GKChP - three main misconceptions about August 1991

This week we are almost close to one of the saddest and tragic "anniversaries" in the history of our Motherland - the thirtieth anniversary of the events that remained in the people's memory under the short name of the State Emergency Committee. It just so happened that those fateful days, which are separated from you and me by the standards of Big History, present moments, remained "terra incognita" for the absolute majority of our fellow citizens. No, each of them, having heard the familiar abbreviation, will, of course, remember what exactly they are talking about, and ... will begin to present the official versions of August 1991, which have a coincidence of less than 1% with their true essence and background.

This happened, no doubt, due to the fact that too many powerful people and forces, both directly and indirectly participating in the events of thirty years ago, were completely uninterested in their participation and, even more so, their true role in them became common property. That is why there are so many lies and myths around the State Emergency Committee that they not only altered or "corrected", but completely replaced the truth about it. So before moving on to a really serious conversation about those days, it is necessary to first sort out at least the most obvious lies about them.

1. GKChP was a "coup", "conspiracy", "coup d'etat"

It just so happened that the vast majority of people will most likely call the four short days that the State Committee for the State of Emergency ruled the Soviet Union as the "August putsch." Well, and add to this other unpleasant definitions given by me above. In fact, every single statement characterizing the actions of the State Emergency Committee as something illegal and illegal are absurd and legally illiterate. This is - at least ... To start here, perhaps, should be with a very clear conclusion, which was made on this issue five years ago by a person who has every right to judge him - the actual state counselor of justice Alexander Sukharev, who at one time was no one, and the Prosecutor General of the USSR. This undoubtedly highly professional lawyer is deeply convinced that the creation and activities of the GKChP were absolutely legal and legitimate, since they completely and completely fit into the framework of Article 127.7 of the Constitution of the USSR, which said who should take the reins of government in the case of the incapacity of its president. Whether this was reality in August 1991 or Gorbachev's cunning game is a topic for a completely different conversation.

The bottom line is that the creation of such a special body as the State Emergency Committee was absolutely legitimate at that moment. Conversations about a "coup" and "putsch" (well, of course - after all, the top leadership of the army and special services took part in it!) And does not stand up to criticism at all. First, in the case of those, the main thing is carried out - the seizure of power. But it was exactly that everyone who was part of the Committee already had, and in its entirety! Secondly, what kind of coup is this, if in its process not a single arrest (or physical elimination) of opponents is carried out, the system of state bodies does not ruthlessly break down, there is no change in the constitutional system, socialpolitical formations? The point is that the GKChP members were not going to destroy anything at all! On the contrary, all their actions (at least explicitly) were an attempt to save and preserve the great country. A coup or putsch organized in defense of the existing order of things is, excuse me, sheer nonsense. And here it is impossible to disagree with the same Alexander Sukharev, who believed that the conspirators who carried out anti-constitutional and illegal actions were precisely the supporters and entourage of our unforgettable "beacon of national democracy" - Boris Yeltsin. Well, he himself, of course, and in the first place.

2. The Emergency Committee was the last chance to save the Soviet Union

The formal reason that prompted the highest officials of the Soviet Union to create the State Emergency Committee is the signing of an agreement, scheduled for August 20, 1991, on the creation of a kind of quasi-formation instead of the USSR - the Union of Independent States. Even with the most ardent desire, it would have been impossible to name a freak who was supposed to be born as a result of the so-called "Novoogarev's process" as a country. It was about a kind of association, which, in the most successful scenario, could include 9 out of 15 former Soviet republics, representatives of each of which tried their best to outperform each other in ambition and the desire to cut off more "independence" for themselves. At first, according to the original intentions of the creators, it would be a "soft federation", and then a confederation of completely independent states without any centralized system of political, economic and military governing bodies. In a word, it is pure fiction, not a state. It is impossible not to mention (albeit for the thousandth time) that all these extremely dubious ideas were promoted against the will of the absolute majority of the citizens of the Soviet Union, at the referendum held in March of the same 1991, they unequivocally spoke in favor of preserving the USSR.

Yes, the plebiscite was not held in the Baltics, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova, but in many of these republics similar sentiments reigned "among the masses". And certainly the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the same Belarus and Ukraine did not feel any desire to destroy the USSR. Could the GKChP, with the proclamation of which all plans for signing a suicide treaty were covered with a basin of a known metal, become salvation for the Soviet Union? Let's be realistic - in no case. First of all, it should be mentioned that, according to the recollections of many high-ranking officials and employees of the Soviet state apparatus, real preparations for the conclusion of this agreement were curtailed, and then completely stopped long before August 18. Nobody was going to sign anything without any "emergency". The point is that in reality the USSR was finally and irrevocably ruined not in 1991, but much earlier. Gorbachev's law "On economic independence of the Baltic republics "(1988) and adopted at his own submission later on similar legislative acts" On the delimitation of powers between the center and the republics that are part of the USSR "," On the procedure for the secession of the republics from the USSR "," On the national languages ​​of the peoples of the USSR " and others like them - that's what destroyed the great power. By 1991, the process had become almost irreversible.

3. If the GKChP wins, everything would only get worse

This thesis, as a rule, is voiced by those for whom the events of August 1991 look like "an attempt at revenge by the gloomy reactionary and totalitarian forces," seeking to "stifle the seeds of democracy and deprive the peoples of the USSR of chances for freedom and a new life." Stupidity, of course, uttermost. If hardened conservatives who were eager to “turn back the wheel of history” at any cost had really united in the State Committee for the State of Emergency, they would have acted, of course, in a completely different way. The enterprise, as such, could theoretically be crowned with success. However, here we are faced with a real paradox - in order for the story of the State Emergency Committee to end not with a complete failure, but with the termination of "perestroika", which is destructive for the country, completely different people had to get down to business. Pragmatic, tough, convinced of their righteousness and believing in the ideals that they undertook to defend. And, no less important, they are not afraid to make decisions and bear responsibility for them. Including - and shedding someone's blood. But here's the trick - if there were such personalities in the highest echelons of the government and the party, the scenario, the "crown" and final of which was the proclamation of the State Emergency Committee, would simply be impossible! It would not have come to a "slide of society towards a nationwide catastrophe." No tanks on the streets and no "Swan Lake" on TV would be needed.

They would have gotten rid of Gorbachev and his accomplices much less effectively, without putting the whole country on the ears, but much more effectively. And, most importantly, much earlier. Then, when something else could really be changed and saved. Since this was not done, therefore, the GKChP should by no means be considered an attempt at "Soviet revenge." It was something different, with goals and objectives that, firstly, did not fit into the brief paragraphs of the "Statement" announced on August 18, and secondly, most likely, they were interpreted in completely different ways by all participants (both explicit and secret) of the process, which is known to us under the name of the State Emergency Committee. Proceeding from this, the very initial premise about the possibility of "victory" as such is false and erroneous in this case. There was not a single chance of such, if only due to the fact that it is still unclear what the members of the State Committee for a State of Emergency meant by such, and, most importantly, the forces behind them in reality. A thoughtful, detailed and impartial study of not only the four days of August 1991, but, above all, the events that preceded and followed them, suggests the conclusion that the game that was being played then was much more multifaceted, multilevel and confusing than this is presented by putting forward early versions and hasty hanging labels.

Public opinion polls conducted five years ago in Russia showed that at least a quarter of our compatriots still believe that with the victory of the State Emergency Committee "everything would only get worse." Someone talks about the possibility of a civil war and new, only much more fierce and bloody power struggles. Someone is frightened by the "preservation of the communist ideology" and the "Soviet way of life." However, a third of Russians still believe that in August 1991 the country “turned in the wrong direction” and took a categorically wrong path. What is most indicative is that more than 40% of the respondents said that they would not even think about repeating those events now, “to become breast for the defense of democracy” ...

Who really was supposed to become the "main beneficiary" of the State Emergency Committee and who actually became it? What combination did the domestic special services implement during the preparation of the August events, during and after them? What role did the secret services and leading Western politicians play in all this? What caused a real wave of mysterious deaths of the top leaders of the "power" departments of the USSR and high-ranking party leaders very soon after the failure of the State Emergency Committee, and why did these people die, and not any others? Whose special operation, after all, was the State Committee for the State of Emergency of the USSR? We will certainly talk about all this in detail and in detail exactly in a week - on the 30th anniversary of the fall of the State Emergency Committee.