Is African Djibouti capable of replacing the Russian Navy's lost Port Sudan?

So, our worst assumptions began to be confirmed. With a high degree of probability, it can be argued that there will be no Russian naval base (PMTO) in Port Sudan after all. Since the change in the decision of official Khartoum is clearly traced to pressure from the United States, for the Kremlin this refusal will be a serious blow to the image. What now remains to be done, and do we really need our own naval base on the Red Sea?

The decision to establish a logistics center in Port Sudan was made last year. Its conditions were very beneficial for Moscow: over the next 25 years, Russia received a small naval base on the coast of the Red Sea, where no more than 4 warships could be simultaneously located (including those with a nuclear power plant, i.e. any of two of our TARK project "Orlan"), as well as at least three hundred servicemen to protect it. In return, Khartoum was supposed to receive a Russian military machinery and weapons, and our side undertook obligations to modernize the port and informally - to ensure security in this difficult region.



Rumors that Khartoum might change its mind emerged a month ago, when the Sudanese authorities announced the suspension of a construction agreement adopted by the previous regime. In principle, even then everything was clear, but the Russian Foreign Ministry cheered up, covering up the failure with streamlined diplomatic formulations, and in the domestic press all such reports and theories were stubbornly called “fakes”. Alas, it was not a "fake". A new introduction from Khartoum on the prospects for an agreement with Russia on the opening of a PMTO reads as follows:


At first glance, everything looks not so scary. Like, let's just offer Khartoum more, and it's in the bag. Unfortunately, in this "Sudanese auction" we cannot kill our competitors. On the other side is the United States, which firmly set out to squeeze China out of Africa and at the same time prevent Russia from gaining a foothold on its coast, the reasons for which we have in detail told a month ago. Washington has already given Sudan as much as Moscow could not have given in principle: it excluded this African country from the list of sponsors of international terrorism, helped with the repayment of the debt to the World Bank and with obtaining a new loan. US senators who visited Sudan promised to provide new tranches of financial assistance. You can, of course, try to offer more, but the US certainly has no problem printing new dollars. If necessary, they can do with offsetting at all, having achieved the repayment of part of Sudan's external debt to the Paris Club, which amounts to $ 60 billion. But is this PMTO worth it to “hack at the auction” for it with the Americans?

There will indeed be some benefit from our own naval base on the Red Sea for our Navy: ships will be able to refuel there and receive repairs, their crews will rest on the shore. There are some doubts about everything else. Usually it is customary here to poke at a map and show that sea routes pass through the Red Sea from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean and further to the Asia-Pacific region. Supposedly, having its base there, our navy could take control of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, through which hydrocarbons from the Persian Gulf countries go to the West. Sounds great, but let's be realistic. How can only four Russian ships, even if one of them be the Peter the Great TARK or the Admiral Nakhimov, with the support of 300 Spartans on the shore, can organize and ensure a similar naval blockade? The forces are too unequal with the potential adversary. How will they go to the Red Sea and then back through Suez? What degree of autonomy does our ships have? How will they be supplied after the blockade is organized? How far will Moscow be able to let one of the Orlans go there? There are many questions, but there are no adequate answers yet. This is simply unrealistic, and nothing good will end for our small Sudanese contingent.

What do we have in the bottom line. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation really would not hurt a new PMTO in this region, but precisely as a point for supply and recreation, and not a naval base, from where we could take control of some strategic straits there. To accomplish such tasks, our surface fleet and naval aviation will still grow and grow. If Khartoum chose the United States as a partner, then the Russian Navy has nothing to do in Sudan, but you can look for other, more hospitable places.

For example, a small African country Djibouti comes to mind, which has its entire the economy and external policies built on the placement of any foreign military bases for a fee. The USA, France, Italy, Japan and China officially have their representative contingents there. In addition, military personnel from Spain and Germany are stationed in one of the bases of the Fifth Republic. If everything is clear with the Europeans, then the presence of the Chinese in Africa attracts attention. Beijing opened its first naval base overseas in 2017 in Djibouti. It is located somewhat apart from the rest and can accommodate up to 10 thousand troops. After expansion, the Chinese base is even capable of receiving aircraft carriers. This is a really serious claim for control over the shipping areas between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

So why shouldn't Russia follow the example of the Celestial Empire and take on a long-term lease a piece of the rocky coast of Djibouti to open its PMTO in Africa?