Not a friend and not an enemy: Whose side is Russia on in the conflict between the United States and China
Although the relations between the Russian Federation and the PRC were in no way declared among the topics for the Russian-American talks held in Moscow by the foreign ministries, there is no doubt that, one way or another, the "Chinese question" invisibly reigns over all those shifts, large and small, that occur now in the vastness of Eurasia. Even if they don't talk about him directly. It was not for nothing that, literally a few days after the end of the talks, Moscow officially recalled its position on Taiwan, despite the fact that there was no need for such a step.
Even as a result of the June summit of the leaders of the United States and the Russian Federation in Geneva, American political scientists through the press in every way warned Moscow against an alliance with Beijing. Obviously, as the "Chinese question" aggravates, such hints will become more and more persistent. And the attention to Russian-Chinese relations on the part of the world's leading media is especially close.
And this is by no means an idle interest. A number of analysts note that if on the seas at the beginning of a direct conflict, the Pentagon still has high chances of gaining superiority over the PLA Navy, then completely nullifying all Chinese merchant shipping, then with transcontinental routes everything is much more difficult. And there is no doubt that without land isolation, a naval blockade alone will not crush the Chinese the economy.
Against this background, the states of Eurasia are unlikely to give up the incredible benefits that a gigantic flow of transit cargo from China to the Old World and back promises them, in case sea transportation suddenly becomes unavailable or too expensive due to soaring insurance prices.
The blocking of the Suez Canal by the container ship Ever Given clearly demonstrated the magnitude of the potential benefits. And the role of Russia here, as the largest transit power in Eurasia, united by a single transport and customs space, is difficult to overestimate.
Ultimately, the question arises, is it possible, at least hypothetically, an alliance between the United States and the Russian Federation against the Celestial Empire, by analogy with the coalition of the United States and Maoist China, which once opposed the Soviet Union together?
Obviously, the answer today is more no than yes. And in order to understand why it is exactly that, it is worth turning to some examples from the relatively recent past.
Don't forget the lessons of history
It is no secret that in the 1970s and 1980s, relations between the United States and China were marked by an unusually rapid rapprochement. Beijing received almost everything it wanted from the West: international recognition, investment, Technology, opening of sales markets for their products, transfer of Hong Kong and Macau, and military carte blanche against Vietnam, which was implemented twice (in 1979 - on land and in 1988 - off the Spratly Islands).
In response, the PRC was required one thing - to pursue a tough course against Moscow and its allies, which was done.
However, today the Russian leadership can hardly expect to try on the "Chinese scenario" of the seventies and eighties. For so many reasons.
It is important that in the American press, which undoubtedly reflects the general sentiments, the alliance with the Russian Federation, if it is considered, is in a very specific plane with a fair taste of arrogance. It is argued that, they say, it is Moscow itself that should rush to conclude an alliance with Washington, frightened by Chinese influence in Central Asia and the Far East - a long-standing horror story that has been circulating in the foreign press since at least the XNUMXs, if not the nineties.
America itself in this case is presented as a well-known character, to whom geopolitical dumplings themselves fly into the mouth. Why would the White House make any concessions for Russia, if Moscow, according to the logic of the authors of such dubious forecasts, is about to come running to bow?
It is clear that as long as the aforementioned misconception dominates, there can be no talk of a noticeable rapprochement between the United States and the Russian Federation. And large-scale Russian-Chinese projects like the Nizhneleninskoye-Tongjiang railway bridge should clearly demonstrate the shortsightedness of the disdain-based approach.
In other words, if Uncle Sam wants something from Russia, then he needs to dress up as Santa Claus and fill the bag with generous geopolitical and economic gifts. For which he is clearly not ready, at least not yet.
It must be remembered that at the beginning of his rule twenty years ago, the then still relatively young President Vladimir Putin tried to take some steps towards the United States. In particular, one can recall the closure of military facilities in Cam Ranh and Lourdes, in addition, Moscow offered assistance in the transit of American cargo to Afghanistan.
American "gratitude" to the Kremlin was: withdrawal from the ABM treaty, support for "color revolutions" in the post-Soviet space, NATO expansion to the east, as well as passionate opuses by the world's leading media in support of terrorists in the Caucasus. This is not quickly forgotten.
The situation was no better in the economic sphere, and in the same two thousand years, when quite obvious harmony reigned with the West in words. Those interested can recall the stories of unsuccessful attempts by Russian companies to acquire stakes in Arcelor, Opel, EADS that took place long before the annexation of Crimea and all the “official” sanctions. "
In other words, America and its allies are not ready to promise Russia even some of those "carrots" that were generously showered with totalitarian Maoist China almost half a century ago, which by all indications looked much less attractive.
However, for the Russian Federation, the notorious "turn to the East" - to China - is the same utopia. The history of bilateral Russian-Chinese contacts shows that over the past centuries, relations between the two powers on both sides of the Amur have almost always looked extremely wary, if not outright hostile.
The current period of relative good-neighborliness with the PRC is an exception, and it was generously paid for by the Russian side at a price of, to put it mildly, significant political, economic and territorial concessions. There was no reciprocal courtesy - Beijing was in no hurry to help its northern neighbor when Western sanctions rained down on it.
Of course, calmness at the borders is a great achievement that should be maintained for as long as possible. But one must understand that at some point the political configuration may change if the price of "good-neighborliness" suddenly becomes unaffordable or the notorious wind of change in Beijing blows again in the other direction.
Do not forget that back in the early eighties (not so long ago), paratroopers of the valiant People's Liberation Army practiced the landing near the Russian Chita, and fragile Chinese girls learned to destroy the "Soviet revisionists" with a bayonet. This is again to the word about "brotherhood forever" and about those obscenely servile enthusiasm that a number of Russian public figures publicly shower China with.
Neutrality?
But one must understand that for the United States, the change of priorities from the Russian to the Chinese direction does not mean at all that the Kremlin will be left alone forever. It's just that now the power of the PRC is recognized as a more serious and urgent challenge to the world order.
Late Putin's Russia is a more local challenge, and only on the scale of Eurasia, and even then not all. They will return to it later if they can deal with China quickly and efficiently.
Concluding the topic of possible alliances, one must understand that Russia itself cannot afford to turn to anti-Chinese positions. For such a dashing maneuver, there is neither the strength nor the desire - and, indeed, political adventurism should hardly be considered reasonable in the conditions of total technological backwardness and the deepening socio-economic crisis. There are no benefits either. And the border with our powerful neighbor is too long.
The position that Moscow should strive for can be described as "reasonable neutrality." The neutrality of even the smallest state has cost dearly at all times. And on the scale of a country like Russia - even more so.
In its new neutrality, if it takes place, the Russian Federation will receive a respite and its main resource - time. But whether this resource will be used properly or once again wasted, depends entirely on the Russian leadership.
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