Two armored BTGs, reinforced with artillery, formed near the Ukrainian border

27

The West continues to intensify hysteria around the "concentration of the Russian military clique near the Ukrainian borders", talking about the "inevitable invasion" of Russia in Ukraine. Another manifestation of the information war against the Russian Federation was the "research" of the consulting company Rochan Consulting, located in Poland.

This structure positions itself as an "independent" firm specializing in the aerospace and defense industry, as well as a "comprehensive and thorough" analysis of the military capabilities of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. It allegedly provides "unparalleled depth and breadth of regional expertise in war games, open source intelligence, conflict reporting and analysis, global defense and national security markets," and has an "extensive network of analysts."



On November 27, the president of this office, Konrad Muzyka, who calls himself a "military analyst", posted on his Twitter account a satellite image of the Pogonovo training ground in the Voronezh region. The aforementioned military facility is located several hundred kilometers from the border with Ukraine, but this does not bother the "expert". The main thing is to maintain the trend generally accepted in the West.

Here is a snapshot of Pogonovo taken yesterday (November 26) in the morning. He confirms the presence of two armored BTGs deployed at the range with some artillery support (probably 2A65 and BM-27) and TOS-1A. The number of staff there is also probably very limited.

He wrote.


Muzyka believes that the main Russian forces stationed at this training ground have already been formed in the BTG and relocated somewhere closer to Ukraine. In addition, he made an assumption about the landfill near Yelnya in the Smolensk region, about which the media wrote a lot.

I can imagine that Russian troops (for example, from Yelnya) will be sent to Belarus not to attack Ukraine from the north, but in order to threaten it with an attack and, thus, to shackle the potential of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this direction.

He summed up.
27 comments
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  1. +3
    28 November 2021 12: 31
    This is serious intelligence for the Poles, they urgently need to fly to the Pentagon in person, gather all the generals and analysts in the building and show this shocking new data. On the way, you can still photograph Aurora in St. Petersburg with the note "secret preparations for combat use were noticed"
  2. +1
    28 November 2021 12: 59
    What is a tank BTG?
    1. -12
      28 November 2021 14: 50
      This is a temporary ersatz unit, shield-gathering, for a short period of time. The base of the battalion is used as the basis. Supported from the entire understaffed division. The BTG is not created from a good life. They recruit there except for officers, contract sergeants and rank-and-file personnel. , and other equipment and weapons. This is an indicator that the newly restored divisions exist only on paper, only with the headquarters of a couple of battalions, with a banner.
      Of course, if they are defeated, they may face criminal prosecution, and the atmosphere of secrecy that the Russian authorities are developing around the use of battalion tactical groups also plays a role. So, this previously led to problems with obtaining the status of a participant in hostilities and obtaining the corresponding benefits. In addition, since the Russian Federation has not declared an official war, the soldiers of the armed forces cannot count on being properly treated when captured: food, medical care, respect. Alas, such a cowardly policy of the highest echelons of power leads to the fact that the soldiers are regarded as mere mercenaries, whose life is not protected by any international treaty.
      1. +4
        28 November 2021 16: 15
        Have you heard anything about a cropped division? It was known back in the USSR to save the military budget
        1. -10
          28 November 2021 16: 34
          You heard a ring, but you don’t know where it is.
          1. +5
            28 November 2021 21: 37
            But you are a plug for every barrel.
          2. 0
            30 November 2021 10: 39
            where did you participate?
            1. -2
              30 November 2021 15: 16
              In eating fatty pilaf from a cauldron, with a small sapper shovel, and I follow the course of hostilities remotely, imitate the graduates of MGIMO.
              1. 0
                4 December 2021 13: 57
                What size should a mouth have in order for the MSL to enter it? There are also unique people in the armies of the sofa ...
                1. -1
                  4 December 2021 14: 43
                  Solid size.
    2. The comment was deleted.
  3. +3
    29 November 2021 10: 01
    Quote: gunnerminer
    This is a temporary ersatz unit, shield-gathering, for a short period of time. The base of the battalion is used as the basis. Supported from the entire understaffed division. The BTG is not created from a good life. They recruit there except for officers, contract sergeants and rank-and-file personnel. , and other equipment and weapons. This is an indicator that the newly restored divisions exist only on paper, only with the headquarters of a couple of battalions, with a banner.
    Of course, if they are defeated, they may face criminal prosecution, and the atmosphere of secrecy that the Russian authorities are developing around the use of battalion tactical groups also plays a role. So, this previously led to problems with obtaining the status of a participant in hostilities and obtaining the corresponding benefits. In addition, since the Russian Federation has not declared an official war, the soldiers of the armed forces cannot count on being properly treated when captured: food, medical care, respect. Alas, such a cowardly policy of the highest echelons of power leads to the fact that the soldiers are regarded as mere mercenaries, whose life is not protected by any international treaty.

    Yes, I’m an expert on powdering the brains of unprepared people. Cropped units are commonplace in the Russian army and, for example, the United States. From what you wrote about some kind of special status of the military personnel of such units, this is not true. Such a unit will be deployed into a combat unit and will be a regular unit, with the standard rights of military personnel. And the fact that today the Russian army does not participate in hostilities in Ukraine and therefore naturally there are no participants in hostilities is understandable. But if he begins to participate in hostilities, then everything will be as it should. All this is already known in Georgia.
  4. 0
    29 November 2021 16: 01
    BTG is not a cropped unit. On the contrary, it is mainly staffed with contract soldiers.
    BTG is not going "from the pine forest". These organic units fit into the division's staff.
    The conscript structure must deal with the service, and the contract soldiers are included in the combat composition of the unit.
    Combat groups in the US brigades can serve as an analogue. Or the battle groups of the Wehrmacht (during the Second World War).
    As part of the BTG, the military personnel of the country's Armed Forces (contract soldiers or conscripts) and therefore all rights under the Geneva Convention apply to them. And the status of a participant in hostilities is fully extended to them.
    1. -3
      30 November 2021 15: 20
      BTG is not going "from the pine forest". These organic units fit into the division's staff.

      A fable for simpletons. There are no two staff schedules. In large-scale hostilities, there are no contract soldiers, no conscripts. There are privates, sergeants, warrant officers, officers, senior officers.

      The conscript structure must deal with the service, and the contract soldiers are included in the combat composition of the unit.

      This is in paper wishes.

      Combat groups in the US brigades can serve as an analogue. Or the battle groups of the Wehrmacht (during the Second World War).

      They confused Babel with Bebeher.
      1. +1
        30 November 2021 15: 30
        Battalion tactical groups are created on the basis of subunits manned by contract soldiers. In the regiment and brigade - there are two or three. These are battalions with reinforcements, numbering 800-900 people. They are provided with everything necessary for the conduct of hostilities, including reconnaissance, surveillance, navigation and closed communications and everything else.

        Based on the results of inspections, control sessions, these units are generally assessed as "good" and "excellent".

        https://structure.mil.ru/mission/practice/all/more.htm?id=12194449@egNews&_print=true

        If you can, then refute the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. I understand that everyone on this site knows much better
        1. -1
          30 November 2021 15: 48
          You read what you wrote about the states of the BTG temporary subdivisions. Not for conducting large-scale hostilities. With the BTG the NGSH got lost in the war 080808. There was no time for their formation. When fried Peter pecked the commander of the 58th Army, the conscripts were issued emergency contract soldiers Sergeant Glukhov), and drove into the attack. Chernomorskaya 810 I separate marine brigade, 80% staffed by conscripts, could not be brought to BG number 1 for three days and did not arrive at the landing point on the SDK. In the 810th brigade, even the reconnaissance company was 45% manned by conscripts.
          1. +1
            30 November 2021 15: 57
            You are writing about 2008. Gerasimov's concept of BTG began to be applied AFTER the war. And they are created as permanent divisions.
            However, I am not a military man. I am using quotes from the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces. I have already said this. Argue with him.
            1. -2
              30 November 2021 16: 00
              Your quote contradicts YOUR comments about dual staff.

              And they are created as permanent divisions.

              You are confused. Are created on the basis of what? Are created, then they are not created, and there is no staffing table. Read carefully, slowly, the source indicated by you. The fact that you are not a military man can be seen in the text.
              1. 0
                30 November 2021 16: 04
                Have you read the cited source?

                Now we have mostly contract soldiers serve in combat units... They are constantly engaged in combat training, they are professionals in their field.

                There are also conscripts, but there are not so many of them. In a regiment, a brigade, two battalions and a number of other combat and support units are staffed with contract soldiers, and the third battalion - with conscripts. Sergeants are all contract soldiers.

                What am I confused about?

                Or

                The first surprise checks carried out in 2013 year, revealed serious shortcomings in the training of troops.

                The formations and military units were, as it were, tied to their military camps and the nearest training grounds; there was no practice of regrouping over long distances and into new areas. Individual training of personnel also left much to be desired.
                1. 0
                  30 November 2021 16: 09
                  Today there are about 170 battalion-tactical groups in the Russian army. According to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, this is a good indicator.

                  "Today we actually have troops of constant readiness. Today we do not have someone to collect, find, we have everything in constant readiness. We have such a formation - battalion-tactical groups. These are the ones who have pressed the button, and they are ready to leave the gate in an hour. We have 168 of them today and this is a very high figure "

                  True, the same note says that these are temporary formations. But 170 temporary divisions is a bit too much. As a military man, don't you think so?
                  1. -1
                    30 November 2021 16: 39
                    True, the same note says that these are temporary formations. But 170 temporary divisions is a bit too much. As a military man, don't you think so?

                    170 is too much. With such a number of BTGs, the combat readiness of the Ground Forces would be undermined. The main failure of the Makarov / Serdyukov reforms is precisely in the impossibility of creating permanent readiness units (regiments, divisions) in the Ground Forces. Part of the constant readiness cannot be replaced by any BTG ersatz. This is clear to everyone, who served the term.
                    The NSH goes to any demagogic tricks so as not to touch upon the sore subject of the absence of a mobilization system since 1990.

                    You are confused in regular units and in temporary, in contract soldiers, and in conscripts. These are the concepts of peacetime. In threatened and operational periods, there will be no contract soldiers and conscripts. There will be military personnel in regular positions. If they can be called up from the reserve.
                    1. +1
                      30 November 2021 17: 02
                      It seems to me that reform is precisely about creating permanent readiness units. They were named BTG. But the name is not important. The main thing is that these are permanent formations. The plans were to create 125 BTGs. Now almost 170. Organizationally, they should be part of the divisions. The brigades do not have amplification and communication capabilities. The division can coordinate the actions of 6-7 BTGs. That is, it is about 25-30 divisions. A bit too much, it seems to me.
                      Prospective development will go to the erosion of the concept of motorized rifle and tank subunits. There will be mobile modules of constant readiness. They can be temporarily reinforced by the regular divisions of the division.
                      Serdyukov's reforms were aimed at disbanding divisions and creating brigades. They were exactly the ones that failed.
                      Practice is the criterion of truth. Constant maneuvers, alarms are precisely aimed at working out the actions and capabilities of the BTG. And as the generals say, this is a fairly promising direction. In particular, it is planned to introduce a sufficient number of UAVs into the BTG.
                      In the last real example (Nagorno-Karabakh), it became clear that the personnel motorized rifle units did not show sufficient efficiency. The most successful were the actions of mixed combat groups and special forces units.
                      1. -1
                        30 November 2021 17: 24
                        It seems to me that reform is precisely about creating permanent readiness units. They were named BTG

                        Tell the military. They will laugh. Serdyukov’s reform is covered with a copper basin. For ten years Shoigu has been trying to close at least the main personnel schools.

                        The brigades do not have reinforcement and communication capabilities.

                        From what overpush!

                        Prospective development will go to the erosion of the concept of motorized rifle and tank subunits. There will be mobile modules of constant readiness. They can be temporarily reinforced by the regular divisions of the division.

                        This is with the failed backward electronics, in the absence of an adequate number of fire support helicopters, in the absence of officers and warrant officers, contract sergeants, in the absence of wearable night vision devices, with shoddy shoes and uniforms,

                        Serdyukov's reforms were aimed at disbanding divisions and creating brigades. They were exactly the ones that failed.

                        Who proved this? NGSh Makarov proved the opposite: the point is the stunted rear capabilities.

                        Constant maneuvers, alarms are precisely aimed at working out the actions and capabilities of the BTG. And as the generals say, this is a fairly promising direction. In particular, it is planned to introduce a sufficient number of UAVs into the BTG.

                        Fairy tales for simpletons of a younger pre-call age. BLA Orion in all performance characteristics is worse than Bayraktar. BLA There is no heavy type in the Russian Armed Forces. The outpost is an Israeli imperfection of 40 years old. Orlan-10 with a Japanese motor, with American and Chinese electronics, with Malay cheap optics.
                      2. 0
                        30 November 2021 17: 26
                        You know better. But so far I see the desire of the RF Ministry of Defense in a different direction. different from your understanding.
                        I will not argue. There are more competent users on military topics.
                      3. -2
                        30 November 2021 18: 29
                        How is this desire manifested? In the Army forum? In the construction of billions of dollars in churches? For example, the Naval Cathedral in Kronstadt of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which costs 90 million rubles a year. In the reduction of reconnaissance and strike naval aviation? In the reduction of the GRU central apparatus? In the fraud of military ship repair?
                      4. -1
                        30 November 2021 17: 26
                        In the last real example (Nagorno-Karabakh), it became clear that the personnel motorized rifle units did not show sufficient efficiency. The most successful were the actions of mixed combat groups and special forces units.

                        Who did they show it to? Who showed it? What is a mixed combat group? In 2011, the Russian Armed Forces reduced special forces units.
                    2. +1
                      30 November 2021 17: 22
                      Echo of Karabakh.

                      Particular attention was paid to the maneuvers "West-2021" on the so-called "situational awareness" of maneuverable formations. Based on the experience of the Karabakh war, small mobile "special forces" groups, using data from constant aerial monitoring of the battlefield, successfully detected gaps in the Armenian defense and used them to cover and isolate, while elements of the larger and more clumsy mechanized brigades of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces were often dispersed by retaliatory strikes. artillery and ATGM of the Armenian forces.

                      At the same time, the SSU "West-2021" already allows a preliminary assessment of the domestic operational-tactical thought in this direction. First, we are seeing a gradual spread of mobile electronic warfare equipment to the lower level of individual battalion tactical groups. If earlier most of the electronic warfare means were attached at the divisional level and above, had limited mobility and, due to the complexity and high value, operated from the operational depth (this can include, for example, the well-known complexes of the Krasukha family), now new, more mobile complexes on highly passable chassis (Borisoglebsk-2, Zhitel, Silok) they can be attached to forward formations and operate close to the enemy's line of contact.

                      https://eurasia.expert/rossiya-i-belarus-vzyali-kurs-na-bespilotniki-i-boevykh-robotov/

                      I do not insist that everything written in the article is true. Evaluate from the point of view of the military. There was an impressive video on the net. Attack of the Armenian tank battalion in the southern direction. The battalion's advance was detected by drones, then they were hit, apparently by Polonaise. The battalion's attack was thwarted.
                      Pure tank or motorized rifle battalions have little chance of surviving on the battlefield in modern warfare. The future belongs to modular units.
                      You can agree or disagree. I am not a military man and do not have to know all the details. But I see the result of a real war.
                      1. -2
                        30 November 2021 18: 30
                        Pure tank or motorized rifle battalions have little chance of surviving on the battlefield in modern warfare.

                        This was understandable by 1939.