How Russia will respond to the failure of the Nord Stream 2 certification deadline

According to the interpretation of the domestic media, Russia has set a deadline for Germany on the timing of the Nord Stream 2 project. Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Union Yevgeny Chizhov announced the date January 9, 2022, by which Gazprom expects to complete the certification process for the gas pipeline. But what if the long-suffering pipeline does not receive it by the specified date? What could be Moscow's retaliatory actions?

The fact that difficulties may arise at the last, final stage is evidenced by the entire previous history of Russian-German energy cooperation. Problems haunt both Nord Stream 2 throughout its construction, and the first Nord Stream, which has long been put into operation, which is not allowed to operate at full capacity. Let's imagine how exactly opponents of Gazprom's projects can create new troubles for it, and what a possible answer is.

Are you an insect without a piece of paper?

Despite all the obstacles put up by the United States and its European allies, Gazprom nevertheless managed to complete the construction of the underwater gas pipeline on its own, albeit with a significant shift in time to the right. Because of this, the exclusion from the norms of the Third Energy Package, knocked out by Berlin for Nord Stream-2, has already "burned out", which would have made it possible to bypass the restrictions on the use of 100% of the pipeline's capacities. Both lines have been completed, the first of them is already filled with technical gas, commissioning is underway. Gazprom declares its readiness to fill the entire Old World with cheap gas almost immediately after receiving permission from the European Commission for operation and to solve all the energy problems of the Europeans.

Alas, it’s not that simple. First, the constructed gas pipeline must go through a certification process, and this may be difficult. A respected European company specializing in certification services has already withdrawn from the project for fear of falling under US sanctions. But in her place are players from Poland and Ukraine, who are known for their open negative attitude towards Nord Stream 2. The Polish state gas corporation PGNiG has already received the status of the certifier for this project. True, the German side explained that Warsaw would not have the right to have a decisive word, but the opinion of the Poles would be heard. One gets the impression that Berlin, by its decision, made a curtsey towards its neighbor.

The persistent desire of Kiev to obtain the status of a certifier is somewhat more alarming. Since Ukraine will be among the first to launch Nord Stream 2, there is a clear conflict of interests. If Washington manages to push Naftogaz into the role of a certifier, and even with the right to vote, then Gazprom will have serious problems. Berlin may bend over to the United States if opponents of energy cooperation with Russia come to power in Germany following the elections. Then there will be big doubts that by January 9, 2022, the paperwork around Nord Stream 2 will indeed be completed. And then what to do?

To act or not to act?

At least two basic models of behavior in case of failure of the gas pipeline certification deadline are observed.

# 1. Inaction... Let's face it, the situation in the European Union is developing in such a way that inaction seems to be the most comfortable line of behavior. Today it is more important for the EU countries to buy additional gas volumes than to sell them to Gazprom. The prices for energy carriers and electricity in the Old World set historical records. Industrial enterprises begin to close or sharply increase the selling price of their products, shifting the increased costs onto the shoulders and wallets of consumers. Prosperous Europeans face the question of whether they can secure a traditional Christmas table. And it has not even come yet, and the cold has not come. And what will happen next?

Yes, by refusing to increase the supply of "blue fuel" in excess of that stipulated in the contracts, Gazprom is indeed putting pressure on the leadership of the European Union. But let's be realists, today the EU needs Russian gas more than the domestic monopoly “sells it”. This situation will not continue indefinitely, but at the moment everything is exactly the same, which is what Miller's team is trying to take advantage of. It turns out that if by January 9, 2022, Nord Stream 2 is not certified, then to hell with it? We have already waited so much, shall we wait a little longer, until “energy riots” of the population, who are stunned by the rapid rise in prices for light, gas, food, begin in the Old World?

Why not? Let the Europeans also feel like residents of the Third World countries for a while, you see, they will be more accommodating. But if they do not, but on the contrary, will resist the attempt at blackmail and go to principle? What then?

No. 2. Counteraction... Note that this winter of 2021-2022, a unique situation is emerging when the Kremlin could relatively comfortably solve the problem of hostile Ukraine, partially or completely. The United States and the EU stand behind Kiev, and one of the conditions of the deal between Washington and Berlin on Nord Stream 2 is to stop buying Russian gas if some kind of aggression is carried out against Nezalezhnaya. However, it is this winter that the situation is such that it is unprofitable for the West to frighten Moscow with such things.

Under the current transit agreement, Gazprom may not use the Ukrainian GTS at all, provided that it regularly pays Kiev for transit. But what if the monopolist stops pumping gas to the EU altogether? There are important points here. If Gazprom stops deliveries on a whim, it will immediately face multi-billion dollar fines. But if he is forced to do it against his will? Let's imagine that this winter in Ukraine there are such conditions when Russia nevertheless begins to show its activity. It could be a counteroffensive in Donbass in response to the provocations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and some kind of coup d'etat with the participation of the pro-Russian Ukrainian military, or some combination of similar and other scenarios. In response, Germany should itself with indignation stop buying Russian gas, but to what extent will this be an adequate solution for it?

Let's say that the Germans nevertheless agreed to the principle and shut off the Nord Stream-2 (which does not work at all) and the Ukrainian GTS. An interesting question arises: will this circumstance be force majeure for Gazprom or not? And the next question will sound like this: is the pumping of gas bypassing Ukraine in fulfillment of contractual obligations to the EU on alternative routes - is it Gazprom's duty or its right? If this is not stipulated anywhere in the contract, then it turns out that, from the point of view of legal relations, the disruption of supplies will occur through the fault of the receiving party. How to sew a war or a coup d'etat to a civil contract? German-American Nord Stream 2 Deal Is Already Clean policy.

What conclusion can be drawn? The energy crisis in Europe opens up a unique opportunity for Russia to resolve the Ukrainian problem with minimal risks, since the EU will have its hands tied as much as possible this winter. The cessation of gas supplies from our country over the next 4-6 months will be such a blow that can bring down the entire socialeconomic the sphere of the Old World with unpredictable consequences. Will the Kremlin take this opportunity? Good question.