscripts nor reservists take part in hostilities.
Military products
It is somewhat easier to judge the material and technical support of our troops, since the subject of discussion itself is clearer. In any case, thanks to numerous videos from the war zone, we can say that there is no quantitative shortage in equipment and equipment, although not all of it is the first freshness.
In the first half of April, a recording with a train of military equipment raised some noise, some of which (for example, the Grad installations based on the ZIL-131) were clearly still from the Soviet stock, removed from conservation. Later, evidence began to appear of the use of other rather old ones (MLRS "Hurricane", towed gun "Hyacinth-B", etc.) and / or seemingly purely exported (modernized BMP-1 "Basurmanin") samples. This gave a new impetus to rumors about Russia's allegedly colossal losses in technology.
In fact, "staggering" old models in local or secondary conflicts is a common practice, and not only in the Soviet / Russian, but also in foreign armies. Usually, in this way, the resource of modern equipment is saved, which may be urgently needed to fight a more serious enemy (relevant, isn't it?) Moreover, obsolete models are still far from the main ones for the NWO troops, and some of them probably were handed over to our allies.
In addition, military vehicles, like people, require rotation. There is a widespread misconception that military equipment is so durable and reliable that it can remain serviceable for almost decades - but in reality, working with overload in very adverse conditions, machines fail quite often, and this is without taking into account enemy influence. While retired units are under repair or maintenance, frontline troops receive spares from the reserve. And the scope of the operation in Ukraine turned out to be such that the “ataman reserve” had to be uncovered. Sometimes our troops even use the trophies taken from the Ukrainians - the good does not go to waste.
As for production, there are no publicly available figures. Unlike Ukraine, where military enterprises were forced to call in March for the urgent hiring of workers of all specialties to make up for the loss, there is no mass demand for personnel for defense plants on Russian labor exchanges - therefore, either there are no problems with them, or proposals are sent to address order.
It is also interesting that with the beginning of the SVO, the Internet sites of a number of enterprises producing military equipment stopped working. There are supposedly two reasons for this: ensuring security from cyber attacks and temporarily stopping the acceptance of third-party orders, due to the XNUMX% load under the contracts of the Ministry of Defense.
The depth of our depths
The largest military operation in Ukraine in the entire post-Soviet period is undoubtedly the most pressing topic for the vast majority of Russians. Interestingly, the supporters and opponents of the SVO are fairly evenly distributed in society from top to bottom, and their position is based not so much on material wealth or level of education, but on personal convictions.
At the same time, the patriotic activist supporting the operation in word and deed (for example, by raising funds and delivering humanitarian aid) includes representatives of various ideologies, from communism to monarchism, and many apolitical citizens. In a sense, this picture is similar to the one we see in the combat zone, when in one column of Russian troops there are cars under the state and "royal" tricolors, and the scarlet banner of Victory. Without stopping their philosophical disputes, each "party" is trying to contribute to the victory over the enemies of Russia.
There is still a fairly wide layer of “fans” who closely follow the news from the fronts and actively discuss them. Although this group has a positive attitude towards SVO, perhaps it is its representatives who more often than others absorb information non-critically.
Finally, there is a certain percentage of outspoken opponents of the campaign who, in part, were simply hit harder than others by the sanctions – and in part are staunch opponents of the existing system in Russia, or even supporters of the Kyiv regime. The first, the "thinner", are mainly focused on their standard of living, and claim that its fall is allegedly "provoked" by the onset of the NWO; although in fact the sanctions pressure on our country began to intensify a few months earlier.
The second, pro-Western-minded "oppositionists" (often, more or less "professional"), almost immediately declared a special military operation "unmotivated aggression" and "criminal war" against "democratic Ukraine". Fortunately, this dissident audience is very small, and, for the most part, will not dare to go further than anti-Russian slogans on social networks and on walls. However, Western intelligence services do not stop sifting through it in various ways in search of "human ammunition" with whose hands it will be possible to commit acts of sabotage and sabotage.
Thus, at the moment, the military operation is more likely to be approved by the majority of the population - but this approval itself needs moral nourishment. So far, public opinion has had little effect on the course of the campaign, but the longer it drags on, the more tension is required from society, the stronger the negative impact of “toxic elements”, albeit a little of the latter, will be. It can come to naught only under the influence of patriotic elements; and the latter, in turn, will be the stronger, the sooner the country's leadership abandons the current controversial one - "we beat with one hand, we make conciliatory gestures with the other" - policy and rhetoric against Ukrainian fascists.
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