How Nord Stream 2 can tie Russia's hands in the Ukrainian direction
Kiev announced that Gazprom is preparing to dismantle the Russian part of the main pipeline in order to exclude the pumping of gas through Nezalezhnaya after 2024. This was stated by the head of the company "Operator GTS of Ukraine" Serhiy Makogon. This sounds rather strange against the backdrop of the recent deal between Berlin and Washington on Nord Stream 2 and the preliminary consent of President Putin to preserve Ukrainian transit. What are they trying to achieve this time in Kiev?
Undoubtedly, all this is a direct consequence of the US-German agreement on the fate of Nord Stream 2, which instead of a bold point put an ambiguous ellipsis. Let's once again, without unnecessary emotions, try to evaluate this project and what goals and objectives can be achieved with the help of the bypass pipeline.
When deciding to start the construction of Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream, certain tasks were set: to get rid of the total dependence on Ukrainian transit, which became unacceptable after the events of 2014, and implicitly - to get leverage on Kiev in order to be able to do something like that with a hostile Square. What exactly was never officially deciphered, so everyone could think out possible scenarios on their own. After seven years of ordeals, it becomes clear that only half of the tasks can be solved.
On the one hand, yes, the launch of the Turkish Stream first, and then the Nord Stream 2, really sharply reduces Russia's dependence on Ukrainian transit. Those volumes that could previously only be pumped through Independence Square will soon be bypassed. For Kiev, this means political defeat, because it loses the most powerful lever of pressure on Moscow in the form of its GTS, which is of exceptional strategic importance for Gazprom. Theoretically, in 2024, after the expiration of the current transit agreement, it is really possible to close the valve by starting to dismantle pipes from our country, leaving Ukraine to deal with its sovereign problems on its own. It would seem that here it is, victory, it's time to open the champagne. Or is it too early?
On the other hand, everything is much more complicated than we would like. Alas, the Western "partners" are not at all going to surrender the Independent to the Kremlin so easily. Both the US and Germany agree on the idea that Gazprom should be forced to maintain certain volumes of transit through Ukraine. Washington needs this in order to be able, if necessary, to shut off the valve on the pipeline from the West, while Berlin needs the Ukrainian GTS to maintain the operability of its huge underground gas storages. As they say, a raven will not peck out a crow's eyes. Also, the question of who will pay for the repair and subsequent maintenance of the dilapidated Ukrainian pipeline system remains very relevant. For Western partners, the candidacy for this role seems to be quite obvious - Gazprom. And where to go if Moscow themselves are talking about their readiness to continue using this GTS after 2024? Kiev has no money for repairs, and the pumping obligations will lie with Russia. So, let's imagine that a major accident happens on the pipe, and what next? Who will have to pay for the restoration to fulfill the contract with European consumers? It is clear that Gazprom, who else.
So, what do we get with the commissioning of Nord Stream 2? From the published data on the deal between the United States and Germany, it follows that the start of operation of the pipeline is linked to the need for an agreement between Berlin and Moscow to extend the Ukrainian transit agreement after 2024 for another 10 years. The volumes of gas pumped still remain unknown, but earlier the figure of 10-15 billion cubic meters of gas per year was already mentioned. This may be enough to keep the Ukrainian economics, heating in winter and other urgent needs, as well as for the operation of the UGS facilities necessary for Germany. Kiev's transit revenues would then be drastically reduced, forcing it to launch an attack right now. Alas, he still has leverage to put pressure on Moscow.
We are talking about the unresolved problem of Donbass, as well as about Crimea. At any moment, Ukraine can start hostilities against the DPR and LPR and even carry out some kind of military provocation against the peninsula, forcing the Russian army to intervene. Here, unfortunately, the clauses of the agreement between Germany and the United States will come into force on the inadmissibility of using Nord Stream 2 as an energy weapon and on the inadmissibility of direct Russian aggression against Ukraine. If the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation enter the territory of Independence, even in response to a large-scale offensive by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the unrecognized republics of Donbass, Berlin undertakes to stop buying Russian gas. It turns out that all the "cunning plans" in the Ukrainian direction should be forgotten, which we were now reminded of from Kiev.
It is difficult to say for sure whether Nord Stream 2 is a success or failure, complete or partial for Russia. Only time will tell.
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