To whom does Russia owe the revival of its combat fleet?

I continue a series of articles devoted to the state of affairs in our Navy (in particular, in its surface component). IN the first part we examined the claims of naval specialists to the breakthrough project of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau - a promising multipurpose attack corvette URO for the far sea zone of project 20386.

Here we will summarize and try to protect the Supreme Naval Leadership from undeserved attacks, as well as discuss some more interesting problems.

ASW problems, modernization and other global problems

We finished the last part on the problems of ASW (anti-submarine defense), and we will start with it. My opponents, as a reproach to the High Naval Command, put forward claims that the project 20386 they criticized was advancing to the detriment of the old project 20380, which could solve the long-standing problems with anti-submarines in all 4 of our fleets, caused by the exhaustion of the resource of the MPK park. (small anti-submarine ships), and this is not done for the sake of someone's selfish interests (whose exactly, I will say below), and this is, if not a crime, then a mistake.

My answer is that no one forgot the problem of ASW, and the 20380 series will be continued taking into account all the necessary upgrades and brought up to 20385 units, taking into account the project 20, which will cover the needs of ASW in the areas where our nuclear submarines are deployed. No one discounts the aging of the Project 1124M IPC fleet, which are responsible for covering the areas of alert for ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which are a critical component of the Nuclear Deterrence Forces (SNF), and in the event of a missed nuclear strike from the United States (which is impossible exclude), these submarines will be the only means of retaliation against the United States, since other components of the strategic nuclear forces risk not surviving a massive missile strike by the enemy.

Experts making claims to the Supreme Naval Command, apparently, from their captain's bridges do not see all the problems facing the Navy. They seem to forget that we are still reaping the fruits of the 90s of the last century, when we ruined and disposed of 55% of our surface fleet with our own hands, even before the end of the service life, retaining only the submarine (and even then partially). The naval design bureaus and the military shipbuilding industry only miraculously survived, thanks solely to Chinese, Indian, Vietnamese and Algerian contracts. Having succumbed to the charm and false promises of the West and lacking funds for the maintenance of the fleet (and the fleet is a very expensive pleasure!), We put ourselves in a position where every little pot-bellied thing began to talk to us through his lips, putting his dirty shoe on our throat and via policy the gunboat began to dictate their terms to us. The coming to power of Putin did not immediately, but radically changed this situation. The shoe was removed from the throat, but they still cannot believe that we are not joking. Russia has simply cyclopean difficulties in rebuilding its surface fleet (with a submarine, thank God, not everything is so bad). It was easy to fall apart, thanks to Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, it was incredibly difficult to restore. There is a sorely lack of money for everything. Therefore, we started with corvettes and RTOs, because even large numbers of frigates are beyond our means to build. But the turn will come to them, as well as to destroyers and heavy cruisers. Not immediately, of course (we cannot keep up with China in this matter).

Therefore, we are building our ships, taking into account their possible subsequent modernization. This can be seen already on a series of corvettes of projects 20380/20385/20386. The modular principle of their architecture allows, during the construction of new and modernization of existing ships, to install new systems of weapons and electronic weapons on them, which reduces production costs and provides a high modernization potential during the minimum 30-year life cycle of the ship (which is extended after overhaul). This principle was already implemented on the 20380 project, when, starting from the second building (the first serial and subsequent), changes were made to the project. Thus, the Kortik-M air defense missile system was replaced with a new medium-range Redut air defense missile system with vertical launch systems (12 cells - 3 modules of 4 cells each), and from the eighth building the 3S24 Uranus anti-ship complex will be replaced with Onyx "Or" Caliber "also with UVP - UKSK 3S14. Starting from the ninth hull, a new foremast is installed on the ships of project 20380, structurally similar to that installed on ships of project 20385. On the surface of such a structure, there will be three antenna blades of the air defense missile system. Project 20385 relative to the eighth corps of project 20380 also underwent changes that increased its armament, in addition to the UKSK 3S14 with its family of missiles for various purposes ("Caliber-NK", "Onyx", "Zircon"), it also received an additional module for 4 cells of the SAM " Redoubt ", now he has 16 of them (4 x 4 instead of 3 x 4 on the project 20380). As a result, the corvettes of this family have turned out to be the most innovative and technically advanced ships of our Navy. The modular principle has turned them into a kind of transformer ships, when each subsequent ship may differ from the previous one, depending on the tasks facing it.

Brief Summary

If we summarize the claims of military experts to the ill-fated project 20386, which they characterize as a concentration of many absurdities with the prefixes "over-", "under-" and "over-", then they boil down to the following: 1) oversize (3400 tons full.) ; 2) under-equipment (standard anti-ship missile system - "Uranus", weak hydroacoustics); 3) "overload" of the precious impenetrable volume of the hull by the under-deck helicopter hangar; 4) overcomplicated main power plant ("with partial electromotion"); 5) excessive cost of construction (close to the cost of the frigate pr. 22350); 6) excessive cost and complexity of operation (associated with the maintenance of additional modules with service personnel); 7) extreme ugliness of appearance; 8) overload with innovations, the percentage of which makes the launch of the project in series before the completion of comprehensive tests and pilot operation of the lead ship a pure adventure.

I tried to partially answer all these questions and close some of the claims. Regarding the ugliness of the project 20386, you know, this is not for everybody (for me, the American new destroyer "Zumwalt" is a handsome man). The rest of the claims will be closed by the operation and service and combat activities of the prototype, which is now only preparing for launching (scheduled for May 2021), and will be able to join the Federation Council only by the end of 2022 (if all goes well, the transfer to the customer is scheduled for December) ... The fact that my personal private opinion coincides with the opinion of the Supreme leadership of the Russian Navy was directly confirmed by Rear Admiral Vladimir Tryapichnikov, Head of the Department of Shipbuilding, Armament and Operation of the Navy, who back in May 2019 at the ceremony of launching the minesweeper "Vladimir Yemelyanov" of the project 12700 (code "Alexandrite") officially announced that the corvettes of the project 20386 will be able to fully replace the frigates of the project 11356 as part of the Russian Navy.

Most of the military experts who criticize the Supreme Naval Leadership repeat the well-known mistake of the battalion commander criticizing the front commander for his erroneous and even criminal, from the battalion's point of view, actions, because the whole picture of the battle is not visible from their captain's bridges. From their point of view, the commander of a fleet or squadron makes a mistake, but they absolutely do not have control of the general situation, not only in the entire World geopolitical ocean, but even in one separate water area, in one single theater of operations (it is not always visible from the trench on the front end) what is visible from the command post of the front commander). Below we will talk about the theater, the very one - of military operations and analyze the "mistakes" of the Commander-in-Chief.

Revival of the domestic fleet

As I said above, in the 90s, our Navy (especially its surface part) was slowly dying. The ships were scrapped, without even waiting for the end of their service life, some of the mortgaged hulls were cut into metal right on the stocks. We reaped the fruits of the reign of the unforgettable Boris Nikolayevich and his flirtation with the West. Then the majority of naval design bureaus due to the lack of state. funding and government orders, so as not to starve to death, they were forced to reorient themselves to the foreign market and thanks to foreign orders they were able to survive and preserve the main thing - the design core of their labor collectives. Therefore, it was at that time that many projects of ships and boats appeared, specially designed for delivery outside the Russian Federation (mainly ships of the 2nd, 3rd and even 4th rank).

It was these promising developments that served as the basis for creating a corvette project, or then it was called a small patrol ship BMZ (near sea zone), a tender for which was announced by the Ministry of Defense for the needs of the Navy. This became the point of revival of our surface naval forces (we still somehow supported the strategic submarine during the EBN). It was 1999, you remember who came to power in the Kremlin.

The leading design bureaus of Russia took part in the competition. As a result of the competitive consideration of the works, the Almaz TsMKB (General Director / General Designer A. A. Shlyakhtenko) was recognized as the winner of the tender, which proposed 7 options for solving the task at once for consideration by the commission. So in 2001, our first surface ship appeared for the needs of the Russian Navy. It was the same corvette of Project 20380. The first ship specially designed and designed to meet the new tasks set for the Russian Navy by the new political leadership of the country, who replaced the tired Yeltsin. From that moment, according to experts, in fact, the revival of the Russian fleet began, and the corvette became the first ship of the 4th generation maritime zone. Now this is already a series of ships of 29 units, of which 8 are already in service, 5 are under construction and another 16 have been contracted for construction in the coming years by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. As a result, by 2028, the corvettes of Project 20380 and its logical continuation of Project 20385 will become the most massive Russian surface warships, the backbone around which our Navy will be built.

Construction wars for access to cut the budget

Therefore, when in 2013 the task of designing a new multipurpose attack corvette of the far sea zone for the needs of the fleet arose, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation did not even announce an open tender, but immediately gave a solution to this issue to the Almaz Central Design Bureau in order to save money and unify the product with previously created corvettes of projects 20380/20385 (which “Almaz” and its competitors cannot forgive). We are talking, as you understand, about the ill-fated project 20386, about which so many copies have already been broken.

But the customer also presented the requirements for the product to the maximum. The combat functions assigned to it are impressive even for hardened Moremans. According to the prescribed TK, the corvette was supposed to successfully resist the enemy at close and distant approaches to the sea borders of our country, perform shock, escort, military-police and patrol functions, solve air defense and anti-aircraft defense missions, and also provide fire cover for the landing force when landing. We can say that the designers were tasked with integrating into one project the capabilities inherent in ships of different classes, namely: 1) protection of sea communications within a 200-mile economic zones; 2) counteraction to ships of a potential enemy at any distance from the bases of the fleet; 3) ensuring stable air defense of ship formations against strikes by air attack means; 4) search, detection and destruction of submarines in a given area; 5) providing air defense and fire support for amphibious operations.

The task was to create a combat ship with high striking power and at the same time capable of performing patrol and military-police functions. The developers completed the task and even exceeded it (more here). If until recently the Russian Navy maintained the tradition of building different types of ships designed to solve similar tasks, then the designers of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau this time went from the opposite - they created a universal ship that could solve diverse tasks on a single platform. Time will tell whether he will go beyond the small series.

And what did the offended competitors offer? And competitors who were late for the distribution of state orders, but did not accept this state of affairs, continued to overwhelm the Ministry of Defense with their proposals, doomedly realizing that if the decision had already been made and the palm had already been given to the Almaz Central Design Bureau, then, following the principles of unification of the production of manufactured products, they will most likely be refused. But he who does not take risks does not drink champagne! Moreover, the initiative is not punishable.

What exactly the competitors offered, and how it all ended for them, you will already find out in the next part. Do not miss. Not saying goodbye.
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  1. Termit1309 Online Termit1309
    Termit1309 (Alexander) April 11 2021 11: 03
    If we summarize the claims of military experts to the ill-fated project 20386, which they describe as the concentration of many absurdities with the prefixes "over-", "under-" and "over-",
    Well, at least the project 22160 lagged behind. Another bone was thrown ... laughing
  2. Sergey Latyshev (Serge) April 11 2021 17: 35
    Nothing, time will tell.
    But that the author of the whole article teaches captains to live, it reads ridiculously ...
    "because from their captain's bridges you can't see the whole picture of the battle" ...
    1. Volkonsky Offline Volkonsky
      Volkonsky (Wolf) April 11 2021 20: 16
      how else to call things when the captri argues with the vice admiral and says that the vice admiral is wrong? (I hope it's clear that I'm not talking about myself). When a major teaches the life of a colonel-general, doubt creeps in that one can see better from his captain's bridge than from the bridge of the Main Staff of the Navy
      1. Sapsan136 Offline Sapsan136
        Sapsan136 (Sapsan136) April 11 2021 22: 32
        Admirals are different. The same Rozhdestvensky distinguished himself only by writing libels on his commander, bribery, licking ass at the court of the king and rudeness in dealing with subordinates. The Bolsheviks came to power and began to lick their asses ...
        1. Volkonsky Offline Volkonsky
          Volkonsky (Wolf) April 11 2021 23: 20
          is that the one that Tsushima lost? well, you remembered!
          1. Sapsan136 Offline Sapsan136
            Sapsan136 (Sapsan136) April 11 2021 23: 43
            He is. Yes, he was not a combat officer at all, but he became an admiral, and this is not the only example of when mediocrity and an impaired insignificance are listed as the chief.

            By the way, your trough 20386 was lowered into the water so that the slipway would not take up. There are no motors for it, no gearboxes, the project itself sucks and it is not a fact that it will be completed. To put motors on it, you need to delay the commissioning of frigate 22350, and they are much more valuable and priority units than 20386
            1. Volkonsky Offline Volkonsky
              Volkonsky (Wolf) April 11 2021 23: 49
              peregrine falcon, do not disgrace yourself!
              Another M90FR engine (KGA - MA3), according to Mil.Press FlotProm, is being manufactured at Saturn for the head corvette “Daring” (project 20386, displacement 3 tons), which is being built there at the “Severnaya Verf” (St. Petersburg). However, tests of Russian gas turbine engines on warships will not begin until 400-2020. While there are bench tests of the M2022FR. If everything goes according to plan, then the third and fourth frigates of Project 90, Admiral Golovko and Admiral Isakov, will be handed over to the fleet in 22350 and 2021, respectively. Corvette "Daring" is planned to be handed over at the turn of 2022-2021 (laid down on September 22, 28).

              For those who are not in the know, I will remind the ship's power plant is a combined gas turbine unit with partial electric propulsion as part of two M90FR gas turbine engines with a capacity of 27500 hp. (made by NPO "ODK-Saturn") and two electric motors ADR-1600V with a capacity of 2200 hp. (manufactured by JSC Power Machines), which transmit torque to two shafts and two variable pitch propellers (CPP) through the 6РП gear unit and the inter-gear transmission (manufactured by PJSC Zvezda).

              For some reason, our experts did not note the fact that variable pitch propellers (CPP) were installed on project 20386, while fixed pitch propellers (CPP) were installed on projects 20380/20385. Knowledgeable people will understand what this gives the ship. And what choice did the designers have? The dimensions and displacement of the ship increased, the mass also increased, and the old Kolomna diesel engines, standing on the previous projects 20380/20385, could no longer cope with the increased requirements to maintain the required speed of the ship, the experts proposed to force them. But for the project 20385, the Kolomna diesel engine was already forced. Its capabilities have been exhausted, Kolomchan then needed to create a new, more powerful diesel engine. This also takes time. The developers went the other way - they put on the ship a Rybinsk-made gas turbine M90FR, which UEC-Saturn developed for heavy frigates of Project 22350 (especially for the newly built Mercury of Project 20386 shifted to the right of all "admirals" of project 22350, except for "Admiral Golovko", which received its gas turbine engines from Rybinsky in the first place - in December 2020). What's a bad decision? And why not try it out on a prototype before putting it into production?

              Especially for you highlighted in bold!
              1. The comment was deleted.
              2. Sapsan136 Offline Sapsan136
                Sapsan136 (Sapsan136) April 12 2021 11: 37
                Today in the Russian Federation only one machine set can be produced per unit of time (turbines + gearboxes) and either it will be an engine + gearboxes for frigate 22350, or for the misunderstanding of 20386, which is worthless ... Screws can also be put on 20385, there is no need for this gardening ... In Kolomna they made DDA-12000, it no longer burns, as on the head one and is quite reliable ... But at 20385 there is a helicopter on an ongoing basis, and from 20386 it will have to be removed in order to install some modules, for example, under 4 Caliber missiles, and without a helicopter this trough is only suitable for drinking with girls, but not for the military ... If you need to cut money, then patrolmen like Bulls and 20386 are the best, but they are not suitable for equipping the fleet.
                1. Volkonsky Offline Volkonsky
                  Volkonsky (Wolf) April 12 2021 13: 18
                  I will tell you a big secret to the DDA-12000 unit for more than 20 years, and about the helicopter, who told you that it would not be there? Klimov 2534, but he then judges Toko by drawings, in his eyes he did not see 20386 alive
                  1. Sapsan136 Offline Sapsan136
                    Sapsan136 (Sapsan136) April 12 2021 15: 56
                    Write less and read more, then you will know that the modules on your favorite trough 20386 can only be received through the helicopter underdeck hangar, and they can be placed either instead of a helicopter or on the site of the turntable necessary for takeoff. And without a turntable on this trough, only the girls from the house of tolerance will not be able to ride for more. Yes, and DDA-12000 was created not so long ago, on the head 20380 there is a slightly different diesel installation, less perfect, from that there were fires ... And 20386 is not alive in nature, therefore no one has seen it, but there are schemes, according to which it is being built and there it is clear what and how ...
      2. Sergey Latyshev (Serge) April 11 2021 23: 26
        Deval in detail, as they say.
        You can focus on some distant majors.
        Or you can teach captains to sail the seas en masse ...
        1. Volkonsky Offline Volkonsky
          Volkonsky (Wolf) April 11 2021 23: 42
          Comrade land sailor, do you essentially have something to object? who here teaches whom to swim? the more that they walk the seas! a known substance is floating in the hole!
  3. Dukhskrepny Offline Dukhskrepny
    Dukhskrepny (Vasya) April 11 2021 20: 09
    Camrani and Lourdes were abandoned already under EBN's student -Putin. I remember the Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin said that now all intelligence can be obtained from satellites and the need for the Lourdes intelligence center in Cuba has disappeared. Now there is China, which apparently does not think so. remember that under Putin, the army and the navy also "got it." This began to reach only after the 2008 war. Yes, even Taburetkin frolicked
    1. Volkonsky Offline Volkonsky
      Volkonsky (Wolf) April 11 2021 23: 18
      China on Lourdes? maybe he doesn't have a low-orbit constellation of spy satellites?
      1. Dukhskrepny Offline Dukhskrepny
        Dukhskrepny (Vasya) April 13 2021 17: 46
        Aha. China has not yet had Eltsin and does not have Putin. There is now a Chinese intelligence center in Cuba.
  4. gorenina91 Offline gorenina91
    gorenina91 (Irina) April 11 2021 20: 34
    To whom does Russia owe the revival of its combat fleet?

    - It's strange; and what ... - the Russian combat fleet (as well as the civilian cargo fleet) has already been revived ??? - It remains only to find the one who carried out this "revival" and thank him for it ...
    1. The comment was deleted.
  5. unholyknight Offline unholyknight
    unholyknight (UnhloyKnight) April 11 2021 22: 14
    And I'm afraid a "torpedo" will come and it will explode under the chair again. Why are you doing this, the author?
    1. Volkonsky Offline Volkonsky
      Volkonsky (Wolf) April 11 2021 23: 17
      to be afraid of torpedoes - do not go to sea (you also know about wolves and the forest, and I am a Wolf!)
      1. The comment was deleted.
  6. Jacques sekavar Offline Jacques sekavar
    Jacques sekavar (Jacques Sekavar) April 12 2021 13: 04
    To whom does Russia owe the revival?

    V.V. Putin.
  7. updidi Offline updidi
    updidi (Alexander Kazakov) April 12 2021 18: 36
    What kind of revival of the Russian fleet can go if warships are built and put into operation sometimes for 12 years. And as you know, we are not talking about aircraft carriers