Why does Russia need an ocean-going fleet and naval bases abroad

When the domestic press raises the question of the need to open military bases of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation abroad, thousands of angry comments immediately pour out that Russia is a "great land power", we only need to protect our borders from NATO tank wedges, the fleet will be enough and " mosquito ", and indeed all this is expensive and useless. Alas, there is nothing more dangerous than aggressive ignorance, which, willingly or unwillingly, defends ideas harmful and dangerous for Russia's defense capability.

The fact that an attack in the style of a "blitzkrieg" of the 1941 model with a march of interventionist troops to Moscow does not threaten us, we in detail disassembled previously. The real danger is posed by the nuclear weapons of the United States and the NATO bloc as a whole, which can be used to deliver a preemptive strike on Russia's military infrastructure in order to bleed our "nuclear triad" Missile defense. For this reason, the US Navy's strategic nuclear submarines equipped with the Trident-2 BIE, as well as the AUG, pose the greatest threat to us, since aircraft carriers can be based on aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. This means that the "great land power" the real threat comes mainly from the sea, and not from NATO tanks in the Baltic States, therefore, to stop it, an appropriate ocean-going fleet is needed.



Wars are not won by defense - this is a commonplace truth, but for some reason "enlightened" readers, who have piously believed in the omnipotence of "Putin's missiles", have to explain it again and again. Yes, and do not forget that our doctrine is purely defensive in nature. It sounds great, but in fact this means that the right to a first strike will remain with the United States and the NATO bloc, and given the prevalence of aggregate military power in their favor, these are very bad prerequisites. If you look at the map, it becomes clear that the American strategy is to surround its potential adversaries in the person of the RF and the PRC with a network of military bases and "defensive alliances." The most correct response strategy will be the transition from defensive defense to expansion and the creation of a threat to the United States itself in its "backyard", so let's see how the USSR solved this problem in its time and now - China.

Bases of the USSR and the Russian Federation

The USSR was a great power and Soviet military bases were located all over the world. Huge military contingents were stationed in Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and the GDR. Soviet warships calmly entered Havana and Cienfuegos, in Cuba, 100 kilometers from the coast of the United States, our medium-range nuclear missiles almost settled on a permanent basis. Points of material and technical support (PMTO) of the USSR Navy were at different times in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Guinea, Vietnam, Syria, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and Tunisia.

As a result, we were left with only Syria, where we firmly settled in Tartus and Latakia. The Russian military left Cuba and Vietnam voluntarily at the beginning of the XNUMXs. Later it was possible to return to Cam Ranh only on "bird rights". The attempt to get a PMTO in Port Sudan turned into some kind of farce. The only "consolation" can be the unattractive fact that the number of surface personnel of the Russian Navy is so small that basing it in the far sea zone is not a priority problem. The land bases and infrastructure of the RF Ministry of Defense are now located in Belarus, Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as in Transnistria, that is, in the near abroad.

PRC bases

Now let's take a look at the experience of another "great land power", the PRC. Unlike Russia, in the Celestial Empire, no one calls to sit out exclusively in the defense of state borders. On the contrary, Beijing is actively economic expansion around the world: in Southeast Asia, Europe, Africa, South America. Since most of China's trade is by sea, and it is through it that a counterattack by the new American-British-Australian alliance can be made, the Celestial Empire is hastily building its own navy. And, yes, the PRC is betting on "unnecessary" aircraft carriers as a means of projecting its geopolitical will abroad. The first types of aircraft carriers are designed for operations in the Asia-Pacific region, but the PLA plans to acquire in the near future the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier that can be sent to the distant sea zone.

Naturally, the presence of the navy abroad requires China to open appropriate bases. There is such a tradition in the Celestial Empire: some retired high-ranking official or military man gives an interview to a respected publication, which can be considered a message to foreign partners. For example, a few years ago, a retired major general and senior adviser at the Arms Control and Disarmament Association named Xu Guanyu in an interview with the PLA Daily, the Chinese Ministry of Defense, said that Beijing intends to acquire 10 military bases abroad at once.

The first of these can be considered a Chinese naval base in the East African country of Djibouti. It can be used by the PRC to control traffic along the Suez Canal, the situation in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. Also, submarines and surface ships of the Celestial Empire entered ports in the Seychelles, Pakistani Gwadar and Sri Lanka. It is quite possible that in the future, the iHavan port project in the Maldives will go to Beijing's property for debts. The respected Chinese news agency Xinhua generally spoke about the possibility of opening 18 foreign military bases at once: in the DPRK, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Angola, Kenya, Tanzania, Namibia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Maldives and Djibouti. As you can see, the last point has already been completed, and the next, judging by the events in neighboring Afghanistan, will be the Pakistani port of Gwadar.

What conclusions can we draw? In a rapidly changing world, sitting on the defensive means missing out on opportunities and waiting for trouble. Our alleged "land" is not an exclusiveness, but only a manifestation of weakness. Economic growth requires external expansion, but such ambitions require appropriate reinforcement with military force, which must be able to project into a distant theater of operations. Taken together, this means that Russia needs a modern aircraft-carrying and amphibious fleet capable of operating in the far sea against any enemy, and it also needs naval bases abroad.