Israel Air Force raid on Latakia: what came under attack

73

On the night of December 28, the Israeli Air Force carried out another air raid on a container terminal in the port of Latakia, located just 20 km from the Russian Khmeimim airbase in the SAR. Israeli pilots used GBU-39 American guided high-precision gliding bombs and performed maneuvers in Lebanese airspace.

It should be noted that the GBU-39 has folding wings, which allows the ammunition to cover a distance of more than 100 km. The initial horizontal speed of the ammunition is equal to the speed of the carrier aircraft at the moment of separation of the GBU-39 from the standard BRU-61 / A beam holder.



The footage filmed and published by eyewitnesses on the Web shows how the ammunition explodes in the port and a fire starts. An Israeli air raid hit 2 barrels of fuel and lubricants that were in containers.


Traditionally, the Israeli side did not comment on the consequences of the air raid. However, Tel Aviv does not stop broadcasting that the Israeli Air Force is destroying "Iranian weapons" in Syria that could threaten the Israelis.


We remind you that the previous air raid on the port of Latakia took place on the night of December 7. Then the Israeli aircraft destroyed containers with food, personal hygiene items and other humanitarian supplies. Note that Damascus has repeatedly promised to end the use of the Lebanese airspace by Israeli warplanes.
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  1. +7
    29 December 2021 10: 47
    Traditionally, the Israeli side did not comment on the consequences of the air raid.

    I wonder if other countries take it as a rule to destroy targets they don't like from the air in third countries, what will the "world community" say to this? Or, what is allowed to Jupiter ... And who then appointed Israel - Jupiter?
    1. 0
      30 December 2021 12: 43
      The problem there is that the attack is taking place over Lebanon, due to the mountain range that obscures the radar's field of view and allows strikes from high altitudes while in the shadows. There can be only one help here - AWACS patrolling, constant. At the same time, the Israelis can see perfectly and through local agents know about all movements of large objects. It is impossible to prevent Israel from using Lebanon. Just like getting him out of the Gaza Strip. To do this, we need to wage a full-fledged war, for which Syria has no possibilities.

      The interception of gliding bombs is already carried out with a high degree of efficiency, but it is impossible to ensure 100% interception and the cost of such efforts exceeds the cost of the attack. Therefore, an attack of 20-30 GBU-39 guarantees a breakthrough of 3-5 bombs to the target, and given their accuracy and the nature of targets (depots), this provides some effect.
  2. +3
    29 December 2021 11: 33
    Just yesterday, in an article on VO, they enlightened that Syria and Iraq, as they declared war on Israel in the 48th, did not finish.

    So what was the C3 and C300 promoted 400 years ago, how is it, 20 km away? do not interfere, and perhaps correctly.
    1. 0
      29 December 2021 13: 14
      The Russian Federation with Japan, too, they say, does not have a Peace Treaty after 2 MB. Now what?
      1. 0
        29 December 2021 14: 28
        Quote: Bulanov
        The Russian Federation with Japan, too, they say, does not have a Peace Treaty after 2 MB. Now what?

        Japan surrendered!
        1. 0
          30 December 2021 13: 27
          And now, after its surrender, Japan is demanding that the Kuril Islands be surrendered to it?
          1. -1
            30 December 2021 14: 20
            Quote: Bulanov
            For jacques (jacques)
            And now, after its capitulation, Japan is demanding that the Kuril Islands be surrendered to it?

            first about the analogy Israel-Syria Russia-Japan
            Israel-Syria are at war
            Russia-Japan is not because Japan surrendered.
            Japan's claims concern a small group of islands about which negotiations are underway with Russia
    2. -7
      29 December 2021 13: 14
      Radar observation and guidance of the S-400 air defense system and the C-300 air defense system at low viewing angles have a range of about 50 km. The earth is round. As the editor-in-chief of the magazine "Arsenal of the Fatherland" said, retired colonel A. Murakhovsky. Air defense covering such strategic objects as the port It should be comprehensive. Like the air defense of Hanoi or Haiphong in the early 1970s, in Vietnam. This theater lacks the most important component of air defense - air defense fighters controlled by the operators of the AWACS and U. It is somewhat naive to rely only on ground air defense. The enemy is aware of the location of its objects. Especially about the radar. And air defense fighters can attack flights and squadrons unexpectedly, from all heights and directions. And anywhere. They are easy to redirect from direction to direction. These lessons have not been learned since 1973, since 1982.
      1. +4
        29 December 2021 14: 08
        Radar observation and guidance of the S-400 air defense system and the C-300 air defense system at low viewing angles have a range of about 50 km. The earth is round.

        Yes, you are a balabol, my friend.)

        What is 92Н6Е you know? (Mobile tower for antenna post - makes the ground "flatter")
        1. -5
          29 December 2021 14: 21
          This tower gives an increase in the detection range of 20 km. It is taking into account the presence of such a tower and the indicated range of 60 km. Potou, and the radar calculations cannot warn the Syrians in advance. Even taking into account the raid of the crews of the Hel Hawir units, it occurs from the sea.
          1. +1
            29 December 2021 15: 44
            This tower gives an increase in the detection range of 20 km.

            Yes, only you forgot to add - for a low flying target. (up to 60 m)
            And such heights greatly limit the capabilities of the attacking side, because both the speed and range at low altitudes are significantly reduced. To destroy a subsonic target, 50 kilometers is more than enough.
            1. -7
              29 December 2021 17: 55
              It is about low-flying goals. Who is in the subject, it is clear. And who is not in the subject, explain to him, just waste time.

              Quote: Dear couch expert.
              This tower gives an increase in the detection range of 20 km.

              Yes, only you forgot to add - for a low flying target. (up to 60 m)
              And such heights greatly limit the capabilities of the attacking side, because both the speed and range at low altitudes are significantly reduced. To destroy a subsonic target, 50 kilometers is more than enough.

              The practice of Hel Hawir in the local theater of operations, from 1967 to 2021, shows that continuous combat training of reconnaissance forces, target designation, crews, and operational training of headquarters is of great importance, and even low altitudes are not an obstacle to the main task.
              1. +3
                29 December 2021 22: 07
                Hel Hawir's practice at the local theater of operations, from 1967 to 2021, shows

                Did you have experience working with Russian air defense?
                1. -5
                  30 December 2021 14: 16
                  The Russian air defense is just a fragment of the Soviet air defense. The Soviet air defense had air defense armies, air defense corps, numerous companies of RTR. As a result of the landslide reduction in 2008-2012, the Russian air defense has a shortage of officers and warrant officers in several thousand. As in the tale about Malchish Kibalchish. Cartridges and shells. there are, but there are no fighters.
                  For more than 6 years of the war, a fair amount of experience has been accumulated with the Russian air defense system.
          2. avg
            +4
            29 December 2021 16: 12
            Tricky question. From what height from the round ground do you need to drop the bomb, what would it plan on the target?
            1. -8
              29 December 2021 18: 04
              Safe from a height for the crew. laughing The height of the guaranteed destruction of the target by FAB, corrected, guided, homing ammunition, up to 3 thousand meters. Above 3 thousand m, the probability of defeat is reduced by about a third. Over 5 km, the probability is slightly higher than 0.2. The number of ammunition, the number of approaches to the target plays a role. manned aviation.

              Therefore, the instructions for the use of MANPADS indicate the main task of the calculation: not to shoot down aircraft, but to force their crews to use ammunition from heights of over 3 thousand meters in order to reduce the likelihood of hitting the protected object.
              1. +3
                29 December 2021 22: 11
                Safe from a height for the crew. laughing The height of the guaranteed destruction of the target by FAB, corrected, guided, homing ammunition, is up to 3 thousand meters.

                This means that the "crew" flies at a distance of 30 km, at an altitude of 3 tm. Do you think the "rounding of the earth" will prevent the C300 / 400 from being knocked down by this "misunderstanding"?)
                1. -1
                  29 December 2021 22: 52
                  When anonymous Syrians shot down our plane, the Jews bombed from a height of 10 km
                  4 bombs at a distance of 80-100 km. All bombs hit their targets.

                  So 3-5 km of altitude, and 20-50 km of range are already outdated.
                  1. +2
                    29 December 2021 23: 02
                    So 3-5 km of altitude, and 20-50 km of range are already outdated.

                    What are you talking about now, "comrade"? About the Syrian air defense, or about the capabilities of the C300 / 400?
                    And is it, as usual - so - in general?
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                2. -4
                  30 December 2021 14: 01
                  This will mean the following: The enemy crew will arrive at the calculated launch point of the ammunition at a minimum height, invisible to the S-300/400 air defense system radar. Immediately before launch, it will use electronic warfare (REP) means. Own or from an escort aircraft. Will change altitude for a short time. And it will launch or dump ammunition. Changes the altitude again and leaves the air defense zone at the minimum altitude. For guaranteed processing of target movement elements, the radar calculation requires at least 3 minutes. An experienced crew will have a couple of minutes of time to maneuver and use ammunition. Which is what they do. This is one of the options. Safe for the calculation of air defense systems. They can carry out a strike, but with preliminary reconnaissance of the radar position, followed by the destruction of the radar, or launchers, control modules.
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        2. 0
          29 December 2021 22: 38
          ..... the station is equipped with a phased array antenna for determining impulses in three coordinates. It has no analogues abroad, a serial sample has been used since 2007 in Elektrostal (Moscow region) .....
        3. 0
          30 December 2021 12: 57
          Alas, draw on paper the height of the tower, the range to the target, and not far from the radar position draw small hills, 900-1200m. And look at the radar shadows from these mountains, in which attacking targets are hiding. Alas, miracles do not happen! Either it is necessary to set up radar posts on the Lebanese mountains, or the AWACS boards must constantly be on duty in the air. Alas, neither one nor the other is possible yet ...
      2. 0
        29 December 2021 21: 26
        In general, it is wonderful: to quote the axioms of air defense construction through the mouth of a tanker. Separation, the use of AI, and also RTV are necessary. And in terms of target detection range, take the basic radar equation and see what this range depends on ...
  3. -3
    29 December 2021 12: 17
    The Kremlin's reputation suffers the most. Everyone is shown once again that: 1. Russia easily betrays its allies, and 2. They are afraid to use their air defense systems due to insufficient effectiveness.
    1. -5
      29 December 2021 13: 17
      Air defense for the protection of Russian military personnel and Russian facilities. The Russian group for the fight against terrorism. And the relations of the Syrians and Iranians with Israel are not our concern. It is impractical to spend expensive SAM ammunition for this purpose.
      1. -1
        29 December 2021 22: 42
        so what ... are we there ??? ))))))
        1. -3
          30 December 2021 14: 20
          In 30 years we’ll find out. laughing
    2. +1
      29 December 2021 13: 55
      Assad is not prohibited from shooting down Israeli missiles, bombs and planes. But there are no real results.
      1. -8
        29 December 2021 15: 23
        If the Syrian air defense dares to shoot down the aircraft and ammunition of Hel Havir, this air defense will be left with embers. With all due respect to the power of the air defense of the former SAR.
        1. +1
          29 December 2021 22: 21
          If the Syrian air defenses dare to shoot down the aircraft and the Hel Hawir ammunition normally, this air defense will be left with firebrands.

          Don't shy away from the topic. You stated:

          Radar observation and guidance of the S-400 air defense system and the C-300 air defense system at low viewing angles have a range of about 50 km. The earth is round. As the editor-in-chief of the magazine "Arsenal of the Fatherland" said, retired colonel A. Murakhovsky. Air defense covering such strategic objects as the port It should be comprehensive. Like the air defense of Hanoi or Haiphong in the early 1970s, in Vietnam. This theater lacks the most important component of air defense - air defense fighters controlled by the operators of the AWACS and U. It is somewhat naive to rely only on ground air defense. The enemy is aware of the location of its objects. Especially about the radar. And air defense fighters can attack flights and squadrons unexpectedly, from all heights and directions. And anywhere. They are easy to redirect from direction to direction. These lessons have not been learned since 1973, since 1982.

          This was without any reference to the air defense of Syria. You spoke specifically about the capabilities of the S300 / 400 air defense system. Please stay in the subject.
          1. 0
            29 December 2021 22: 48
            ........ On November 26, 2015, after Turkey shot down a Russian plane, the S-400 air defense system was deployed in Syria at the Russian Khmeimim airbase in Latakia and took over duty .....))). .. The American BGM-7 Tomahawk cruise missiles launched on April 2017, 109 across Syria were not fired upon by this system, although the operation carried out by the United States caused a negative reaction from Russian officials ...)))
            1. +1
              29 December 2021 22: 52
              The American BGM-7 Tomahawk cruise missiles launched on April 2017, 109 across Syria were not fired upon by this system, although the operation carried out by the United States caused a negative reaction from Russian officials ...

              Your infantile euphoria is incomprehensible, please explain.)
          2. -3
            30 December 2021 13: 50
            The Syrian air defense is only part of the Khmeimim air defense. Calculations of the S-400/300 air defense systems with the same range restrictions at low viewing angles as the Syrian counter-council. Not everything is thought out by the CP of the councilors. In the fourth year of the war, they did not even think of transmitting the codes to the "friend / foe" identification system. This is probably why they do not risk raising Russian and Syrian aircraft during the Hel Hawir raids.
  4. 0
    29 December 2021 13: 49
    hide behind transporters and passengers in Israel in the blood. Probably Syria, and the Russian Federation after the famous incident, it's time to use the potential of the Mig-29 and dryers and meet guests knowing when the transporter is going to land, in addition, you can change the air defense position.
    1. -5
      29 December 2021 14: 24
      Changing the air defense position is not such a quick and easy thing, and even with the creation of false positions. And to change the location during the raid, or after, to make a hole in the air defense. It is not known how many waves of attackers will follow. Without AWACS and U complexes, there is nowhere in modern combat.
      1. +4
        29 December 2021 22: 28
        When maneuvering in order to strengthen the cover of battalions conducting counterattacks against an enemy that has wedged in, an anti-aircraft subunit moves to a new starting (firing) position on a signal from a higher launcher along a previously reconnoitered and prepared route. In order to withdraw anti-aircraft subunits from possible enemy strikes after repelling an air attack or prolonged work (3-4 hours) in the occupied position, the main positions are changed to spare ones. The occupation and change of positions is carried out secretly, in conditions of limited visibility. When the covered battalions retreat, anti-aircraft subunits move from line to line, occupy starting (firing) positions with maximum use of the protective and camouflaging properties of the terrain and continue to carry out a combat mission, firing from a place or on the move.

        Why are you here at all ????

        You have no idea about the tactics of anti-aircraft units.)

        When maneuvering in order to strengthen the cover of battalions conducting counterattacks against an enemy that has wedged in, an anti-aircraft subunit moves to a new starting (firing) position on a signal from a higher launcher along a previously reconnoitered and prepared route. In order to withdraw anti-aircraft subunits from possible enemy strikes after repelling an air attack or prolonged work (3-4 hours) in the occupied position, the main positions are changed to spare ones. The occupation and change of positions is carried out secretly, in conditions of limited visibility. When the covered battalions retreat, anti-aircraft subunits move from line to line, occupy starting (firing) positions with the maximum use of the protective and camouflaging properties of the terrain and continue to perform a combat mission, firing from a place or on the move ...

        https://www.kaznu.kz/Content/Тактика%20зенитных%20подразделений%20войск%20ПВО%20СВ/files/basic-html/page104.html

        Better go to your ukrosayty. There you are, though not an expert, but at least "Experience")
        1. -3
          30 December 2021 14: 04
          Take the risk to educate about the tactics of anti-aircraft gunners. laughingI feel very comfortable in Russia too.
        2. 0
          1 January 2022 08: 19
          This is just another ukroboltun. Poorly familiar with the realities.
    2. +2
      29 December 2021 14: 37
      Quote: lance vosirob
      hide behind transporters and passengers in Israel in the blood. Probably Syria, and the Russian Federation after the famous incident, it's time to use the potential of the Mig-29 and dryers and meet guests knowing when the transporter is going to land, in addition, you can change the air defense position.

      This is if success: the Israelis will see and run away, and if not?
  5. 0
    29 December 2021 15: 21
    Where are our pro ???
    1. +2
      29 December 2021 15: 25
      On alert in case of a nuclear missile war. Do not shoot "sparrows with cannons"? How do you imagine shooting down planning bombs, if four F-16s can drop 16 of them each over 110 kilometers?
      The bombs are small, you can't see them. And spend on a huge rocket with an S-400 for each? belay Then you won't have enough rockets.
      1. -5
        29 December 2021 18: 06
        Calculation of the ZRKP Pantsir S will not save enough ammunition for such "goodies."
        1. +3
          29 December 2021 22: 41
          Calculation of the ZRKP Pantsir S will not save enough ammunition for such "goodies."

          And then Ostap suffered ..))

          Man! What are the "false targets"?))
          The shell "at the turn" is working !!!
          To say such nonsense here, this is already nonsense!
          1. -4
            30 December 2021 14: 04
            The command of Hel Havir did not give a signature about not using false targets against the crew or command post of the air defense missile system Pantsir S. In vain you are indignant.
            1. 0
              1 January 2022 08: 20
              Did you get a certificate?
              1. -4
                1 January 2022 23: 05
                And this is known to the general public.
      2. -1
        29 December 2021 22: 50
        but how to check this missile defense? )))....there are options?
  6. 0
    29 December 2021 15: 36
    Quote: gunnerminer
    If the Syrian air defense dares to shoot down the aircraft and ammunition of Hel Havir, this air defense will be left with embers. With all due respect to the power of the air defense of the former SAR.

    There are brave guys, you can't intimidate them with such trifles. Most likely, they simply do not succeed. No. what
    1. -5
      29 December 2021 18: 08
      The frequency "does not work" raises doubts about the highest skill of SAA air defense calculations. For 50 years of war, experience could have been accumulated.
  7. +1
    29 December 2021 17: 08
    Quote: avg
    Tricky question. From what height from the round ground do you need to drop the bomb, what would it plan on the target?

    For a winged gliding bomb to fly 110 km, it must be dropped from a height of 11 km. And so on, the higher you drop, the farther it will fly away.
    1. -5
      29 December 2021 18: 09
      This is true for polygon conditions, in the absence of organized air defense of the target intended for the strike.
      1. 0
        29 December 2021 20: 39
        This is physics and it is always fair, there is air defense, there is no air defense. The aerodynamic quality of these bombs is ~ 10, their planning range is the drop height multiplied by 10. Does the air defense have anything to do with it? This is a separate song.
        1. +1
          29 December 2021 21: 12
          I agree by linking Dplan. with the presence of air defense, the guy compared ,, warm with soft ,,.
        2. -3
          30 December 2021 14: 22
          Air defense, part of the battle. Everything in the complex. Separately, in parts, consider this for pre-conscripts from the slums of Tehran.
  8. 0
    29 December 2021 20: 44
    Quote: gunnerminer
    The frequency "does not work" raises doubts about the highest skill of SAA air defense calculations. For 50 years of war, experience could have been accumulated.

    And here it is not a matter of accumulating skill, just small bombs, small and fast missiles, technical equipment given to the Syrians does not allow them to detect in time, aim in time and hit with sufficient guarantee. But in the press, they lie, as they have lied for all decades, you need to look at satellite images and videos that other Syrians from the surrounding places are making. From these photos and videos, it follows that all Israeli strikes reach their target, like these last two, in December.
    1. -5
      29 December 2021 21: 07
      Skill would allow jamming the aircraft's radar, disrupting communication between the crews and the squadron's command post. Shooting or damaging the aircraft, and so on. But there is no skill. Who will independently tell about the damage from the enemy!
  9. 0
    29 December 2021 20: 52
    Quote: gunnerminer
    Calculation of the ZRKP Pantsir S will not save enough ammunition for such "goodies."

    The calculation of the Pantsir air defense missile system simply does not see them, they are made as inconspicuous as possible. And they fly fast. In addition, the microprocessors of the bombs build their trajectory in such a way that they flew most of the trajectory at maximum altitude, approaching at a sufficiently high altitude to the target, and then dive over the target - there most Russian air defense systems have a "dead zone" funnel, with a solution of about at 15 °. If a bomb or rocket hits this crater, then this air defense system will no longer grab it.
    1. -3
      30 December 2021 14: 23
      lus massive use of electronic warfare (electronic warfare) by the crews of Hel Havir, which causes increased consumption and overspending of ammunition air defense missile systems.
  10. 0
    29 December 2021 21: 34
    We remind you that the previous air raid on the port of Latakia took place on the night of December 7. Then the Israeli aircraft destroyed containers with food, personal hygiene items and other humanitarian supplies.

    The Iraqi aviation with enviable persistence strikes false targets in the form of containers with a peaceful manufactory.

    This time, as usual:

    In the port, as a result of the strikes, containers with flour, coffee, medical materials and household chemicals were burnt; there was nothing at the site of the fire that could resemble weapons or ammunition.

    Big minus to the vaunted Israeli intelligence.

    PS Well, as often happens, it was not without a pod (Israeli military trick) ..

    The Syrian air defense forces did not engage in anti-aircraft combat, since at the time of the strike, a military transport aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces was in the zone of destruction of the anti-aircraft systems.
  11. 0
    29 December 2021 22: 20
    Quote: Ulysses
    We remind you that the previous air raid on the port of Latakia took place on the night of December 7. Then the Israeli aircraft destroyed containers with food, personal hygiene items and other humanitarian supplies.

    The Iraqi aviation with enviable persistence strikes false targets in the form of containers with a peaceful manufactory.

    This time, as usual:

    In the port, as a result of the strikes, containers with flour, coffee, medical materials and household chemicals were burnt; there was nothing at the site of the fire that could resemble weapons or ammunition.

    Big minus to the vaunted Israeli intelligence.

    A big plus for the vaunted Syrian and Russian propaganda, because there was ammunition there, there were secondary explosions and a big fire.
    See for December 28:
    https://twitter.com/i/status/1475752484803162114

    PS Well, as often happens, it was not without a pod (Israeli military trick) ..
    The Syrian air defense forces did not engage in anti-aircraft combat, since at the time of the strike, a military transport aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces was in the zone of destruction of the anti-aircraft systems.

    But if he had not been there, they would have knocked everything down! laughing

    1. -2
      29 December 2021 23: 24
      The guy is diligent, he made only two fundamental mistakes:
      1. Believes that Russian air defense systems are "the best in the world."
      2. About the Israeli air defense / missile defense, he does not know anything at all, at all. It's even surprising, because there is a lot of material on the web.
      1. -3
        30 December 2021 14: 36
        Air defense without fighter regiments, accompanied by AWACS and U complexes, blind in one eye, and passive. Stationary air defense will always be destroyed.
  12. 0
    30 December 2021 13: 35
    Tell me, if Russia is bombed by any country, will Russia hunt for bombers or bomb the aggressor country?
  13. -1
    30 December 2021 15: 47
    Quote: Bulanov
    Tell me, if Russia is bombed by any country, will Russia hunt for bombers or bomb the aggressor country?

    "An autopsy will show!" what
  14. 0
    30 December 2021 15: 48
    Quote: gunnerminer
    Stationary air defense will always be destroyed.

    Watching, and whose (air defense - feminine), looking and by whom. smile
  15. 0
    30 December 2021 16: 08
    Quote: gunnerminer
    Plus the massive use of electronic warfare (electronic warfare) by the crews of Hel Hawir, which causes increased consumption and overexpenditure of ammunition air defense missile systems.

    It is not always appropriate to use electronic warfare equipment at all - any use of them immediately unmasks a group of aircraft carrying out the attack.
    Here, for example, that unfortunate case when their own people shot down their Il-20: four Israeli F-16s dropped bombs from the Mediterranean Sea on targets in the Latakia region, planning GBU-39 bombs (they later found out from their fragments) were dropped from range of more than 100 kilometers from an altitude of more than 10 kilometers. After that, the bombs were planned for 10-11 minutes to the shore, to their targets, and the planes, after being dropped, immediately turned away and rushed home. The Syrian air defense came to her senses only 2 minutes after the bomb explosions and randomly fired at each other's missiles for another half hour. Then, for some reason, they drove the Il-20 into the sea (20-25 minutes after the explosion of the bombs) and there he was shot down. No Israeli planes had been there for half an hour.
    Naturally, in this situation, the use of electronic warfare equipment with the F-16 would be absolutely inappropriate.
    1. 0
      31 December 2021 06: 15
      Two F-16s of the Israeli Air Force arrived from the Mediterranean and attacked four missile targets in the port of Latakia. As a result of the Israeli attack, the port infrastructure was slightly damaged, ”he said. "The Syrian air defense did not launch missiles at the planes attacking the port, because at that time a Russian army plane was landing at the Hamim airport near the city."

      As mentioned, and unusually, the Syrian state media did not report yesterday morning about the work of the air defense systems against the attack, which Damascus attributes to Israel. The attack was the second in less than a month at the port of Latakia, which is considered the main port of Syria. Khmeimim base, where the Russian military is stationed, also hosts state-of-the-art S-400 air defense systems, and journalists and Syrian residents expressed surprise that they were not involved in the attack.

      Syrian television reported yesterday that a fire broke out in the container storage area of ​​the port, and the intensity of the explosions damaged several homes, a hospital and several other businesses and tourist sites as a result of the attack. Firefighters worked for hours in the fire zone in the port to extinguish the fire, no casualties were reported.

      The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, an opposition group based in the UK, said echoes of the bombings were heard throughout the city of Latakia and even in its Mediterranean suburbs. The explosions caused concern among residents of the city and the area. According to the monitoring center, several missiles hit the containers with weapons, but it is not known whether they were from Iran.

      According to the Syrian Observatory, the opposition organization Israel attacked Syria 2021 times during 29. The 29 attacks, according to the organization, hit 71 targets in Syria and killed 130 people, including five civilians and 125 militants in Syria. the Syrian army and its masters, its alliance with the terrorist organization Hezbollah and the Shiite militias controlled by Iran. The organization claims that this is a decrease in the number of attacks compared to last year, which is why, according to its data, there were 39 attacks. The Damascus area is reportedly the most attacked with 12 of the 29 reported attacks.

      Recall that in September 2018, a Russian Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft with 15 crew members was shot down. The plane was hit by Syrian anti-aircraft fire, and Russia was accused of launching anti-aircraft missiles following an Israeli attack in the Latakia region. An investigation published by Russia showed that the plane passed through Syrian air defense systems, and Moscow accused Israel of "irresponsibility" and the death of crew members.

      https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/hkjoioksk
      (Machine translate)

      In a report submitted by the IDF in Moscow in English and Russian, the Syrian Air Force is said to have deployed several aviation batteries, which were then deployed throughout Syria. The batteries, according to the report, fired for over half an hour, even when Israeli fighters returned to base. The direction of fire, according to IDF maps provided to the Russians, left no room for doubt: there were many missiles of different types.
      1. -5
        2 January 2022 17: 19
        You cite as an example a particular case, and even with a low level of combat training of air defense crews and air defense command post operators.
        1. 0
          2 January 2022 18: 16
          What is the "special case"? The case is more than typical, especially since the target was located less than 20 kilometers from the Russian military base! lol
          And there was the S-400, the most advanced system in Syria.
          1. -3
            2 January 2022 18: 26
            The command of the S-400 air defense missile system was ordered to sit quietly and evenly. The level of training of targeting officers and operators is unknown. Russian targets and military personnel were not intimidated during the air raids. This is the main thing at the moment.
            1. 0
              2 January 2022 19: 22
              Naturally, they should not have suffered because no one was aiming at them. But after all, no one interfered with the calculations of the S-400 to give target designation to the Syrian air defense, so that they did not fire "into the white light like a penny," but tried to hit at least the falling bombs and missiles. Until now, all the "data" from the results of the Syrian air defense forces should be "divided by 10". lol
              1. -5
                2 January 2022 22: 34
                Hindered by the tiny experience of operating the surveillance radar, the difficult to calculate operational situation, the shaft of contradictory instructions from the higher command, who did not orientate themselves in the situation, the absence of the AWACS and U complex at the disposal of the air defense missile system commander. The radar air defense missile system Pantsir C did not observe such ammunition. The ESUTS was not yet in service, so there was no exchange between Khmeimim's units. The air defense calculations of the naval group were useless, due to the obsolescence of their equipment, and the low level of combat training. Interaction between the naval air defense and the coastal defense was not debugged, Until now. I do not even consider the Syrian air defense.
  16. 0
    2 January 2022 23: 00
    Quote: gunnerminer
    Hindered by tiny operational experience with surveillance radar

    You are saying some very strange things: the S-400 system has been around for many years, there are no children sitting at the remote controls, what makes you think that they have "tiny experience of operating it"? This is nonsense.

    ... a challenging operational environment

    The operational situation could not be simpler: one single pair of F-16s approaches from the sea and drops 110 bombs from a range of 16+ km. What is the "complexity" of the operational environment? It is simpler than polygon.

    ... a shaft of contradictory instructions from the higher command, who did not orientate themselves in the situation

    Well, what "shaft of instructions" in the middle of the night ?! At night, all the bosses sleep in deep sleep and the shift on duty make decisions on their own. Moreover, the Russians in Syria are warned at least 10 minutes before the strike that the strike will be delivered and they say without fail that this will not affect Russian facilities in any way.

    ... the absence of the AWACS and U complex at the disposal of the air defense missile system commander.

    And why would an air defense missile system commander need an AWACS aircraft against targets flying at an altitude of 10-12 kilometers? request

    It is too expensive to hit bombs and missiles with ammunition of the S-400 air defense system with expensive missiles.

    It's true. But giving target designation to "Armor", "Toram" and "Bukam" is just right. And you don’t need to spend your missiles.

    And the operator of the radar air defense missile system Pantsir S did not observe such ammunition.

    Naturally - his radar does not allow him. But what prevents you from putting an external IKO with the S-400 directly into the Pantsir's cockpit? Just stretch a thin cable?

    ESUTZ is not yet in service, so there was no exchange between Khmeimim's divisions.

    Who is stopping you from organizing the system? Only personal disorganization and indiscretion.

    The calculations of the air defense of the ship group were useless, due to the obsolescence of their equipment and the low level of combat training. Interaction between the naval air defense and the coastal defense has not been adjusted, until now, I do not even consider the Syrian air defense.

    The S-400 does not need any shipborne radar for help.